What led up to the extrajudicial killings on 5 Aug’s ‘March to Dhaka’
This is a slightly edited version of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’ report on 5 Aug, before and after. The edits were for grammatical and stylistic reasons.

Public announcements by the protest leaders and information obtained by intelligence agencies gave Bangladesh's political leadership the knowledge that the protest movement was planning a major protest march towards the centre of Dhaka on 5 August, a UN report released today (12 February) says.
A day earlier, then prime minister Sheikh Hasina chaired a meeting of the National Security Council in which, inter alia the chiefs of Army, Air Force, Navy, BGB, DGFI, NSI, Police and its Special Branch, and the ministers of Home Affairs, Education and Foreign Affairs took part, according to participants.
They discussed reimposing and enforcing a curfew to prevent the "March on Dhaka."
After the meeting, the home ministry declared that a strict curfew would continue indefinitely without breaks, while the prime minister issued a statement describing the protesters as terrorists and "appealing to our countrymen to suppress these terrorists with a strong hand."
In a second meeting at the Prime Minister's residence in the evening, attended by Hasina herself, Asaduzzaman Kamal, the heads of army, police, RAB, BGB and Ansar/VDP, among others, the army chief and other security officials reassured the PM that Dhaka could be held, according to senior officials.
A plan was also agreed in which the Army and BGB would deploy alongside police to block protesters from accessing central Dhaka, if necessary by force.
The Army and BGB were to block access routes into central Dhaka by deploying armoured vehicles and troops and not letting protesters pass, while the police was to "control mobs," according to senior officials who participated in those meetings.
Consistent with these testimonies, just after midnight on 5 August, the former Director-General of the Special Security Forces, which was Sheikh Hasina's personal bodyguard force, sent two consecutive WhatsApp messages to the Director-General of the BGB.
According to hardcopies of those messages provided to OHCHR, the first message forwarded a broadcast message that appeared to be from protest leaders informing marchers on routes to take into central Dhaka.
The second message appeared to contain a video outlining an order of battle, distinguishing a first and second line of defence, a third long-range unit, a backup unit and a rear guard, along with advice from protest leaders on how to circumvent these lines of defence.
On the morning of 5 August, army and BGB personnel largely stood by and did not implement their assigned roles in the plan.
One senior official testified that the army had not deployed the forces that it promised to deploy, while another noted that BGB let some 10,000-15,000 protesters per hour pass by entry points it was supposed to control.
A third senior official recounted how he knew that something was going wrong when he saw CCTV footage showing 500-600 protestors moving from Uttara towards central Dhaka without the army stopping them.
A fourth senior official personally called the prime minister to inform her that things were not going according to plan.
The police nevertheless still shot at protesters in many places with lethal ammunition, attempting to stop the "March on Dhaka" and prevent protesters from reaching the centre of the city.
One police commander explained that "[t]he Army knew from early that day that Sheikh Hasina had fallen, but not the police. So the police were out there still defending the Government."
The OHCHR documented police shooting in several areas, all following the same pattern.
One journalist talked to several police officers, who told him that senior officers had forced them to deploy, but that ordinary police did not want to cause more casualties. Another witness to shooting in the area also saw the body of a boy who had been killed on 5 August later that day and told OHCHR that 5 August was "the happiest day for us [protesters], but the saddest for the boy's mother."
On the morning of 5 August, police and Ansar at the Jatrabari Police Station received orders to shoot at protesters to protect the station and its officers. They fired rifles and shotguns loaded with lethal ammunition from positions within and around the station at large crowds of protesters who had mobilised for the March on Dhaka and were gathering near the police station.
Some protesters were throwing bricks at the police, according to officials deployed at the scene.
Several protesters were killed, and scores injured. Among the victims was an autistic man who was hit by two bullets. Army units deployed in the area briefly de-escalated the situation in the early afternoon, but then withdrew.
Shortly after, police reinitiated confrontations by throwing a sound grenade at protesters outside the station gate and then storming out in formation while shooting their rifles and shotguns.
Witness testimony, corroborated by videos, established that police officers intentionally shot and killed several unarmed protesters at close range as they were seeking cover or fleeing, while police were also shooting generally towards the crowd.
On the afternoon of 5 August, as crowds of people began celebrating Sheikh Hasina's departure, some police were still shooting at them with lethal ammunition.
Among the victims were several young children.
In Uttara, a 6-year-old boy was shot dead when his parents brought him to a "victory march," as confirmed by witness testimony and medical records.
Videos and photos showed moments of jubilation when rumours of the Prime Minister's resignation spread.
However, chaos ensued with the sound of grenades and gunfire, causing them to flee. The child was shot in the thigh and later died in the hospital from his injuries. The witness did not see who shot the child but described a chaotic scene with security forces and people who resembled Awami League supporters by their attire throwing sound grenades.
There was an Armed Police Battalion station located nearby, and the witness described how the officers had taken positions on the south, east and west of the protest march. He also witnessed other people being injured and collapsing on the street, including another boy who was shot in the head.
In Mirpur, one of those shot by security forces at a celebratory protest was a 12-year-old boy, according to witness testimony and corroborating medical information.
On the afternoon of 5 August in Gazipur, a 14-year-old boy was deliberately maimed - shot in the right hand during a largely peaceful protest of 5,000 to 6,000 participants.
Witnesses stated that protesters were unarmed and posed no serious threat. The situation escalated when security forces began firing without warning. The crowd, blocking roads near Ansar Gate, panicked and fled.
Forensic evidence shows that the boy was shot at close range with shotgun pellets. The shooter aimed to punish him for allegedly throwing stones, saying, "You won't use this hand to throw stones again." The victim suffered severe damage to his right hand, with over 40 shotgun pellets embedded and significant bone and tissue damage.
Another incident occurred in Gazipur, where police officers apprehended an unarmed rickshaw driver and shot him dead at close range. The police dragged the body away and never returned it, leaving the family unable to bury and mourn their loved one. The police officer who shot the man was arrested in September. A family member pleaded with OHCHR: "I want justice, independent investigations and the return of [the] body."
In Ashulia, the situation escalated in the afternoon, when protesters targeted the Ashulia Police Station.
A large crowd surrounded the station and, despite repeated attempts by the police to retreat, continued to advance, throwing bricks and debris. In response, police fired indiscriminately, using military rifles loaded with lethal ammunition. While the police attempted to clear a path for their exit, the gunfire was random and appeared more aimed at intimidating the crowd rather than specifically targeting violent individuals.
This resulted in injuries and fatalities among both protesters and bystanders. A 16-year-old student was critically injured in the spine by a bullet fired at close range, paralysing him.
On the order of senior police officials, police later piled the dead bodies of shooting victims into a van and set fire to the vehicle in the apparent hope that the burning of the bodies would create the false impression that the victims had been killed by protesters.