Can the government's 'Yes' campaign taint referendum credibility?
These moves have removed any ambiguity about the interim government’s position: it has effectively become a “party” to the referendum and is openly opposed to a “No” vote
The interim government's large-scale campaign for a "Yes" vote in the referendum scheduled alongside the 12 February parliamentary election poses a serious test for the Election Commission (EC), which is legally bound to conduct the referendum with "honesty, integrity and impartiality" under the Referendum Ordinance promulgated by the same government.
According to a report published by The Business Standard on 8 January, the Chief Adviser's Office has drawn up extensive plans to intensify the "Yes" campaign by mobilising not only the entire state administration but also non-government actors such as NGOs and the readymade garment (RMG) sector, with the stated aim of creating a nationwide wave in favour of approval of the July National Charter.
These moves have removed any ambiguity about the interim government's position: it has effectively become a "party" to the referendum and is openly opposed to a "No" vote. The implication is clear. If deputy commissioners (DCs), upazila nirbahi officers (UNOs) and other field-level officials follow executive instructions to promote a "Yes" vote, they can no longer be regarded as neutral administrators during the run-up to the referendum.
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By contrast, the EC has so far maintained a formally neutral posture. Its advertisements and social media materials merely explain the proposals on the referendum ballot and instruct voters how to cast either a "Yes" or a "No" vote. On the face of it, this approach aligns with the Referendum Ordinance's requirement of impartiality.
However, this is where the core contradiction emerges.
Both the interim government and the EC are relying on the same field-level administration.
Under the Representation of the People Order (RPO), the EC has appointed DCs and UNOs as returning officers and assistant returning officers for the 12 February parliamentary election. From the announcement of the election schedule until the publication of results in the official gazette, these officials operate under the control, supervision and direction of the EC, not the government. During this period, the government cannot transfer them without EC approval, and any failure to act impartially constitutes a criminal offence under the Election Officials (Special Provisions) Act, 1991.
Once the election schedule is announced, conducting the parliamentary election becomes the administration's top priority.
The electoral Code of Conduct for candidates and parties contesting parliamentary polls is also applicable for the current campaign and referendum
The legal overlap deepens further. Under Section 5 of the Referendum Ordinance, the same officials serving as returning officers and assistant returning officers for the election automatically become ex-officio officials for the referendum. The same applies to presiding officers, assistant presiding officers and polling officials at polling stations. After being engaged in election duty, all of them are legally required to act neutrally in both processes.
Yet the interim government has reportedly instructed officials to launch an "awareness" campaign with explicitly persuasive messages such as: "Vote 'Yes' to implement all reforms; vote 'No' and gain nothing. For change, vote 'Yes'."
Grey zone
This raises several fundamental questions.
Can the interim government, through executive instructions, direct officials who are already under the EC's control to campaign for a particular outcome in a referendum?
Who ultimately controls DCs and UNOs once they are appointed as election officials, the government or the EC?
And can the EC allow such campaigning to continue without undermining the level playing field for both the referendum and the parliamentary election?
The legal framework offers a clear answer on paper. Article 126 of the Constitution obliges all executive authorities to assist the EC in the discharge of its functions. Section 18 of the Referendum Ordinance grants the EC broad powers to issue any order it deems necessary to ensure the referendum is conducted with "honesty, integrity and impartiality." The EC can also review, suspend or overturn any instruction issued by its subordinate officers and pass interim orders where required.
Of the three previous referendums held in Bangladesh, two – conducted in 1977 and 1985 – were explicitly designed to legitimise the continued rule of then presidents Ziaur Rahman and HM Ershad. In both cases, the governments were direct parties to the referendums and openly campaigned for a "Yes" vote, producing outcomes in which more than 90% of voters endorsed the presidents' hold on power.
The 1991 referendum marked a clear departure from that pattern. The government was not a party to the process, and the vote – supported by all major political parties – paved the way for the restoration of parliamentary democracy from the presidential system.
Against this backdrop, the interim government's current role in actively steering the referendum stands apart, occupying a grey zone between past authoritarian plebiscites and the consensus-driven exercise of 1991.
Divisions appear
The July National Charter proposes 11 major reforms, including limits on unilateral constitutional amendments, a 10-year cap on the prime minister's tenure, a bicameral parliament, an opposition deputy speaker, checks on presidential pardon powers, and a stronger balance between the president and prime minister. While 26 political parties – including BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami – signed the charter, BNP attached notes of dissent to nine proposals, and four parties, including the National Citizens Party (NCP), did not sign at all.
Jamaat-e-Islami and the NCP-led alliance are campaigning for a "Yes" vote. BNP, which earlier criticised the July Charter Implementation Ordinance for excluding its dissenting notes from the referendum ballot, has so far refrained from campaigning for either side, choosing instead to focus on the parliamentary election.
As electioneering intensifies after 20 January, these divisions are likely to become more pronounced. Against this backdrop, the government's overt "Yes" campaign risks blurring the line between referendum advocacy and electoral influence.
Question of a level playing field
On 14 December, the EC instructed divisional commissioners, regional election officers, DCs and returning officers to ensure a conducive environment ahead of the 13th National Parliament election. If the same officials are simultaneously mobilised to advance a government-backed referendum outcome, the question of a level playing field becomes unavoidable.
Both the interim government and the EC have repeatedly pledged to deliver a free, fair and neutral election on 12 February. Yet their positions on the referendum appear misaligned.
Talking to TBS on 6 January, Ali Riaz, special assistant to the chief adviser and also chief coordinator of the awareness campaign of government for referendum, defended the campaign, saying the interim government, born of a popular uprising, must secure a "Yes" vote in the July Charter referendum to implement reforms.
Constitution expert Shahdeen Malik disagreed, warning that direct government campaigning to influence a referendum outcome amounts to state interference in the voting process and could further destabilise the political landscape. "Anyone can challenge the result of the referendum in court," he added.
Election Commissioner Abul Fazal Md Sanaullah said the government may raise awareness about the referendum's importance, but should not promote either a "Yes" or a "No" vote.
That distinction now defines the moment.
The law leaves little room for ambiguity. What remains uncertain is whether the EC will summon the resolve to enforce it.
