16 years of Hasina: The kind of tie Bangladesh doesn’t want with India
From rigged elections to trade restrictions and border killings, Bangladesh’s relationship with India under Hasina was anything but equal. The future demands a different approach
Indian External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar recently remarked that Dhaka must decide what kind of relationship it wants with New Delhi.
Fair enough. But before we discuss what we do want, let's be clear on what we don't: another 16 years of the so-called "special ties" we saw under the Hasina regime.
During this period, Bangladesh played the junior role while India, as the "big brother," dictated the terms.
Take 2013, for example—when India's then-Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh flew to Dhaka to "persuade" Jatiya Party's HM Ershad to join the 2014 elections. With the BNP boycotting, this move ensured a controlled opposition and a one-sided election, rubber-stamped by New Delhi.
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The result? Hasina stayed in power, but Bangladesh's democratic credibility crumbled—lost for a decade until a mass uprising forced her out in August 2024.
During the Hasina era, water-sharing was no less disappointing. In 2011, then-Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh arrived in Dhaka with a proposed Teesta treaty—only for West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee to block it at the last moment.
Since then, successive Indian governments have failed to deliver equitable solutions—not only regarding the Teesta dispute but also concerning other transboundary rivers like the Feni, Dharla, and Dudhkumar—leaving Bangladesh to endure crippling dry-season shortages and worsening ecological woes due to India's upstream water diversions, which have severely impacted agriculture, fisheries, and biodiversity.
Transit arrangements have mirrored the same imbalance. While Bangladesh opened its roads and rivers to facilitate India's northeastern connectivity—providing seamless passage for Indian goods—Bangladesh's own attempts to secure similar access for its exports to Nepal and Bhutan through Indian land routes have been stymied by bureaucratic delays and selective permissions.
Then there's the treatment of Bangladeshi citizens. The Indian visa process – now limited to medical and emergency ones only – was often riddled with bureaucratic obstacles, particularly for those who have travelled to China or Pakistan.
And even if one managed to secure a visa, the ordeal wouldn't be over—many faced undue scrutiny and humiliation at Indian immigration and customs, making it obvious that every Bangladeshi traveller is a suspect.
On the trade front, New Delhi unilaterally imposed abrupt trade restrictions as well, such as bans on onions, sugar, and wheat, destabilising Bangladesh's markets and contributing to abnormal price hikes.
For instance, in December 2023, India extended its export restrictions on onions, including a minimum export price of $800 per tonne and a 40% export duty, until 31 March 2024. This decision caused onion prices in Bangladesh to surge by Tk20-25 per kilogram, as local markets struggled to adjust to the sudden supply shortfall.
Similarly, India's ban on wheat exports in May 2022 and non-basmati rice in July 2023 disrupted Bangladesh's food security, prompting Dhaka to seek assured annual supplies of these staples from New Delhi to mitigate future market volatility.
To attain the Hasina regime's legitimacy, which was severely questionable due to a lack of people's mandate and blatantly rigged elections, the Hasina regime prioritised Indian interests over those of Bangladesh.
At times, cultural disputes have surfaced too—India's early GI registrations of Jamdani sari, Fazli mango, and Nakshi Kantha revealed a tendency of heritage claiming and cultural appropriation before Bangladesh could formally protect its own.
But of all grievances, border killings remain the most painful. Despite the so-called warmth and friendship with India during the Hasina era, India's Border Security Force (BSF) went ahead with a "shoot-to-kill" policy, leaving hundreds of Bangladeshi nationals dead over the years.
The 2011 killing of 15-year-old Felani Khatun, her body left hanging from a barbed-wire fence, became a haunting symbol of these brutal excesses—promises of non-lethal enforcement notwithstanding.
And so, according to Dr Saimum Parvez, Senior Researcher at the MF Norwegian School of Theology, Religion and Society, Oslo, Norway, under the Awami League government, bilateral relations between India and Bangladesh were not based on cooperation but rather on a lopsided advantage for India.
"To attain the Hasina regime's legitimacy, which was severely questionable due to a lack of people's mandate and blatantly rigged elections, the Hasina regime prioritised Indian interests over those of Bangladesh," Dr Parvez said.
"Bangladesh was never treated with the equality and respect that a sovereign country deserved," he added.
In return, Hasina got exactly what she sought from India. Saleh Uddin Ahmed, a US-based academic, political analyst and former Ducsu secretary, explains that India had been supporting Hasina in every international forum when there was immense criticism of Hasina's brutal authoritarian rules everywhere.
"International media covered it fully and many foreign governments did not suppress their displeasure with Hasina's election manipulations, and oppression of the opponents," he said.
Ahmed specifically referred to a Washington Post article in August 2024, which detailed how Indian diplomats were pleading with the Biden administration "to go easy with Hasina" after the January 2024 one-party election.
The article mentioned, "Indian officials demanded that the United States tone down its pro-democracy rhetoric. If the opposition were allowed to gain power in an open election, Indian officials argued, Bangladesh would become a breeding ground for Islamist groups posing a threat to India's national security."
Ahmed further added, "Prime Minister Modi was also appreciative that Hasina did not make any public outcry on Modi's anti-Muslim policies by which 204 million Indian Muslim population were suppressed brutally. Modi reciprocated by keeping his mouth shut on Hasina's foul politics of goom (abduction), khun (extrajudicial killing) and election manipulations."
But moving forward, this can't be the way of India-Bangladesh relationships any more.
According to Dr Nazmul Islam, associate professor of Political Science and Head of Türkiye, Asia and Indo-Pacific Studies at Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University, India should revisit its foreign policy approach. Instead of engaging primarily with a single political party, India should cultivate reliable and balanced relations with all political parties, particularly by fostering goodwill among the Bangladeshi people.
He explained that, unlike Pakistan, Bangladesh does not pose a significant security threat and has no active conflict zones along its border. Therefore, treating both Bangladesh and Pakistan in the same way could be counterproductive.
"It is crucial for India to recognise that provoking anti-Indian sentiment in Bangladesh serves neither country's interests and may, in the long run, hinder regional stability and cooperation," he said.
Dr Islam added that instead of following its foreign policy approach with Russia or Israel, India should take inspiration from countries like France, Germany, Türkiye, or the UK—nations that have fostered regional cooperation, engagement and partnerships to build a more stable and civilised international order.
That said, one thing that could severely hurt Bangladesh-India relations is, once again, the Hasina factor.
So, "the first gesture of goodwill that India could show to Bangladesh is to extradite Sheikh Hasina to Bangladesh for trial for her involvement in crimes against humanity," Dr Parvez said.
