Why disagreement on the July Charter has become a Gordian Knot

How does the road to a February election look — smooth or fraught with risk?

In Bangladesh, the road to elections has never been smooth. So, the question now is: Are things any better today, or have they worsened? 

In my view, the situation is filled with uncertainty. The most credible election we've ever had, to my knowledge, was in 1991, conducted under a non-partisan interim government — the first of its kind. 

After the uprising against the Ershad regime, there was a rare national consensus. There was genuine momentum and optimism surrounding the polls. If we take 1991 as a benchmark, today's political circumstances appear far more unstable by comparison.

On 3 November, following the advisory council meeting, political parties were urged to reach a consensus within seven days. That deadline has now passed. Do you see any signs of agreement?

Frankly, several crucial steps should have been taken earlier. The July Charter should have been finalised immediately after the July Uprising. The movement that began in July lacked a clearly defined vision at the outset. 

After 5 August, a political vacuum emerged, which was filled by Professor Yunus. But so far, he has not demonstrated a coherent political vision. Public aspirations may have evolved, but no new political force has emerged to give voice to those expectations.

So, looking at the three major political parties, a new tripartite dynamic seems to be forming. How do you interpret their current positions? Let's start with the BNP.

The BNP's position is not unreasonable. They argue that the reservations they lodged at the time of signing certain proposals must remain on record — and if the government now backtracks on those understandings, it effectively imposes decisions on the BNP. 

Naturally, no political party can accept such terms. Now, whether their objections are entirely justified is another question. 

As I said earlier, public expectations are sky-high, but political parties have failed to keep pace. They continue to operate under the old framework, unwilling to step beyond their traditional partisan boundaries.

The NCP has declared it will not enter any alliance and will contest elections alone. How do you view that decision?

The real question is: What is the NCP's political vision? To this day, I cannot define it. A political party must have a manifesto — a clear statement of its goals and ideology. But what does the NCP actually stand for? We don't know. 

One day they hold talks with the BNP, another day with Jamaat, then with Charmonai. It's unclear where they stand or whether they have an independent political identity at all.

In the past, we saw the Jatiya Party play a buffer role — ideologically leaning towards the BNP but electorally aligning with the Awami League. At least that pattern, however contradictory, was identifiable. But with the NCP, even that level of clarity is absent.

Ultimately, whether they contest elections independently is not the core issue. What matters is this: If they were to enter government, what exactly would they deliver?

But the NCP has, in fact, published a manifesto outlining what they would do in power.

Yes, they may have issued a manifesto, but a manifesto alone does not automatically establish an ideological foundation. Simply criticising India or hurling insults at secularists does not amount to an ideology — it is merely negativity. 

That is negative politics. Positive politics is about articulating what you stand for and what you want to build. What we are seeing here is almost entirely the former, and I fear the NCP has fallen into that same trap.

Look at the BNP — at least they clearly profess an ideology: Bangladeshi nationalism. It may be loosely defined, but the narrative exists. The Awami League, too, has a recognisable ideological anchor — the four founding principles of the state, and so on. But when it comes to the NCP, I see nothing crystallised, nothing coherent that defines their political character.

How do you assess Jaamat-e-Islami's current political strategy?

Jamaat carries an undeniable historical burden. In 1971, they served as collaborators with the occupying forces and sided with those responsible for genocide and crimes against humanity. 

In the years that followed, with political patronage from both the BNP and the Awami League, they gradually rehabilitated themselves into mainstream politics. 

But that does not erase the past. A moral reckoning — genuine accountability — is still owed.

However, Jaamat-e-Islami's Amir recently issued a public apology. What do you think about it? 

Yes, he apologised. But an apology and accountability are not the same thing. If crimes were committed, where is the legal process, the justice? Moreover, his apology referenced the period from 1947 onwards, framed broadly. But the public grievance against Jamaat is not about 1947 — it is about 1971. 

And even before that, there is a documented history: the anti-Ahmadi riots in 1953, Maududi's death sentence (later commuted to life imprisonment and eventually dropped), and repeated incitement of communal violence. These are not isolated allegations — they are part of a long, violent political legacy.

Do you believe that since 5 August, Jamaat has emerged as the BNP's main rival? That it now entertains ambitions of power and is making electoral promises? How did this rise happen?

With the Awami League absent from the field, the contest for state power is now essentially between the BNP and Jamaat. Our political competition, unfortunately, is driven not by ideas but by toxicity — aggression, rhetorical warfare, and personal attacks. Intellectual or policy-driven competition is almost entirely absent.

The other reality is generational. The overwhelming majority of today's voters did not witness 1971. What shapes their political consciousness more viscerally, more immediately, is the 15-year rule of Sheikh Hasina. 

That era — not 1971 — forms the emotional core of their political reactions. And with the Awami League out of contention, former allies have now become adversaries.

Would a quick election right after 5 August have changed the outcome?

Absolutely. If an election had been held within one, two, or three months after 5 August, the BNP would almost certainly have secured a landslide. The field was clear. But over the past year to year-and-a-half, the political landscape has shifted significantly. 

The BNP's grip has loosened — this is undeniable. And yet, the BNP still has Khaleda Zia, an intensely charismatic figure. 

Even in limited political activity, her presence alone gives the party a major electoral advantage. No other party today has a leader with comparable mass appeal.

The Awami League still retains a support base. Could that influence the next election? Where will those votes go?

Here we must recognise a fundamental truth: most voting in Bangladesh is not based on ideological conviction — it is negative voting. Political loyalty is often shaped by patronage networks — contracts, money, promotions, favours, and access. That is how political constituencies are built.

There is also a behavioural pattern: in villages, if the local BNP MP is perceived as corrupt or abusive, voters shift to the Awami League; if the Awami League MP is oppressive, voters switch to the BNP. 

People vote against the incumbent more than for an ideology.

But this time the Awami League is not in the race. If voters grow disillusioned with the BNP, where will they go?
That is the critical opening — and it is where Jamaat and the NCP see opportunity. If the BNP fields candidates with tainted records — extortion, violence, criminality — much like the Awami League did for years, discontented voters will look elsewhere.

Jamaat in particular believes it has an advantage: its involvement in the July Uprising and the perception that a large section of young people — including school, college and madrasa students in rural areas — sympathise with them. That is a significant political asset.

However, Jamaat's electoral performance historically has been weak when competing alone: three seats in one election, two in another. Their strength has always multiplied when aligned with the BNP — and let us not forget that the BNP's two terms in power were possible precisely because of that alliance. So the relationship has not been one-sided; both parties have benefited.

This is the first time the BNP and Jamaat will compete as direct rivals rather than allies. And this election, more than any before, will reveal two fundamental truths. How much influence the BNP can command on its own without a coalition, and what Jamaat's true electoral capacity actually is beyond alliance politics. 

As we were discussing earlier, the July Charter has clearly run into complications. A political deadlock seems to have formed. How can this deadlock be resolved?

Now that the impasse has taken shape, breaking it will be extremely difficult. There's a famous expression in English — the Gordian knot — a problem so tangled that conventional solutions cannot untie it. The July Charter has become something very similar: a tightly bound knot, almost impossible to unravel through ordinary negotiation or compromise.