The chronicles of July Charter — and its shaky future

When Sheikh Hasina's regime fell on 5 August 2024, it was less a change at the top and more a call to change Bangladesh's political system itself. The uprising that ended her long rule reinforced demands to fix the state and undertake a comprehensive overhaul. 

In response, under the leadership of Professor Muhammad Yunus, the interim administration formed several reform commissions, promising to deliver what the uprising and its blood-soaked sacrifices had demanded. 

By 11 September 2024, the interim government had formed reform commissions tasked with reviewing key pillars of governance: the Constitution, elections, public administration, the judiciary, and anti-corruption institutions. 

The message was clear: A mere change of faces would not transform the government without overhauling its structure. If Bangladesh were to move forward, its institutions would need recalibration. 

The work intensified in early 2025. On 13 February, the National Consensus Commission (NCC) was formed to bring political parties to the same table to discuss and agree to the draft texts that the reform commission had developed. 

The idea was simple in design but complex in practice: forge agreement among deeply divided political actors on a roadmap for systemic reform.

What followed was a marathon of lengthy meetings, many of them broadcast live on television.

Between its first and second phases, the NCC held 67 meetings — 44 in the first and 23 in the second. A third phase added eight more days of concentrated dialogue. Over months of negotiation, 84 reform issues were agreed upon. 

The discussions were technical, at times tense, but largely sustained. For a country accustomed to boycotts and zero-sum politics, the act of prolonged dialogue was historic.

On 28 July 2025, a preliminary draft of what would become the July National Charter was released after consultations. The charter proposed recalibrating executive authority, revisiting the structure of constitutional bodies, and introducing proportional representation in a newly proposed upper house of parliament. 

It also laid out revised frameworks for institutions, such as the Public Service Commission, the Anti-Corruption Commission, and the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General.

By 17 October 2025, the July National Charter was finalised and publicly registered at a grand programme outside the parliament. It was presented as a binding political contract — a reform blueprint to be implemented through constitutional amendments by an elected parliament.

But unity proved partial, and it had major caveats. 

While most parties ultimately signed the charter, dissent lingered. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), now the ruling party, formally recorded objections to some major issues, despite fully participating in the talks. 

It opposed proportional representation for the upper house. It also dissented on aspects of the proposed appointment processes and powers of constitutional bodies like the Public Service Commission (PSC), Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) and Ombudsman over the structure and appointment process of its chiefs. 

On the very first day of the new parliament that Bangladesh had long awaited — perhaps since the government was formed in 2008 — there was uncertainty over the BNP's refusal to take the oath as a member of the constitutional assembly.

Left-leaning parties registered dissent over constitutional fundamentals, particularly the framing of the state's core principles. Jamaat sought clearer legal grounding for the Charter's authority before signing. The National Citizen Party (NCP), in contrast, signed without notes of dissent — but only after the election had taken place. 

The months-long discussion, while it was often tedious, also had many chaotic and heated occasions of disagreements. However, for many the key dissents on limiting the authority of the executive appeared as a blow to the fundamental recalibration of the state. 

However, despite its caveats, in a referendum held alongside the general election on 12 February, voters were asked to approve implementation of the July Charter. The questionnaire itself was ambigous, given the voters were allowed to say "Yes" to everything or "No" to everything. Some raised questions about how to sort the issues for who agrees to a part of it and disagrees with the other parts. 

Nevertheless, the outcome was decisive despite the concerns: 48,074,429 people or 68.06% voted "Yes". The mandate, at least numerically, was clear. Four days later, on 16 February, the NCP formally signed the charter, citing the referendum result as political legitimacy. The reform agenda had survived the ballot box.

Yet survival does not guarantee certainty. And the charter now moves into its most precarious phase: implementation. Its provisions are not self-executing. They depend on the elected parliament acting as a constitutional assembly to translate commitments into enforceable amendments. 

And on the very first day of the new parliament that Bangladesh had long awaited — perhaps since the government was formed in 2008 — there was uncertainty over the BNP's refusal to take the oath as a member of the constitutional assembly.

"None of us have been elected as members of the Constitution Reform Council. Once the National Parliament constitutionally adopts it, we can take the necessary steps," BNP's Salahuddin Ahmed stated. 

But to many, BNP's refusal signalled that the process would be prolonged and that implementation of the July Charter would not be as smooth as they had hoped. And that requires political will and sustained consensus — the very ingredients that Bangladesh's politics have historically struggled to maintain.

The July Charter's journey thus far tells a story of unexpected dialogue in the aftermath of an uprising. It reflects both aspiration and caution.

What remains undeniable is this: the Charter is the most structured attempt at cross-party reform in decades. It was debated on 84 reform issues, negotiated over 60 meetings, signed by most major political parties and endorsed by millions at the polls.

But charters are promises on paper until power gives them life.

As Bangladesh returns to parliamentary democracy, the July Charter stands at a crossroads — buoyed by popular approval, shadowed by political hesitation. History may remember the July Charter either as the foundation of institutional renewal — or as a bold document overtaken by the very politics it sought to reform.