Humanitarian aid corridor to Rakhine: What would it mean for Bangladesh?

Sketch: TBS

Recent reports citing policy-level sources suggested that Bangladesh had agreed in principle to a UN-supervised humanitarian corridor to deliver aid to Myanmar's conflict-ridden Rakhine State. The foreign adviser to the government appeared to confirm this in comments to the press. However, the Chief Adviser's Press Secretary Shafiqul Alam on 29 April categorically refuted the claim, stating that no such decision has been made.

However, the reports and accompanying statements have already sparked debate. BNP has warned that such a move could push Bangladesh into a situation resembling Gaza, cautioning against decisions that could jeopardise national security. Experts have also raised concerns about the legitimacy of such a decision by an interim government and the risks it may pose in terms of regional diplomacy and internal stability.

In the meantime, although it was announced in early April that the Myanmar government had agreed to take back 180,000 Rohingyas from Bangladesh, there has been no further development or clarification on the matter. On the contrary, recent reports indicate that between November 2023 and now, approximately 113,000 Rohingyas have entered Bangladesh.

The Business Standard spoke with experts to explore the challenges, opportunities, and concerns surrounding a potential corridor, as well as the broader Rohingya crisis in Bangladesh.

Sketch: TBS

Not just a humanitarian issue, there are also security and logistical issues

Humayun Kabir

Diplomat

This is a new experience for us, with massive implications. Those with direct interests in Rakhine would obviously like to know our plans. They will analyse it depending on their priorities. In this case, China and India might be curious to know. 

The Myanmar government should know exactly what the modalities of this decision are. Multiple stakeholders beyond Bangladesh will be interested in this.

This is happening across our border, so if the situation worsens in Rakhine, more Rohingyas could come straight into Bangladesh, but that does not go well with our national interests. So, any effort that helps us avoid that is positive. 

Furthermore, the UN has agreed to help us. We cannot mobilise the resources we need to do this ourselves. So, the support of the UN means the international community is showing interest, which is a positive thing. 

If Bangladesh and the UN work together, Bangladesh will have its say. My sense is that, as the Foreign Adviser has indicated, Bangladesh has expressed its preference in regards to the operation. 

The UN will only possibly arrange the humanitarian support element, and those could be stored here in Bangladesh and passed to the Rakhine side. Bangladesh would be involved in every stage of the process, because this is not just a humanitarian issue, but there are also security issues and logistical issues.

If you look at our Rohingya camps, there are issues with the law and other problems on our side. But if you look at the Rakhine side, it's a warzone. Then there is the Arakan Army that is controlling that side. We do not know exactly what their government's capabilities are. So, we could face problems from people on the other side. 

Then the issue of distribution comes in. This is for the distressed Rohingya community in Rakhine. So, we must ensure that these supplies reach those who need it, and there could be problems with that. In these kinds of situations, those who hold ground tend to swipe parts of the supply. We would have to make sure the aid reaches the intended people.

However, Bangladesh should have consulted relevant political parties before agreeing to this in principle. Anything that has national implications, it is best to consult the relevant stakeholders.  Conceptually, this is a problem because it sounds like the political parties have not been consulted. The interim government, by definition, is temporary. 

Once the next government comes into picture, they have the right to either continue or suspend the programme. If they had been brought into the fold early on, then there could be the possibility that they would be under a kind of commitment to continue. But if they aren't consulted, they could just suspend it. This is why it is required to get consensus. It ensures greater sustainability of the programme.

I do not, however, think that this decision could lead to Bangladesh having to host more Rohingyas. We are not interested in that at all. We want them to go back as soon as possible. Regardless of what happens, we have made our position very clear. Our position is that Rohingyas need to go back with dignity and in a sustainable manner. We want the situation to stabilise in Rakhine so that they can go back.

Humayun Kabir is a former ambassador of Bangladesh to the United States. TBS' Alhan Arsal spoke to him over the phone.

Sketch: TBS

Consent of political parties needed for such a move

Altaf Parvez

Researcher and Author

A significant development has drawn increased international attention to Bangladesh's southern frontier. The government is considering a UN-proposed "humanitarian corridor" for delivering emergency supplies to Rakhine (formerly Arakan) and this has already made international headlines.

But there remain some critical questions. 

Firstly, what is Bangladesh getting in exchange for offering this facility to Arakan? What are the conditions being set? To what extent is the political sphere in Bangladesh informed about these terms? These are pertinent concerns. It is also essential to involve Rohingya leadership in this process.

It is already evident that 80–90% of Arakan is currently under the control of the Arakan Army. Notably, the more control they gain, the more the influx of Rohingyas into Bangladesh continues — something clearly reflected in reports by Daily Samakal, which confirm that new arrivals occur daily. 

