Is a report enough to end enforced disappearances?
The commission’s recommendations challenge the foundations of Bangladesh’s security architecture. But implementing them will require political courage, judicial independence and a clear decision to place human rights above expediency
For decades, the word 'gum' (enforced disappearance) has carried fear, uncertainty and silence in Bangladesh. Families searched for their missing loved ones for years without answers, while the state denied any responsibility.
In this context, the final report and recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances, formed under the interim government, mark a defining moment for state accountability and human rights.
But the question remains: Does having a commission, along with its report and recommendations, mean that enforced disappearances will actually end, or will they merely take a different form?
Enforced disappearance is not a new phenomenon in Bangladesh. Its roots can be traced back to the 1971 Liberation War, when numerous intellectuals and political figures were abducted and many were never seen again.
Globally, the practice first gained notoriety under Nazi Germany's Night and Fog Decree of 1941 and later resurfaced in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s, particularly under military regimes, where it was used as a tool of political repression.
In Bangladesh, the post-independence period saw sporadic incidents, but over the last 16 years under the Hasina regime, enforced disappearance became systematic. It was often orchestrated by state security agencies in coordination with political power, targeting opposition figures and dissidents. This history underscores that enforced disappearance in Bangladesh forms part of a long-standing pattern of politically motivated abductions.
In its final report, submitted on 5 January 2026, the commission found that the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) was involved in about 25% of disappearances, followed by the police at 23%. Other agencies, including the Detective Branch (DB), Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime unit (CTTC), the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), and National Security Intelligence (NSI), were also found to have carried out widespread disappearances.
Both single and joint operations involving RAB, the police, and intelligence agencies point to coordinated state action rather than isolated misconduct.
According to the commission, 75% of Jamaat-Shibir leaders and activists returned after disappearance, while the return rate for Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) affiliates was 22%.
A total of 1,569 complaints were under active consideration, including 251 cases of individuals still missing and 36 cases of people recovered after disappearance. During the investigation, 222 individuals were questioned, and 765 victims and their family members were interviewed multiple times.
The commission also issued a series of recommendations aimed at dismantling the central command structure that orchestrated thousands of abductions. Central to these findings was the recommendation to immediately disband the RAB, which the commission identified as being responsible for roughly one-quarter of all documented cases.
The recommendations include withdrawing the armed forces from internal law enforcement duties; repealing or fundamentally amending the Anti-Terrorism Act 2009; developing community-based preventive counterterrorism policies; repealing Section 13 of the Armed Police Battalions Act 2003; bringing all security forces under strict legal accountability; mandating human rights training; ensuring victim-centred justice, compensation, and rehabilitation; and converting Aynaghar-like facilities into museums as symbols of truth, memory, and accountability.
Crucially, the commission called for judicial and security sector reforms, including stripping intelligence agencies such as the DGFI of their de facto immunity, creating a robust victim reparations fund, and empowering the National Human Rights Commission with independent investigative authority to ensure that state-sponsored kidnapping never again serves as a tool of political repression.
To understand what may happen next in Bangladesh, it is necessary to look beyond its borders.
History shows that many countries undergoing political transitions after long periods of repression have faced similar dilemmas. Some succeeded in significantly reducing enforced disappearances, while others failed, allowing the practice to continue in quieter or more complex forms.
In Bangladesh, the commission's findings identify systematic involvement by state security agencies, coordinated operations rather than rogue actions, and the deliberate destruction of evidence. This recognition is critical, as denial is often the first shield of impunity.
By officially acknowledging state responsibility, the report breaks a long-standing wall of silence. Yet recognition alone does not dismantle the structures that allowed disappearances to occur in the first place.
International experience suggests that commissions are only the beginning, not the solution.
Argentina offers one of the clearest examples. After the fall of the military dictatorship in the early 1980s, the CONADEP commission documented thousands of disappearances. Crucially, this was followed by prosecutions, trials of senior military officers, institutional reforms, and the cultivation of a strong culture of memory and accountability.
Disappearances did not stop simply because a report was published; they stopped because the cost of committing them became too high for the state.
Chile's experience was more mixed. Truth commissions documented abuses and acknowledged victims, but early political compromises shielded many perpetrators. While large-scale disappearances did not return, justice remained partial and slow. The lesson is that commissions can stabilise a transition, but without sustained legal accountability, they leave unresolved wounds and weak deterrence.
Sri Lanka presents a more troubling case. Despite high numbers of enforced disappearances during its civil war, post-war commissions and institutions failed to deliver justice or systemic reform. Disappearances declined in their wartime form, but surveillance, arbitrary detention, and intimidation continued. The state changed its tactics rather than its behaviour.
This illustrates a key risk for Bangladesh: disappearances may not vanish, but mutate.
Mexico demonstrates an even harsher reality. Despite national search commissions and legal reforms, enforced disappearances have increased over the past decade. Criminal violence, collusion between security forces and organised crime, and weak accountability mechanisms have created a system in which disappearance became decentralised rather than eliminated.
