Do election losers always concede defeat?: Why strong democracies move on, but weak ones don’t
The refusal to accept electoral defeat has become a defining fault line between strong and weak democracies. Political scientists call it “losers’ consent” — the willingness to accept defeat and compete again
Just after dawn in Dhaka, before the queues at polling centres had fully formed, the warnings had already begun.
Senior leaders of several political parties went on record to say they would not accept the results of what they described as a "setup election". The language was familiar, almost ritualistic. Acceptance, they suggested, would depend not on the ballot but on who controlled the process.
In political science, there is a precise term for this moment: losers' consent. It describes the willingness of the losing side in an election to accept defeat, recognise the winner's legitimacy, and prepare for the next contest.
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Where losers' consent holds, elections become routine exercises in accountability. Where it collapses, ballots turn into flashpoints; followed by court battles, street protests, crackdowns, or, in the worst cases, coups and civil war.
In the aftermath of Bangladesh's first competitive election in more than 15 years, this global pattern matters.
Around the world, the refusal to accept election results is far more common in weak or uneven democracies, while countries with stronger institutions tend, though not always, to absorb defeat and proceed to peaceful transitions. The contrast is stark, and the consequences profound.
When losing feels like an existential threat
The Kofi Annan Foundation, in its policy brief titled Confidence in elections and the acceptance of results, gives a blunt diagnosis.
In many weaker democracies, elections are experienced as a "winner-take-all game". Winners gain not only office but control over resources, protection from prosecution, and access to patronage. Losers, by contrast, may face persecution, exclusion, or even violence. In such systems, losing is not a temporary setback; it is a threat to personal and political survival.
This structural fear explains why losers' consent breaks down so easily. Research cited in the brief shows that losers' evaluations of elections are significantly more positive in established democracies than in non-established ones.
Where power-sharing mechanisms, independent courts, and institutional "veto players" exist, losers are more willing to trust the system even when they dislike the outcome. Where these safeguards are absent, distrust hardens quickly.
Bangladesh's own recent history fits this pattern. For years, elections have been boycotted, disputed, or followed by civil disobedience. After the July Uprising of 2024 and the formation of an interim government, the country voted again yesterday amid deep scepticism.
Africa
Across Africa, election rejections increasingly trigger institutional standoffs and violent state responses.
In Tanzania's October 2025 election, the main opposition party CHADEMA rejected the results, alleging systematic rigging and the abduction of activists. By early 2026, reports indicated that security forces had killed hundreds during the ensuing protests.
In Uganda, veteran opposition figures, including Kizza Besigye, rejected President Yoweri Museveni's victory in the January 2026 presidential election. Their rejection followed the arrest of more than 500 opposition members and a nationwide internet shutdown, conditions under which acceptance was arguably impossible.
Zimbabwe's 2023 election followed a similar script. The Citizens Coalition for Change rejected the re-election of President Emmerson Mnangagwa, while observers from the Southern African Development Community concluded that the poll "fell short" of democratic standards. The government ignored both the rejection and the critique, remaining firmly in power.
These cases illustrate a recurring cycle: weak institutions, high-stakes competition, rejection of results, and repression. Acceptance is not absent because opposition parties are uniquely obstinate, but because the political cost of losing is perceived as unbearable.
Europe
In Europe, election rejection has increasingly intersected with democratic backsliding and geopolitical tension.
Belarus set the template in 2020, when Alexander Lukashenko claimed an implausible 80% of the vote. Opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya rejected the results, triggering the largest protests in the country's history. The regime responded with mass arrests and forced exile, crushing any prospect of negotiated acceptance.
Georgia's crisis has been slower but no less destabilising. After the October 2024 parliamentary elections, the pro-Western opposition and President Salome Zourabichvili rejected the victory of the Georgian Dream party, alleging fraud and Russian interference. Protests and political paralysis have persisted into 2026, eroding trust in the electoral system itself.
Even within the European Union, warning signs are visible. In Hungary, with elections approaching in April 2026, the surging Tisza Party and other opposition groups have already questioned the fairness of redistricting laws passed under Viktor Orbán. The rejection has not yet happened, but the groundwork has been laid.
Americas
In the Americas, election rejection has increasingly followed a recognisable populist script.
