Why money matters in elections and statecraft — and where it comes from

There are promises of jobs, free healthcare, industrial revival, youth empowerment, and a state that finally works for everyone —  typical of election seasons. 

But beyond the rally stages and policy summits, another conversation is unfolding quietly inside the finance ministry and economists' offices, one that is far less forgiving.

Where will the money come from?

Under the promises of the leaders lies a political economy shaped by money, not only in public spending, but in how power itself is acquired. Elections in Bangladesh are so expensive that many candidates enter politics expecting returns on their investment.

Once elected, the pressure to recover campaign costs often pushes MPs towards rent-seeking, influence-peddling and corruption, feeding a cycle in which public office becomes a financial asset rather than a public trust.

The result is a continuous loop: Money buys access to politics, politics generates opportunities for private gain, and the fiscal burden ultimately falls back on the state and its citizens.

Bangladesh is heading towards the 2026 national election at a time when its fiscal room is shrinking. Public and private investment remain sluggish, domestic business activity is weak, export growth has slowed, revenue collection is struggling to keep pace, while debt servicing and interest payments continue to rise sharply. Even covering basic operating expenses has become a challenge for the state.

Against this tightening backdrop, the scale of proposed spending is expanding dramatically.

One of the clearest examples is the National Pay Commission's proposal for an increase of up to 142% in salaries, allowances and pensions for government employees. If implemented fully, the new pay structure would require an additional Tk1.06 lakh crore every year. Economists say mobilising such an amount under current economic conditions borders on impossible.

Even if the pay hike were phased in over three fiscal years, the government would still need to find around Tk35,000 crore annually, roughly the equivalent of three and a half months of total national revenue just to sustain higher public sector wages. This is not development spending. It is recurrent expenditure, locked in year after year.

The pressure does not stop there. Election-year politics has a habit of multiplying commitments.

As Bangladesh approaches the polls, both the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami have placed the economy at the centre of their political messaging.

Jobs, industrialisation, investment, and a more business-friendly environment dominate their narratives. Party sources from both camps have confirmed that these priorities will feature prominently in their manifestos.

BNP is signalling an emphasis on youth employment, private sector growth and expanded social protections. Jamaat-e-Islami too has shared its vision at a policy summit in Dhaka, briefing foreign diplomats, economists and civil society representatives.

In principle, economists and business leaders welcome the focus. Bangladesh needs jobs. It needs investment. It needs confidence. But the questions return quickly: how realistic are these plans, how fast can they be implemented, and how will they be financed? Institutional capacity, fiscal discipline and revenue mobilisation remain unresolved gaps.

Healthcare offers a revealing case study of how political intention and fiscal reality collide.

As Bangladesh moves closer to 2026, voters are being offered expansive visions of the future. The harder task lies in confronting the arithmetic behind them. Until the gap between political ambition and fiscal capacity is honestly addressed, the most important question will continue to echo, unanswered, beneath the noise of the campaign: Where's the money?

Health has emerged as a central election issue, with parties promising higher public spending, free treatment and steps towards universal coverage after years of limited investment.

The current national budget allocates Tk41,908 crore to health. That sounds substantial, until it is placed in context: it represents 5.3% of the total budget, but only 0.67% of GDP. Even that allocation is not always fully utilised.

For ordinary citizens, the consequences are immediate. Around 68% to 73% of healthcare costs in Bangladesh are paid directly by households. Nearly three-quarters of medical expenses come out of people's own pockets.

The promise of free or expanded public healthcare resonates deeply, but delivering it would require sustained, predictable funding far beyond current allocations.

This is where money begins to matter not just in policy, but in politics itself.

A recent report by the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD), a UK public body dedicated to strengthening democracy and open societies, lays bare how expensive politics has become in Bangladesh. 

Titled "The Cost of Politics in Bangladesh", the report paints a picture in which wealth increasingly determines who can contest, win and govern: candidates typically spend between Tk5 crore and Tk10 crore to secure party nominations and run election campaigns. The situation, the report notes, worsened significantly during the past four Awami League-led governments between 2009 and 2024, as financial influence in politics grew dramatically.

The research, conducted between July and December last year, was based on 25 in-depth interviews with former MPs, election officials and other stakeholders, alongside two focus group discussions and extensive analysis of government publications, international organisation data and academic literature.

To even be considered for nomination, candidates often spend heavily on community events, donations to local institutions and the maintenance of informal patron-client networks. As the report puts it, "A common perception in Bangladesh is that those unable to spend money cannot be credible candidates for MP."

Several politicians interviewed indicated that aspiring candidates often spend between Tk2 crore and Tk5 crore simply to gain the favour of influential party leaders, particularly within the Awami League and the Jatiya Party. The report also alleged that, in some cases, additional payments were made directly to members of the prime minister's family to secure nominations, an allegation denied by Jatiya Party Secretary General Mujibul Haque, who told a national daily, "This allegation is an absurd one. No one had to pay for getting a party nomination."

Campaigning itself is even more costly. Candidates typically spend Tk3 crore to Tk5 crore or more, depending on constituency size and competition. On polling day alone, an average of Tk50 lakh is spent per candidate. Vote-buying was reported across all election contests in 2024, with payments ranging from Tk1,000 to Tk5,000 per vote.

The money does not always come from clean sources. While formal funding includes party contributions and personal savings, informal financing often involves donations from businesses, vested interest groups and, in some cases, illicit sources linked to tax evasion, extortion and organised crime. Such backers, the report notes, expect political influence in return once candidates are elected.

Even after victory, costs continue. Some candidates reportedly spend an additional Tk4-5 lakh to expedite administrative processes, including the official publication of results and documentation.

The outcome is visible in the composition of parliament. 

According to Transparency International Bangladesh, 85% of MPs in 2024 possessed movable or liquid assets worth Tk1 crore or more. In the 2018 parliament, that figure was nearly 82%, according to Shushashoner Jonno Nagorik.

Businessmen now dominate politics: 66% of MPs in the 2024 parliament were businessmen, compared to 38% in 1991 and just 18% in 1973. Some interviewees told the researchers that election expenditure in certain constituencies may reach as high as Tk100 crore.

Nurul Huda Sakib, a researcher and a professor of Government and Politics at Jahangirnagar University, warned that high election expenditure has become normalised. "This trend is also contributing to the growth of crony capitalism and kleptocracy," he said.

The WFD report recommends stronger legal frameworks and coordinated oversight to deter financial misconduct, proposing a task force involving the Anti-Corruption Commission, the Information Commission, the Comptroller and Auditor General and the Election Commission. It also calls for party nominations based on merit rather than privilege.

Taken together, these strands reveal why the question of money matters so deeply. Election promises of higher pay, better healthcare and more jobs are not merely policy choices; they are shaped by a political economy where access itself is costly, and public resources are perpetually stretched.

As Bangladesh moves closer to 2026, voters are being offered expansive visions of the future. The harder task lies in confronting the arithmetic behind them. Until the gap between political ambition and fiscal capacity is honestly addressed, the most important question will continue to echo, unanswered, beneath the noise of the campaign: Where's the money?