Iran's 'Decentralised Mosaic Defence': A strategy for military resilience

Iran has developed a military strategy called the "Decentralised Mosaic Defence" to ensure its armed forces can continue fighting even if the country's top leaders, central communications, or major command centres are destroyed.

The doctrine assumes that in a conflict with a stronger opponent, such as the United States or Israel, Iran may lose centralised control, but its regional units must remain operational and able to act independently.

The core principles behind the strategy

The doctrine focuses on resilience through dispersion and redundancy. Instead of relying on a single command centre, authority and capabilities are spread across multiple locations and organisational units. The strategy follows the philosophy that "decapitation is not a silver bullet," aiming to keep the "body" of the military functioning even if the "head" is struck, says the Soufan Centre.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said: "Our military units are now, in fact, independent and somewhat isolated, and they are acting based on general instructions given to them in advance." He added that the doctrine allows Iran to "decide when—and how—war will end," even in the face of attacks on the capital.

The approach is meant for long-term conflict rather than quick battles. Ali Larijani, a senior Iranian official, stated: "Iran, unlike the United States, has prepared itself for a long war."

How is it organised?

The doctrine was formalised in 2005 under General Mohammad Jafari. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) reorganised into 31 provincial commands. Each provincial command functions as a self-contained military unit with its own weapons, intelligence, and command systems. Dr Michael Connall, an expert on Iranian military culture, said the restructuring was designed to "make any attempt at degrading Iran's defence exceedingly difficult."

To prevent operational paralysis, Iran has implemented "successor ladders." Deputy Defence Minister Reza Talaeinik stated that every position in the military chain of command has named successors "stretching three ranks down" who are ready to take over immediately if a superior is killed or isolated, says the Palestine Chronicle.

Low-cost asymmetric strategy

Iran's doctrine emphasises asymmetric warfare and attrition. Low-cost weapons, such as Shahed drones costing $20,000–50,000, are used to force opponents to spend millions on interceptors like the Patriot missile, creating what analysts call "cost asymmetry." Matthew McInnis, a former US deputy special representative for Iran, said the Iran-Iraq War and the invasion of Lebanon "entrenched a strategy based on proxy and asymmetric warfare, as well as ballistic missiles, to confront adversaries with superior technological capabilities and manpower."

The doctrine also relies on Iran-backed groups, collectively known as the "Axis of Resistance," to widen the battlefield. Velayati, a senior advisor to the Supreme Leader, said Hezbollah remains strong: "Hezbollah is stronger than ever," despite claims it had weakened.

Even threats on US soil are part of the broader picture. In 2017, a Hezbollah operative arrested in the United States admitted he was part of a "sleeper cell" instructed to act if the United States went to war with Iran. US President Donald Trump commented on such threats: "I guess Americans should be worried. We plan for it. But yeah, you know, we expect some things. Like I said, some people will die. When you go to war, some people will die."

The history behind it

Iran's military planners developed the doctrine after studying US military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans. They learned from the 2003 collapse of Saddam Hussein's centralised regime, observing that highly centralised militaries collapse quickly once their leadership is removed, reports Al Jazeera.

Abbas Araghchi highlighted the historical perspective: "We've had two decades to study defeats of the US military to our immediate east and west. We've incorporated lessons accordingly. Bombings in our capital have no impact on our ability to conduct war. Decentralised Mosaic Defence enables us to decide when—and how—war will end."

The strategy also draws on Iran's experience in the 1980–88 Iran-Iraq War and on prolonged war theories, where a weaker side survives by stretching the conflict and wearing down the enemy's political will.

The decentralised system increases unpredictability. Empowering mid-level officers to act independently can raise the risk of miscalculations or unintended escalation. Analysts note that the strategy assumes "severe loss and disruption," with continuity preserved through redundancy and organisational resilience.