Odds favour election in February 2026
Having an election in February 2026 is now the optimal path for all political actors in play. Convergence on the least common denominator of unresolved issues is in the self-interest of the political contestants.
Bangladesh is undergoing a rare political transition. This process is not just about choosing leaders but also retrofitting governance – an episode with few historical parallels. Having an election in February 2026 is now the optimal path for all political actors in play. Convergence on the least common denominator of unresolved issues is in the self-interest of the political contestants.
What follows is a strategic reading of incentives, constraints, and signalling behaviour in the discourse on election. It draws on basic game-theoretic logic – how actors adjust their moves based on what others are likely to do, and how credibility, timing, and coordination shape outcomes. This lens helps explain why participation in election, not abstention, has become the dominant strategy, and why attempts to derail the process – though persistent – may be containable.
Political incentives
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Let's start with the political parties.
If BNP's rivals choose to participate in the election, BNP has little choice but to compete as well; otherwise, it risks becoming marginalised. On the other hand, if the rivals decide to abstain, BNP automatically gains the political space left behind. In both scenarios, sitting out is no longer optimal. The same reasoning holds true for Jamaat and NCP: if their competitors enter the race, they must also participate to avoid losing relevance, but if their competitors stay out, they have an opportunity to fill the resulting void. As in physics, emptiness is never truly empty in politics.
The incentives are clear. No party wants to be left out of a race that others are running. This convergence is already visible in political behaviour. BNP's nomination rollout is a strategic signal. Jamaat and NCP are not too far behind. Smaller parties are aligning swiftly with the nomination and coalition momentum, signalling readiness to contest.
Adhering to the electoral timeline is in the strategic interest of the political parties. Delay risks dilution of momentum, unity, and public patience. Will spoilers regroup, the rules change, and the interim government lose resolve? Delay is corrosive.
The threats of street protests and institutional blame by top of the rank parties are tactical postures in a high-stakes negotiation. They are calculated signals designed to mobilise their base, gain leverage in shaping the rules of the transition and even appeal to the politically orphaned voters. These tactical postures are proof that the parties believe the election train has departed, and they are negotiating from within.
The process is complex, unfolding through several critical decision points – most notably, when and how to hold the referendum and implement the July Charter. The risks of breaking ranks have grown, while the benefits of staying in the process are more apparent than ever. Much like the classic "Battle of the Sexes" scenario in game theory – where participants may have different preferences but ultimately benefit from acting together – unity on election yields more than division.
Potential aggression from the fallen
The fallen regime is seeking to re-enter the political arena riding on the "inclusion" narrative to transform its reputation from former despot to a political victim. Their approach relies on creating disruption and spreading fear by undermining electoral institutions, pressuring officials, exploiting international concerns, and using inflammatory actions. They pose a nontrivial threat capable of derailing the political process.
But this isn't a "Game of Chicken". Unlike that classic scenario, there is no single road where every side must either swerve or crash. There is a corridor where the opponents of the fallen, who currently hold the political levers, can live and let live with each other. Together they have the capacity to manage the consequences or simply maintain their direction without being forced off track by provocations from the fallen.
The forces seeking to knock the election train off track, hoping instability will open doors for infiltration, may stir turbulence but are unlikely to prevail. Public patience for turmoil is low, with institutions and elites in business and citizens' platforms largely playing along. Beyond fearing instability, the international community actively prioritises electoral continuity as a stabilising force.
Hence, while the possibility of disruption – and even literal "explosions" – exists, its impact is likely to be contained. The real risk lies in internal divisions or missteps within or between political parties, the IG, or the administration that could create openings for seismic rupture. Even minor fissures or overlooked signals could trigger a butterfly effect – an eruption capable of derailing the journey.
The IG's role
The IG faces a series of urgent challenges. With delays threatening both momentum and legitimacy, it is strongly incentivised to uphold its commitment to the election timeline – even if that requires difficult choices that won't satisfy every stakeholder.
For the parties, the real challenge is to demonstrate flexibility without appearing to retreat. Quiet alignment becomes possible if preferences are communicated discreetly to the IG, avoiding public concessions. Delegating the announcement to the IG allows each party to preserve its public posture. Critical or distancing remarks then serve as political cover – signalling independence while masking convergence.
Alternatively, if no tacit consensus emerges, the IG is likely to proceed with the least common denominator – a fallback position reflecting minimal viable agreement. From the discourse surrounding the July Charter, this denominator appears to include a commitment to holding elections within the constitutional timeline, procedural engagement by major parties, and a civilian-led process coordinated by the IG. Parties want to pressure the IG to couple and decouple reforms and elections, but not to the point of collapse.
These elements, while thin and fragile, form a narrow corridor of convergence – enough to sustain momentum without full resolution. In this scenario, the IG's role becomes one of pragmatic arbitration: advancing the process based on signalled alignments, even if public consensus remains elusive.
Election is on, then what?
The odds therefore heavily favour an election in February 2026 – not because everyone agrees, but because no one can afford not to play. Even those who threaten to walk away are, in effect, negotiating the terms of their continued engagement. The winning move is not to swerve but to steer. And steering requires mutual presence.
The election selects the players. The referendum retrofits the rules. The real test will be whether those players abide by the rules they help ratify. Bangladesh's political history offers little comfort here. Credible elections have often failed to produce credible governance. Institutions have been bent, state power weaponised, and mandates stretched beyond their meaning.
A credible election alone is unlikely to alter the political trajectory. The post-election process may remain contentious, and the durability of rules and boundaries will depend not only on the balance of power in the new parliament, but also on the posture of other institutions, the resilience of the bureaucracy, and the incentives shaped by public and international scrutiny. That balance – within and beyond parliament – will determine whether the system is steered or swerved once again.
Zahid Hussain is former lead economist of The World Bank, Dhaka Office
