Bangladesh is entering a more complex geopolitical phase: M Humayun Kabir

In past elections, Bangladesh's politics often revolved around pro-India and anti-India narratives. Is that still the case this time?

We are seeing a clear shift. 

Earlier, Bangladesh's electoral politics tended to be framed as either pro-India or anti-India. In this election, that dynamic has weakened considerably. India's role, while still important, is no longer the central axis of the electoral discourse. 

Instead, multiple external actors have become active simultaneously. We now see increased engagement from the US, China, the EU, and even the UN. Earlier, it was largely India engaging actively while others observed from a distance. That situation has changed now.

Has anti-India sentiment increased as the election approaches? 

There is some rise in anti-India sentiment, but it is more nuanced than before. At the same time, people are cautious about swinging to the opposite extreme. 

From what I have observed on the ground, citizens want a balanced, middle-path diplomacy. People want Bangladesh to assert its dignity and equality in relations with everyone — neither confrontation nor alignment against one country in favour of another. 

The demand is for self-respect, sovereignty and equal treatment with all partners.

Do you expect post-election tensions, both internal and external, to subside automatically? 

No, not automatically. We are already seeing continuous social and political churn. Elections alone will not resolve that. The next government will need to engage actively and demonstrate fairness in governance.

If people do not see credible, fair and inclusive governance, the underlying tensions will remain. 

Foreign policy stability is closely tied to internal legitimacy.

How do you assess the role of the US in the context of Bangladesh's elections? According to a recent DW report citing experts, some argue that Washington may be favouring Jamaat-e-Islami, while others believe the US seeks leverage by preferring a weaker government. 

I see three perceptions regarding the US. 

First, some believe the US is maintaining closer communication with Jamaat-e-Islami and that this may give Jamaat an advantage. 

Second — and this is the most credible — the US position, clearly stated by the ambassador, is that they support a transparent electoral process and will work with whichever government is elected by the people. 

Third, some argue... I don't want to go into that. 

It is important to understand that Washington operates within a broader geopolitical framework. It views Bangladesh through both a global and a regional lens. Previously, the regional lens was largely shaped through India; now, the US is increasingly trying to view Bangladesh independently. That is one shift.

At the global level, the US ambassador has already stated that Washington does not view Bangladesh's growing closeness with China favourably. This position is rooted in the US' global strategic considerations, not Bangladesh alone. 

Therefore, we must understand where US sensitivities lie — some are regional, some are bilateral and some are global. From Bangladesh's perspective, prioritisation must be based on our own capacity and independent assessment.

Based on my understanding, the second position reflects actual US policy. The United States has long maintained dialogue with all political parties. That is standard diplomatic practice. If any party emerges as a significant political force — government or opposition — the US will engage with them.

There is widespread perception on social media that the US wants Jamaat in power. Do you agree? 

No, I do not accept that interpretation. Diplomatic engagement does not mean political endorsement. The job of diplomats is to talk to all relevant political actors, understand their positions, and assess future scenarios. 

The US focus is on process — whether the election is participatory, credible, and transparent. They have made it clear that they will work with any elected government, including one led by Jamaat, if that is the outcome.

How do you see China's role in Bangladesh amid growing global power competition? 

There is definitely global competition involving Bangladesh. However, all major powers, including India, agree on certain fundamentals: Bangladesh should remain stable, democratic, and continue its economic progress. 

China sees Bangladesh as an important partner, particularly under the Belt and Road Initiative. China has been involved in infrastructure, agriculture, health, and increasingly investment. 

In areas where other partners hesitate, China often steps in. There is space for continued cooperation with China, especially where Bangladesh's development needs align with Chinese capacity.  

Where does India fit into this evolving geopolitical landscape? 

India remains a critical partner. We have deep security concerns, extensive trade relations, and geographic realities that cannot be ignored. These will continue whether you like it or not. 

Even during the past one and a half years of political strain, bilateral trade has remained largely stable. If Bangladesh's economy grows further, economic engagement with India will likely intensify. 

This relationship is structural, not temporary.

How should Bangladesh manage relations with multiple competing global powers?

The core principle should be engagement with all, alignment with none. Bangladesh must maintain working relationships with India, China, the US, the EU, Japan, and others — without allowing rivalry among them to create friction inside our own policy space.

This requires professional, capable diplomacy. We must keep partners at a safe distance from one another while advancing our own interests. Many countries — Vietnam, for example — manage complex relations with China and the US successfully. 

Bangladesh can do the same. But this requires clarity about what Bangladesh itself wants. Our priorities must be defined domestically, not dictated externally. In that context, Bangladesh must remain engaged with all major powers while carefully managing competing interests through professional diplomacy.

How does Bangladesh's graduation from LDC status change its foreign policy calculus? 

This is critical. Previously, as an LDC, Bangladesh received benefits without being asked for much in return. That era is ending. Now, relationships are becoming transactional. Over the next 50 years, Bangladesh's diplomacy will be fundamentally different from the past 54. 

Partners will expect commitments, concessions, and alignment on certain issues. That is why strategic thinking and long-term planning are now essential.

Diplomacy must function professionally and independently, but direction must come from political leadership. Without a clear political vision, diplomacy cannot be effective. If political leadership leans excessively toward one side, risks increase. Diplomacy needs space, autonomy, and trust — otherwise it cannot manage complex global relationships.

What is your assessment of last-minute international agreements by the interim government? 

Some agreements are continuations of earlier commitments — for example, discussions with the US on tariff arrangements. In that sense, continuity can be justified. However, the real concern is transparency. 

What exactly are we signing? What obligations are we assuming? Once signed, future governments are bound by these agreements. Stakeholder consultation has been weak. Whether it is trade deals or port-related agreements, affected groups often say they were not consulted. 

All stakeholders must be consulted. Otherwise, this undermines accountability and public trust, and it leaves the burden on future governments and parliaments.

What foreign-policy challenges will the next parliament face? 

Reconciliation will be a major challenge. If post-election politics returns to boycotts and street confrontation, then we will have learned nothing from recent history. Parliament must become the space for resolving political conflict. 

Otherwise, instability will persist, undermining both domestic governance and foreign policy credibility. If the same patterns repeat, Bangladesh risks facing another crisis like July. 

The lesson is clear. Without institutional reform and inclusive politics, neither democracy nor diplomacy can be sustained.