The most influential example remains the United States in 2020. After losing the presidential election, incumbent Donald Trump refused to concede, alleging widespread fraud despite losing more than 60 court cases and audits confirming the results. The denial culminated in the 6 January 2021 Capitol riot and left behind a durable election-denial movement within American politics.
Brazil saw echoes of this in 2022. Jair Bolsonaro delayed conceding defeat to Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, while supporters claimed the electronic voting system was rigged. On 8 January 2023, they stormed government buildings in Brasília, mimicking the imagery and logic of Washington.
Elsewhere, rejection has been more institutional. In Venezuela's 2024 presidential election, the opposition presented physical tally sheets indicating victory for Edmundo González. Nonetheless, government-controlled courts and the election authority certified Nicolás Maduro. Much of the international community continues to refuse recognition, making this one of the most disputed elections in the region's history.
Honduras added another variant in late 2025, when Congress itself rejected official election results, citing procedural violations, plunging the country into an institutional standoff accompanied by mass protests.
In many weaker democracies, elections are experienced as a "winner-take-all game". Winners gain not only office but control over resources, protection from prosecution, and access to patronage. Losers, by contrast, may face persecution, exclusion, or even violence.
Asia
Asia has some of the clearest contrasts between breakdown and resilience.
Myanmar represents the extreme. After Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy won a landslide in November 2020, the military rejected the results, alleging fraud. When the election commission dismissed the claims, the Tatmadaw staged a coup on 1 February 2021, annulling the results entirely. The country remains trapped in civil war.
Pakistan's February 2024 election followed a different but equally corrosive path. Supporters of the imprisoned former Prime Minister Imran Khan alleged that results were altered during the final count to favour military-backed candidates. Nationwide protests followed, and a senior bureaucrat, the Rawalpindi commissioner, publicly confessed to helping "convert losers into winners". Despite this, official results stood and a coalition government was formed, leaving legitimacy deeply contested.
Thailand's rejection was quieter but no less consequential. In 2023, the Move Forward Party won the most seats, yet its leader was blocked from becoming prime minister by a military-appointed Senate. In 2024, the Constitutional Court dissolved the party altogether, effectively nullifying the voters' mandate.
Indonesia, by contrast, demonstrated how stronger institutions can contain rejection. After Prabowo Subianto's victory in 2024, losing candidates filed lawsuits alleging nepotism and state interference. The Constitutional Court rejected the claims due to a lack of evidence, and the transition proceeded peacefully.
Where acceptance still works
Against this backdrop, it is easy to forget that most elections worldwide still end without incident.
In July 2024, the United Kingdom delivered a textbook case of losers' consent. After 14 years in power, the Conservatives suffered a landslide defeat. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak conceded early the next morning, resigned, and facilitated the swift appointment of Keir Starmer. "Power will change hands in a peaceful and orderly manner," he said, and it did.
Mexico followed a similar path in June 2024. Claudia Sheinbaum's historic victory was quickly acknowledged by her rival, Xóchitl Gálvez, once the official "quick count" was released. In India, despite losing its outright majority, the BJP formed a coalition government after the opposition accepted the results as a moral victory rather than a stolen mandate.
Taiwan's January 2024 election showed how acceptance can endure even under intense external pressure. Candidates from rival parties delivered concession speeches on election night, recognising Lai Ching-te's win.
South Africa, in May 2024, saw the African National Congress lose its parliamentary majority for the first time since 1994. President Cyril Ramaphosa accepted the result and entered a Government of National Unity with long-time rivals.
Similar patterns played out across Europe and beyond: France's fractious but accepted hung parliament in 2024; Germany's orderly transition in 2025; Canada's smooth power shift the same year; and Botswana's extraordinary 2024 election, where a party that had ruled since independence conceded defeat even before the final count was complete.
These countries share common traits. Independent electoral management bodies operate with genuine autonomy. Courts function as credible arbiters rather than political weapons. Crucially, losing office does not mean losing personal security or political relevance.
Why it matters for Bangladesh
The lesson from these cases is not that rejection only happens in authoritarian states. Even established democracies can falter, as the US demonstrated. But the frequency, intensity, and consequences of rejection are far worse where institutions are weak, and politics is a zero-sum game.
Bangladesh's 13th National Election is taking place under precisely such conditions: low trust, high stakes, and a history of disputed outcomes. When parties declare in advance that they will not accept results, they are not merely posturing. They are signalling a deeper belief that the system cannot deliver a fair loss.
So, will the losers of this election concede defeat?
