Why Dhaka and Delhi should reset relationship: M Humayun Kabir

This excerpt is from Road to Election, a political talk show hosted by Shakhawat Liton, executive editor of The Business Standard. The guest for this episode was M Humayun Kabir, a veteran Bangladeshi diplomat and former ambassador to the United States and Nepal, as well as former high commissioner to Australia. 

In this conversation, Kabir unpacks the shifting dynamics of Bangladesh–India relations in the wake of the recent court verdict on Sheikh Hasina, analysing the diplomatic, political and regional implications of her exile in India. He discusses the pressures on bilateral ties, the evolving strategic posture in South Asia, and the challenges and opportunities facing Bangladesh's next government as it seeks to rebuild trust with its neighbours and reposition the country in a complex geopolitical landscape.

After the August uprising, Sheikh Hasina left Bangladesh and sought refuge in India. Since then, a significant strain has been visible in diplomatic relations between Dhaka and New Delhi. With the court's recent verdict, questions naturally arise: Has this tension deepened? Are Bangladesh–India relations entering a new and more severe test?

It is undeniable that a new element has now entered the equation. Since the political changes of July and August, Sheikh Hasina's presence in India — and her occasional public remarks — have generated a degree of discomfort within Bangladesh. Now that a court decision has been delivered, and with political pressure mounting to implement it, the issue has become more sensitive. 

The verdict is rooted in the events of the past 15 years, culminating in the crimes committed during the July–August period. The public now wants the judgment executed. Since Sheikh Hasina is in India, she would have to return for that to happen. The question is whether India will send her back.

Broadly, three factors are at play here.

The first is Sheikh Hasina's own decision. What does she intend to do? Does she want to return? Or would she rather stay on in India — or even move to another country? That is entirely her choice.

The second is the position of the Bangladesh government. Dhaka formally communicated its stance last December, requesting her return. I understand that the court may also issue an official order to this effect — our Law Adviser recently hinted as much. If such an order arrives, the government will reiterate its position clearly: Bangladesh wants her back.

The third, of course, is India's decision. Bangladesh and India do have an extradition treaty, signed in 2013, which covers crimes and acts of terrorism. Under the treaty, both sides may return individuals accused or convicted of such offences. But the agreement contains several loopholes. For instance, Section Six exempts crimes of a "political nature". A political figure involved in murder would not be shielded under that clause, yet there remains another crucial caveat: if India believes the accused would not receive a fair trial, it may decline the extradition request. The same option would be available to Bangladesh.

India is the dominant regional power, and an aspiring global one. A pertinent question, therefore, is whether India will choose to protect its long-standing allies. Sheikh Hasina is now something of a symbol for Delhi — evidence that India stands by its friends. That political signalling may carry considerable weight.

Only if these three considerations converge will Bangladesh be able to secure her return.

Will Bangladesh–India relations remain trapped solely within the Sheikh Hasina question? Or do other dimensions matter just as much?

There are, in fact, many dimensions, and none of them are insignificant. Bangladesh and India are deeply interlinked, especially in terms of security. Bangladesh's security is important for India, and India's is equally important for Bangladesh. We share a 4,000-kilometre land border, plus maritime boundaries. This geographical reality has shaped both countries' security considerations since independence — and it still does. It will continue to do so in the future.

So would it be a mistake to measure everything solely through the Sheikh Hasina issue?

Trade and commerce continue regardless of political tension. Over the past year, even amid diplomatic unease, economic activity has not declined — in fact, it has grown. This is because trade runs on mutual need: supply and demand. People-to-people contact also continues. Only yesterday, I saw reports that India is considering relaxing its visa regime again. These practical, everyday elements of the bilateral relationship remain active because they are mutually beneficial.