This shows that without strong institutions, political will, and independent oversight, commissions can coexist with worsening human rights conditions.
Collectively, these examples point to one uncomfortable truth: Commissions do not reduce disappearances by themselves. They work only when followed by prosecutions, security sector reform, judicial independence, and a political consensus that such practices are unacceptable under any circumstances.
So, where does Bangladesh stand today?
Nurul Huda, former Inspector General of Police, spoke to TBS about the final report and recommendations of the commission.
"I hope everyone has seen the commission's recommendations. They include proposals regarding the RAB and other armed forces, such as disbanding the RAB, withdrawing armed forces from internal policing, and changes to the Anti-Terrorism Act. Whether these will be fully repealed or implemented in a modified form is difficult to say at this stage. Such decisions cannot be taken without an elected political government," he said.
"These are very drastic measures," Huda added. "Suddenly disbanding or restructuring a force established over decades would create challenges for law and order. The current state of law enforcement in our country is already fragile. Therefore, any such decision must be considered with extreme caution."
On the Anti-Terrorism Act, Huda noted, "Without this law, terrorism — which is a real threat — could increase. It is essential to understand why the law was created and to ensure its proper implementation. Any failure in enforcement or misuse of power must be prevented through proper oversight and a system of checks and balances."
Reflecting on both domestic and international experience, he said, "In various countries — Latin America, Europe and South Asia — the culture of enforced disappearances has sometimes been completely eradicated after political transitions, while in other cases it has persisted. In our context, strong laws, proper implementation, and clear limitations on the powers of officials at different levels are crucial."
Huda emphasised, "Even when power is granted, it should not be exercised indiscriminately. Oversight and regulatory mechanisms are essential to prevent abuse of authority. If these are in place, the law can be applied effectively, and problems will be reduced."
Another critical factor is the judiciary. In countries where courts actively challenge unlawful detention and protect due process, disappearances decline. Where courts remain cautious or politicised, commissions lose their deterrent power. Bangladesh's interim government faces a narrow window to strengthen judicial independence before old habits reassert themselves.
Although no enforced disappearance has been recorded since the fall of the Awami League government, the post-uprising transition has not produced a clear rupture from Bangladesh's long-standing pattern of human rights abuses.
Data from leading rights organisations show that while enforced disappearances appear to have stopped, other forms of state violence remain entrenched.
Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK) recorded 35 extrajudicial killings between January and October 2025, including 14 deaths in so-called shootouts before arrest and nine custodial deaths caused by torture.
Odhikar reported more than 40 extrajudicial killings in the 14 months following the uprising, with victims shot dead, tortured or beaten to death. These figures closely mirror patterns seen under the previous regime, suggesting continuity in methods even after a change in political leadership.
The absence of reported enforced disappearances is significant — especially compared to the 677 cases documented during 15 years of Awami League rule — but it does not necessarily indicate a broader transformation in law enforcement behaviour.
At the same time, the human rights crisis has expanded beyond direct state violence into custodial neglect and social breakdown. ASK documented 28 deaths in custody between January and October 2025, mostly in the Dhaka division, where political arrests and prolonged pre-trial detention are most common.
Mob violence has surged to alarming levels, with 165 people killed in lynchings during the same period, reflecting a deep collapse of public trust in policing and the justice system. Press freedom remains fragile, with 351 incidents of harassment against journalists reported in 10 months, including 109 physical attacks. Minority rights have also deteriorated, with 39 attacks against minority communities recorded in 2025, alongside growing attacks on Sufi shrines and cultural activities.
Together, these trends reinforce a central lesson from other post-authoritarian transitions: without structural reform of security institutions, judicial accountability, and political commitment, a reduction in one form of abuse does not prevent the persistence — or even intensification — of others.
Rezaur Rahman Lenin, a human rights activist and independent researcher, emphasised the deeper structural challenges behind enforced disappearances and human rights abuse.
"The problem goes beyond the existence of a report or recommendations. Many institutions remain designed to operate in secrecy, where disappearances, torture, or extrajudicial killings can occur without accountability," he said.
He added, "Even if reforms are recommended, true change requires robust judicial oversight, public transparency, and mechanisms to identify those — both officers and civilians — who have participated in abuses. Without these, the cycle of human rights violations can continue, simply taking new forms."
Lenin also highlighted the importance of history and memory, not just reports.
"Places where atrocities occurred should be preserved for public education and transformed into human rights museums — not merely as memorials, but as sites for training, reflection, and accountability. Otherwise, the lessons are easily forgotten, and the structures enabling abuse remain intact."
He also agreed with the commission's findings and recommendations regarding the RAB, stating, "Most disappearances are directly linked to its officers, and this is not just individual wrongdoing — RAB's structure allows abuses to continue. Real change therefore, requires dismantling or reforming the institution and holding both officers and civilian collaborators accountable. A military reform commission could have been established; this was a missed opportunity for the interim government."
Saqlain Rizve is a Bangladeshi journalist with a focus on politics, diplomacy and broader social issues. He also occasionally writes about entertainment and lifestyle.
