Humanitarian corridors: An ideal solution or a mere illusion?
As Bangladesh weighs a UN-proposed corridor to Rakhine, can such fragile pacts ever balance aid delivery with security risks?

Let's start with spitting a simple fact: International Humanitarian Law (IHL) does not explicitly mention 'humanitarian corridors.' Then the question arises: How and on what basis do international fora and national parties in conflict deploy or initiate humanitarian corridors during kinetic or civil wars? The answer is, although the exact concept of humanitarian corridors is not included in IHL, it is based on the provision of free passage stipulated in the Geneva conventions and its additional protocols.
To plain eyes, the term seems to have a direct link to humanitarian activity, but in reality, it is rather a military operation enforced by military means (but with a humanitarian label).
The use of protected passages for humanitarian purposes is not a new phenomenon. In fact, humanitarian corridors have been employed since the early 20th century and go back to the Spanish Civil War in 1936. They have since been used in numerous conflicts, including World War II; the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the conflict in Syria; more recently in Ukraine; and Gaza.
The reason humanitarian corridors (also known as relief corridors or safe passages) are not referred to in relevant IHL treaty provisions is that if the respective law of armed conflict were respected by parties/nations in conflict, there would be no need for such operations. Therefore, such safe corridors are considered the very last resort against massive rights violations of civilians when no other possible intervention could be envisaged.
Theoretically (and also in practice), humanitarian corridors in essence have three significant characteristics: agreement between the parties, limited scope (functional for a limited amount of time and only consisting of a limited geographical area), and a neutral third party.
As humanitarian corridors consist of agreements between parties to the conflict (State entities and/or armed groups), often mutual respect for the terms of the agreements or impartiality are hard to find. What is more, despite consenting to the humanitarian corridor, civilian protection therein is never totally guaranteed by the parties.
Indeed, recent history teaches us that it would be a mistake to place too much hope in a temporary and restricted right of 'safe' passage, the respect of which is subject to the questionable goodwill of the parties to the conflict.
With regard to the corridors established in Aleppo, though the Syrian and Russian Governments announced that these routes were being used by civilians, they were reported on the proposed routes, with residents of Aleppo terming the passages 'corridors of death'. Although various sources reported that the hundreds of people did leave through the corridors; others state they were largely unused, as people did not trust that they would be able to travel through it. The promised delivery of aid was also not done.
According to Basma Kodmani, member of the opposition, the corridors, despite claims to the contrary, were only to drive people out, not bring aid in. This concern led forty humanitarian organisations to adopt a joint statement in 2016 that considered them "deeply flawed on humanitarian grounds" in the context of the siege of Aleppo in Syria.
Similar patterns were noticeable in cases of humanitarian corridors in the Tigray region of Ethiopia. In the case of Ukraine, Françoise Duroch, head of the Research Unit on Humanitarian Stakes and Practices (UREPH) at MSF Switzerland and Maelle L'Homme considered them to give the "illusion of an ideal solution".
It is obviously not to imply that all the humanitarian corridors failed to serve their purpose; many, indeed, worked under hostile environments and served as a passage for people to leave the atrocities and to deliver emergency supplies, aid, etc, despite the risks and blockades, but ironically, they functioned on an oscillating basis.
Other than the technical glitches, what I find problematic with humanitarian corridors is that intrinsically it somehow implies that the commitment to save human lives and non-harm to civilians does not apply outside the assigned space or time. So, the question must be who decides, and on what basis, the demarcation of the corridor, the exact date and time of its expiry, and what happens to the people who choose not to use it? The right of people to flee an area of armed conflict only makes sense if unhindered access for humanitarian organisations is guaranteed to assist those who were unable or unwilling to flee.
Recently, it was announced that the interim government of Bangladesh has agreed in principle to allow a humanitarian corridor with Myanmar's Rakhine state under UN supervision with certain conditions.
Myanmar's junta government has blocked all supplies to corner the Arakan Army rebel group in Rakhine state, which has worsened the humanitarian crisis further. With the situation, the UN fears famine in Rakhine and asked Bangladesh to provide a corridor to deliver humanitarian aid. While on humanitarian grounds it seems like the right and humane thing to do, this move has also sparked debates.
As the region is known for many (documented and undocumented) cross-border crimes, many people fear that when such corridors are opened, criminals, including rebels or terrorist groups in the region, have the opportunity to use them as a safe route for drugs and arms trafficking.
Moreover, before agreeing to make such a bold move, it was neither consulted with political leaders nor with the Rohingya population. As there exist a plethora of precedents where such moves to establish a safe passage have backfired, this time, as it was the UN which proposed it, will the UN take responsibility if tension between Bangladesh and Myanmar escalates? Who is there to guarantee that the Arakan Army and Myanmar's junta government will respect the conditions of the agreements?
As we speak, there are 13 lakh refugees in Bangladesh at the moment. Is Bangladesh infrastructurally and financially ready to take more without ensuring conditions for Rohingya repatriation?
One can say that each case is different and reaches various degrees of effectiveness in terms of the provision of aid to beneficiaries. Of course, when effective and well thought out (with strict monitoring mechanisms), humanitarian corridors can facilitate much-needed aid to beneficiaries, but we also need to realise that conflicting parties have a unique influence. Their utmost cooperation is needed for the corridor to be successful, because if not, then they also have the ability to render a corridor unusable and make situations worse.

S Arzooman Chowdhury is an Alumna at the University of Cambridge and a Human Rights and Research Specialist.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and views of The Business Standard.