Our Chief Adviser recently said Bangladesh wants a relationship with India based on honourable equality. I believe this reflects the aspirations of ordinary Bangladeshis. We do not wish to damage our relations with India. What we want is the space to make our own decisions — without unnecessary Indian influence. During the BIMSTEC meeting in April, our Chief Adviser met Prime Minister Narendra Modi. At that point, it seemed that tensions might ease, that the ice might begin to melt. But progress since then has been limited.

The reason is that Bangladesh finds itself in a particularly fragile situation. Under Sheikh Hasina's 15-year rule, India enjoyed many strategic advantages in Bangladesh — advantages that extended beyond bilateral ties, benefiting India regionally and globally. Now, Delhi is uncertain whether it can retain those advantages. That uncertainty has created heightened sensitivity.

Adding to this is the political and diplomatic narrative that emerged over the past year — narratives that have fed the sense of tension. Whether or not these perceptions reflect reality, they have shaped the mindset on both sides. 

After the BIMSTEC meeting, instead of seeing relations normalise, we witnessed the opposite: India suspended trans-shipment facilities and halted certain overland exports from Bangladesh. These actions suggest that New Delhi viewed some Bangladeshi statements or actions unfavourably — or at least not objectively. The consequences were visible. Even now, diplomatic and political engagement seems to lack transparency and objectivity.

A particularly notable shift occurred with Ajit Doval's statement in October. Earlier, the dominant Indian narrative was that the overthrow of governments in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal was the result of domestic and foreign conspiracies. But Doval's comment marked a near-complete reversal. He said the collapses stemmed from failures of governance and transparency.

This, in my view, represents an important evolution — even an objective analysis. If this signals a shift in India's strategic thinking going forward, it could open the door to the qualitative improvement in Bangladesh–India relations that many of us want.

But if tensions with a neighbour persist, would this affect foreign investment in Bangladesh?

Certainly — and negatively. When the world looks at Bangladesh, it does not assess us in isolation. Investors look at the entire regional context: India, South Asia, Southeast Asia — even China. They evaluate Bangladesh's relations with all these neighbours as part of their risk assessment. It is an essential factor. Our ties with China, with India, with the European Union — all of these are important.

Since China has entered the conversation, let me add this: during the 7 January 2024 election, when Sheikh Hasina's government faced intense pressure from the West, particularly the United States, three major powers supported her — India, as always, but also China and Russia. With those two, Bangladesh has experienced no notable strain.

However, there has long been a stream of domestic politics in Bangladesh that relies on anti-India sentiment. As elections approach, this rhetoric may intensify. If it does, it could become a significant obstacle to rebuilding relations. The upcoming election is a product of a long movement against the conditions that prevailed over the past 15 years — conditions in which India worked closely with the previous government. So, naturally, the India factor will surface. But I believe our political discourse needs to transition away from this pattern and into a more open, forward-looking mindset.

The interim government will leave after the February election. Whoever comes to power after that will have a five-year mandate — a long-term period. What, then, should be the diplomatic priorities for this new government?

In my view, there are three key priorities.

First, national consensus. The government must build a broad internal agreement on foreign policy. This requires bringing the opposition on board — even those outside Parliament. Without internal unity, a country cannot project strength. Our real strength lies in domestic cohesion.

Second, coordination. Bangladesh lacks institutional coordination in its external affairs. Ten or twelve ministries handle foreign-related issues, each operating according to its own approach. This cannot continue. There must be political and bureaucratic coordination — this is urgent.

Third, regional equilibrium. Bangladesh must normalise relations with all countries in the region according to its own national interests. In South Asia, the geopolitical environment is extremely sensitive. We must maintain relationships wherever necessary, but avoid becoming entangled in unnecessary competition. Without a peaceful region, investment will not come. Our trade relationships — China as our largest import source, India as our second — must be strengthened. This requires stability. Bangladesh must preserve a peaceful environment and avoid stepping into any rivalry.

Ultimately, Bangladesh does not need — and cannot afford — to enter into any form of regional tension. Stability, balance, and internal consensus must guide our diplomacy in the years ahead.