In this context, the safety of Rohingyas in Arakan and the conditions for their repatriation should logically be Bangladesh's primary preconditions for permitting the humanitarian corridor. However, the sincerity with which the Arakan Army will agree to such terms remains questionable. There is significant anti-Rohingya sentiment among the Rakhine population.

Another crucial question is whether representatives from both Rakhine and Rohingya communities will be involved in the handover and distribution of humanitarian aid inside Arakan. The Bangladesh government must surely raise this issue with the United Nations. Handing over all relief supplies solely to the Rakhines would be unjust. 

Moreover, transferring goods through such a corridor would also require the approval of the Naypyidaw government, since ensuring the corridor's security is imperative. Given the ongoing conflict between the Myanmar government and the Arakan Army, the presence of a third-party guarantor — someone acceptable to all sides in Myanmar — would be essential for the corridor's viability. Bangladesh and the United Nations must hold special consultations with China regarding this matter.

There are also serious security concerns. Even though it is being framed as a humanitarian corridor, it is closely related to Bangladesh's national security. Critical questions remain. Like, who will be in charge of the security of the corridor? Will it be Bangladesh or the UN or another nation? Will regional powers like India and China agree to a UN-managed presence in the Bay of Bengal? Will it be declared a no-fly zone? If someone violates these provisions, who will be held accountable? Until and unless these questions are addressed and all stakeholders agree on the terms, the initiative raises major security concerns for Bangladesh.

There may also be confusion surrounding whether the humanitarian corridor would be placed under a "no-fly zone" and whether its overall management would be entrusted to Bangladesh. These are all relevant issues. 

Furthermore, the consent of Bangladesh's political parties is also needed for such a move. Although the current government is popular, it is an unelected and interim administration. An interstate corridor is an extremely sensitive matter, involving both military and security implications. Historically, "humanitarian aid" in conflict zones often ends up carrying military significance.

Therefore, unless Bangladesh's interests and security are firmly ensured, such a proposed initiative will not be sustainable in the long run. Given the current absence of a functioning parliament, any decisions regarding the corridor must be made in consultation with, and with the consensus of, the major political parties in the country.

Altaf Parvez is a researcher of South and Southeast Asian history and politics. TBS' Anonno Afroz spoke to him over the phone.

Sketch: TBS

Such corridors often become home to criminal activity, foreign military presence

Dr Mubashar Hasan

Post Doctoral Fellow, University of Oslo

As far as I understand, there are a few key points in this whole discussion.

Firstly, it is about the premise. The interim government is considering the issue, but this is subject to further clarification and discussion. At the same time we should note that while this would be the first official corridor if everything works out, Teknaf has been previously used twice unofficially as a corridor, so this is more like a formalisation of an informal experiment.

The second point is the process. This is where the interim government's decision is becoming questionable. The decision did not involve discussions with other political parties. Furthermore, the foreign adviser said that there were other conditions to acceptance which would not be discussed with journalists at this time. 

So, in a way it's an informal consensus, not involving historically important stakeholders like the military, BNP and Jamaat. Since they were not informed, the process has gaps. Additionally, the foreign adviser is not someone who is a formal representative of the people, so he does not have the legitimacy to say that the government will not discuss anything. It is a questionable process, but I do understand that there is a need.

The third key point is the problems that may arise. The understanding for doing this is that it is going to help people who are in need. If I understand correctly, the corridor has to be made because supplies to Rakhine have been closed off. If Bangladesh does not do anything, there will be an influx of Rohingyas to the country. That is the nature of conflict.

If you look at Ukraine or  Palestine, people leave during a conflict. We do not want more refugees coming into the country. Since Bangladesh is the next neighbour, there will be a new influx of refugees if the conflict worsens. The government thinks this corridor may act as a deterrent to minimise that risk. 

However, there are security implications to this move. In every part of the world that has had a corridor like this,  there has been an increase in criminal activity, arms smuggling etc. It may also open up spaces for foreign military presence. The most logical deduction is that the foreign presence could be UN Peacekeepers. If the Bangladeshi military gets engaged, it could start conflict between two countries.

It should also be underpinned that there must be engagements with the Tatmadaw, the Burmese military, if you want to create this corridor. The way a corridor works is that it would officially not be under conflict; it would be beyond the reach of conflict. So, you cannot create a corridor without agreements with foreign militaries. 

We should also be looking at alternative options, because this is generally not good news for Bangladesh. There has to be proper conditions for taking in refugees, which we do not have. It is a long shot, but with the UN involved, perhaps the government can use them to diplomatically engage with other countries to take in more Rohingyas. 

