Dysfunctional parliament: Why the solution does not lie in upper house
Economist and Research Director at the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) Dr Khondaker Golam Moazzem has recently appeared on TBS talk show ‘Road to Election’. The interview was conducted by Sakhawat Liton, Executive Editor of The Business Standard. The discussion sheds light on a CPD study presented at a national dialogue titled “Proposed Upper House in the National Parliament: Can it Ensure Accountability of the Majority Party?” and explores whether the proposed structure can genuinely strengthen parliamentary checks and balances in Bangladesh. Here is an excerpt of the interview.
A research report by the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) has been published. In the study, you have recommended scrapping the plan for an upper house. You have expressed concerns that such a body could create parliamentary chaos. Why?
In South Asian countries where bicameral systems exist — such as the Republic of India, Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Kingdom of Bhutan and more recently Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal — these institutions emerged in specific contexts and realities. If we consider the situation in Bangladesh, it is uncertain whether those same contexts or realities exist here. Similarly, in many European countries where upper houses are more powerful, their establishment was shaped by strong democratic processes and institutional maturity. It is important to ask whether such conditions currently exist in Bangladesh.
We believe that the present parliamentary structure of our national parliament can be strengthened to ensure greater accountability of the majority party without the need to create a separate upper house. In some countries in the subcontinent, the upper house has been used in completely different contexts, and in some cases, it has actually weakened the lower house.
In particular, our research on Pakistan shows that many individuals elected to the upper house have not primarily served the interests of the people but rather the interests of various agencies or vested groups. The role they were meant to play in ensuring balance between the two houses, giving stronger opinions on legislation, and strengthening the lawmaking process has not materialised effectively.
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We have also had to consider the financial implications. In countries with upper houses, the expenditure is generally similar to that of the lower house. In Bhutan, for instance, the costs are almost the same; the same applies to Nepal. In India, we found a cost structure of roughly 60–40 per cent.
Taking all these factors into account, from a research perspective, it seems that under the present circumstances, the establishment of an upper house in Bangladesh has little practical justification.
That could then also create opportunities to rehabilitate some leaders of various political parties.
To be honest, I have spoken to businesspeople, members of civil society, and politicians. What struck me most is that each of these groups sees the proposed upper house as a new space for inclusion — a place to secure their own representation. But the original philosophy behind introducing a bicameral legislature was to dismantle an autocratic, centralised, single-chamber structure. That is not where their focus seems to be.
Under the current proposal, the upper house would have 105 members — five nominated by the President and the remaining 100 through a tiered system. Of these, 65% would be nominated by political parties, and 35% by various social groups, with 30% reserved for women.
None of these provisions, however, indicate that the upper house would function as a legislative chamber in the true sense. Rather, it appears to be designed as an advisory body. It would only play a major role if any constitutional amendment issues arise. For other matters, it would simply review legislation passed in the lower house and provide opinions or analysis — which the lower house may or may not consider.
Is there any risk of new crises emerging from this arrangement?
From what we have observed in several countries, when upper houses are formed with the intention of bringing in 'specialised individuals', they often end up playing a disproportionately influential role in shaping public opinion, even if their formal legislative power is limited. This can weaken the voice of elected representatives in the lower house, particularly during prime minister's question time and in committee meetings, where robust debate and scrutiny are supposed to take place.
Our concern is that the strength and functionality of parliamentary committees could be eroded. Instead of fostering broader democratic participation, discussions and negotiations could become confined to a select few from both houses, potentially narrowing the space for meaningful deliberation.
Is there a possibility of conflict or a deadlock situation emerging from this?
Yes, that is a very natural concern. Under the current proposal, a party would need at least one per cent of the vote to be considered for representation in the upper house. But if a large political force dominates, it could create pressure and, through its opinions and actions, generate a deadlock. That risk must be taken into account at this stage.
However, it is also important to note that the proposed structure does not actually give the upper house any significant power.
Then is this going to be just ornamental?
In most cases, yes — it appears to be designed as an ornamental institution with limited functions. But what worries us more is that it could weaken existing parliamentary mechanisms. It may undermine the strength of parliamentary committees, the prime minister's question time, and the bill-making and approval processes that should ideally be vibrant and effective.
So, is Bangladesh not ready for such a structure?
No, certainly not. Our view is that instead of creating an upper house, the existing lower house — in fact, the current national parliament as a whole — needs to be made much stronger. Even if multiple chambers are introduced, if the political culture is not right — if the culture of power abuse remains unchecked — then there can be no guarantee that this new structure will work.
If we look at how upper houses have evolved in this region — setting aside Republic of India's Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha, where democratic practices are comparatively stronger — countries like Islamic Republic of Pakistan and Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal have shown serious weaknesses.
In my own research on Pakistan, I found many allegations against Senate members, who often serve the interests of different groups — including the interests of the military, foreign players, civil society groups, and lobbyists. In many cases, the upper house has turned into a lobbying platform, with a culture often described as "horse trading", where deals and exchanges shape the chamber's dynamics.
In countries like ours, unless internal party democracy at the grassroots level is opened up, and leadership is not always selected in a top-down manner, people's voices will continue to be sidelined in these structures.
