Can a 'toothless' police commission deliver on its promise?
The ordinance, as promulgated, sits in an awkward middle ground. It is more institutional than an advisory note yet less empowered than many reformers had hoped
On 4 December 2025, the interim government enacted what was billed as a long-awaited reform: the Police Commission Ordinance, 2025.
At first glance it looks like a step towards modernising a force that has too often been accused of serving political, rather than public, ends.
Reading between the lines, however, reveals something that looks less like a change of direction and more like a 'minimalist rebrand', a commission without the powers necessary to bite.
Environment Adviser Syeda Rizwana Hasan, speaking at a briefing after the Advisory Council meeting chaired by Chief Adviser Prof Muhammad Yunus, set out the official case for the body with characteristic clarity: a five-member commission, led by a retired Supreme Court judge and including a retired senior police officer, a former district magistrate, an academic and a human-rights or governance expert, would advise on modernisation, investigate public complaints about police conduct and make the police "more people-friendly".
She emphasised that the commission would highlight areas needing human-rights-sensitive training and recommend measures to improve transparency, discipline and welfare.
But the ordinance that emerged from the approval process is a pared-down creature. Provisions in the primary draft that would have let the commission recommend panels for appointment to the inspector general post, or oversee promotions and postings at senior levels, have been removed.
The word "independent" has been dropped from the commission's title. In plain terms, the body can make recommendations — but it will not have the authority to recommend the recruitment, promotion or posting of officers, including the inspector general; nor will it have the power to insist on measures to ensure a cadre of officers "free of external influence".
All of these provisions were in the original draft, officials with knowledge of the process told the media.
The omissions are not technicalities. For critics, they go to the heart of whether the exercise is reform in anything but name.
It currently appears to be little more than a mechanism for the executive government to carry out a task. Any genuine police commission must focus on fundamental reform. The Commission is not undertaking the detailed organisational rank-structure changes necessary for meaningful reform.
"The formation of the Police Commission has generated little serious expectation, and for good reason. The structure and initial workings of the body strongly suggest that it is 'not meant to be serious' or 'mean business'," said Muhammad Nurul Huda, a former inspector general of police.
"In fact, it currently appears to be little more than a mechanism for the executive government to carry out a task. Any genuine police commission must focus on fundamental reform. The Commission is not undertaking the detailed organisational rank-structure changes necessary for meaningful reform. Consequently, I cannot entertain anything very positive about this."
His diagnosis is stark: without "teeth — the ability to exercise power" and without legal and financial support to secure what he calls functional autonomy, the commission will be unable to deliver lasting change.
That fear is shared by those who look to the new body to secure one of the most urgent demands that erupted during recent mass protests: an accountable, depoliticised police force.
"This is a deception on two fronts," Altaf Parvez, a political commentator, argued.
The police force itself didn't want this; they wanted a more self-governed commission. And from the people's perspective, they won't gain much from it. The accountability that the public expects from the police force won't happen because here, the rules for transfer, promotion, and deployment remain in the hands of the home ministry.
"Firstly, the police force itself didn't want this; they wanted a more self-governed commission. And secondly, from the people's perspective, they won't gain much from it either. The accountability that the public expects from the police force won't happen because here, the rules for transfer, promotion, and deployment remain in the hands of the Ministry of Home Affairs."
The ordinance, as promulgated, sits in an awkward middle ground. It is more institutional than an advisory note yet less empowered than many reformers had hoped. The selection mechanism for commissioners: a committee that will include a judge nominated by the chief justice, representatives of the National Human Rights Commission and the Public Service Commission, the cabinet secretary, the home secretary and two MPs — is intended to lend legitimacy and balance.
But legitimacy is not the same as capability. A body can be fairly chosen and still be unable to alter the incentives, career paths and reward structures that orient police behaviour.
Posting and promotion, especially concerning the higher ranks, meaning IGP and Additional IGP — we had suggested that the Commission should provide recommendations for appointments to these ranks. We also suggested trying to ensure transparency and accountability in matters of recruitment…
"Posting and promotion, especially concerning the higher ranks, meaning IGP and Additional IGP — we had suggested that the Commission should provide recommendations for appointments to these ranks," said noted human rights activist Nur Khan.
"Furthermore, if any complaint comes against any police officer, especially against someone from the Cadre Service, or if any complaint comes against the police, the Commission can investigate it, give opinions, make recommendations, or take action. This much was suggested. We also suggested trying to ensure transparency and accountability in matters of recruitment and other things," he added.
Those who have spent decades within the service are blunt about the consequences.
M Akbar Ali, president of the Retired Police Officers' Welfare Association, worries that recommendations will be ignored, "If the members of the commission set the policies but the government does not follow them, then what's the point? The government will do whatever it wants, and that is what will happen, right? Recommendations mean nothing if the government chooses to ignore them," he said in an interview with The Daily Star.
Transparency International Bangladesh, among others, urged significant revisions to earlier drafts to insulate the commission's functions and independence; those calls resonate louder in the light of the final ordinance's retrenchments.
But for now, the document on the statute book reads as reform by definition rather than reform by design. Unless the commission is granted the ability to turn its recommendations into enforceable changes, and unless political actors accept the limits of their reach into policing, the new body risks becoming another chapter in the long story of deferred institutional reform.
That, in the end, may explain why so many seasoned observers cannot, as Nurul Huda puts it, "entertain anything very positive about this" until the commission is given the means to effect the changes it proclaims to seek.