Lastly, I must urge the country to tread very carefully. This is a really complex problem. Bangladesh is not dealing with a normal state. We are dealing with an authoritarian government that operates like a mafia. It's a syndicate over there. Rakhine is becoming more like Gaza. In light of this, we all need to establish unity, and that is where the government should have done better.

Dr Mubashar Hasan is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Oslo. TBS' Alhan Arsal spoke to him over the phone.

Sketch: TBS

Decision of providing a corridor lacks political legitimacy, people's mandate

Saimum Parvez

Researcher

The plan of providing a humanitarian corridor by the interim government of Bangladesh lacks political legitimacy and people's mandate. 

Any issue related to national security and sovereignty of a country, especially if it involves using and providing lands to foreign entities, irrespective of the purpose, is a matter of national security and should be approved by an elected parliament. 

In absence of the parliament, the interim government of Bangladesh, should have at least discussed the issue with the political parties and relevant stakeholders to take a participatory approach. 

The government's unilateral and somewhat abrupt decision-making is questionable and lacks political legitimacy. 

In association and support of the international partners, the interim government should take a pragmatic and diplomatic approach that would allow peaceful resolution of the crisis.

Dr Saimum Parvez is a Senior Researcher at MF Norwegian School of Theology, Religion and Society. 

Sketch: TBS

Humanity without accountability can turn into national liability

Shariful Hasan 

Migration Expert

There are questions that arise from this decision. Do the political parties agree on this? Has the government verified whether the common people of this country are behind such a decision? Can an interim government take such an important decision like a corridor without national consensus?

Another question is, how will the goods that will pass through this corridor be verified and selected? If the humanitarian corridor is opened, I also want to know whether the Arakan Army, rebels or any other group or criminals will take the opportunity to use it as a safe route. If so, what should we do?

Will the UN or any international community take back the Rohingyas in exchange for providing this humanitarian corridor? I understand that this corridor is thinking about the people living in Rakhine. But under what conditions are we providing the corridor? Do the Arakan Army and the Myanmar military junta have the same position on this issue?

Well, India, China, Thailand, and Laos also have borders with Myanmar. Have these countries been proposed to make humanitarian corridors? Or will only Bangladesh make a corridor?

Look, I have no objection to being humanitarian. But if you look closely, you will see that we have given shelter to over a million Rohingyas considering humanitarian aspects, but have we been able to send back even one? If not, why? What did the UN do then?

Think about it. The number of Rohingyas registered in the 33 refugee camps in Ukhia and Teknaf is now around 1.2 million. Of these, 500,000 are children aged six to 14 years in the refugee camps. Every year, 30,000 new children are added to the camps. Marriages are also happening widely. What is their future?

A few days ago, the interim government said that it would send back 180,000 Rohingyas, so how did we get another 100,000 Rohingyas? Do the people of Bangladesh agree to give shelter to the Rohingyas again? 

Can we tell the UN that in exchange for providing a humanitarian corridor, the Rohingyas will have to be sent back after a year or two? If they are not sent, what will the UN do?

See, I have been to the region of Rakhine myself. I have worked with Rohingyas not only in Bangladesh but also in Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia. As well as knowing their plight, I have also reported on various crimes from Myanmar, starting with yaba smuggling and human trafficking. I understand a little bit about the behaviour of the Rohingyas and the behaviour of the Myanmar government. Considering that, my question is, are we not creating any new dangers?

I always fear that the weak role of the international community, including the UN and China, may mean that the Rohingyas may never be sent back to Myanmar. What will happen in that case? I hope the government will consider the issues.

The interim government is working for a national consensus on various issues. I request them to establish a national consensus on the Rohingyas. I would like to know from all the political parties in this country what the position of the common people of Bangladesh is on the Rohingyas. I would like to know whether a corridor will be provided or not. If so, on what conditions? How will criminal activities be controlled? Is there any example of a corridor in any country in the world where there have been no problems?

Every citizen of this country has the right to get answers to these questions. How does the government decide to provide a corridor without answering these questions? Under what law? I would like to tell the government, don't do something that will become a thorn in the side of Bangladesh.

BNP's comments about the fear that this could lead to Bangladesh becoming Gaza is quite a powerful statement. If I understand Mirza Fakhrul correctly, he was trying to convey that there was a time when refugees went to Palestine to settle there, and now they have become the state of Israel, waging war on the native population. And now there are discussions of needing a corridor to aid the people of Gaza. This is a powerful and relevant point.

I hope the policymakers will think about these issues. I hope they remember that Bangladesh comes first! You see, even if there are differences of opinion on various issues, everyone has to come together for the sake of the country. 

Shariful Hasan is an Associate Director at BRAC and heads its Migration Programme. TBS' Alhan Arsal spoke to him over the phone.