Why bureaucrats avoid becoming project directors
Why are capable officials reluctant to lead development projects despite the prestige and power attached to the role? The answer lies in structural risk, bureaucratic culture, and corruption incentives embedded deep within the system
In a post-ECNEC meeting press briefing, the highly respectable Planning Adviser expressed that no officer likes to become a Project Director (PD). This is very sad, since at the time of joining government service, each official signs conditions stating that he or she is willing to work in any post to which the government appoints them.
In Bangladesh, the size of the ADP is around one-third of the national budget, and the number of projects is around 1,200 (1,173, 1,343 and 1,309 in FY 2025–26, 2024–25 and 2023–24, respectively). On average, about 800 officials are required to serve as project directors, since in many cases one PD heads more than one project.
These PDs are mainly engineers and mid-level bureaucrats; a few come from agriculture, medicine and other professions. PDs ideally need qualities such as integrity, leadership skills, sound decision-making, task delegation, organisation, professional proficiency, problem-solving ability, collaboration, negotiation skills, goal orientation and management capacity.
The Government of Bangladesh has gained a widespread reputation for undertaking many projects to satisfy public and political expectations, utilising almost 30% of the national budget. The development budget portrays nationwide development activities, for which each government claims credit for growth and progress.
Most governments take credit for this portion of the budget because it is spent on visible infrastructure such as roads, railways, bridges and other social, educational and health facilities that directly benefit the population. The remaining 70% of the national budget is spent on routine expenditure such as salaries, bonuses, housing, equipment, ammunition and foreign debt payments, which are less visible to the public and do not directly affect daily life.
There is a formal procedure for selecting and appointing PDs to implement these projects. At the first stage, based on dossiers kept at the Ministry of Public Administration and other relevant bodies, the Planning Ministry prepares a preliminary list.
After scrutiny, this is placed before a committee headed by the Planning Minister, with several secretaries as members. They examine service records and decide which officers are suitable to serve as PDs.
The question is why officials are unwilling to become project directors despite the post being important and attractive in terms of decision-making authority, financial and administrative power, and independent office facilities. Many officials fear taking responsibility for large expenditures and implementing projects under strict timelines.
By definition, projects operate within limited resources — time, manpower and tools.
A crucial aspect of project implementation is the procurement of goods, services and works, which consumes a major portion of the budget. This requires practical knowledge of procurement rules and the administrative burden of forming committees under Public Procurement Rules.
Arranging tender evaluation, tender opening and technical specification committee meetings is cumbersome. Preparing agendas and minutes requires specialised skills. After evaluation committee meetings, proposals must follow a strict approval process through the Head of Procuring Entity (HOPE).
Procurement is the most risk-prone part of project implementation. Officials fear future corruption allegations that could lead to job loss or imprisonment.
Procurement involves complex steps such as pre-qualification, tender invitations, requests for proposals, financial and technical submissions, and consultant conflict-of-interest declarations. Public procurement rules require extensive documentation and strict template compliance.
Preparing a procurement plan alone involves a 19-column framework requiring precise scheduling of advertising, evaluation, approvals and contract signing.
While running a project, a PD must organise external meetings such as Project Implementation Committee (PIC) meetings, chaired by the head of the agency and Project Steering Committee (PSC) meetings, chaired by the ministry secretary. These must occur at least quarterly.
Setting agendas, issuing notices, arranging logistics, drafting minutes and securing approvals are demanding tasks. PDs must also answer questions in monthly ADP review meetings in the presence of ministers.
All projects must follow strict activity schedules. Many officials are unaccustomed to working under rigid timelines. Failure in one component can disrupt an entire project.
For example, the Dhaka Airport Third Terminal faced operational delays due to a minor telecommunications oversight despite costing Tk 23,000 crore. Similarly, land acquisition delays in a sub-project slowed the Dhaka–Sylhet Highway project.
Following a schedule is far harder than drafting one, partly due to a broader institutional culture that undervalues disciplined time management.
Consultant management can also be complex. International consultants require strong English communication skills. Some consultants are highly experienced retired officials, and effectively utilising their expertise demands managerial sophistication.
PDs are sometimes subjected to undue and unethical pressures from agencies and ministries. Officials with strong ethical standards often resist such environments.
The Delegation of Financial Power is a critical administrative framework PDs must follow to avoid audit objections or legal risk. Audit compliance is mandatory, and failure can even affect pension eligibility. Audit authorities demand extensive documentation for all expenditures.
In some technical departments, serving as a PD is prestigious and contributes positively to promotion. In bureaucratic settings, however, the role is sometimes undervalued or even career-risking.
Consequently, corrupt actors may aggressively pursue PD posts, while honest officials avoid them, leaving projects poorly managed.
Routine administrative work distributes accountability through hierarchies. PDs, by contrast, bear concentrated responsibility. The role resembles running an independent organisation, increasing vulnerability to penalties.
Yet the fear is not entirely justified. PDs usually have deputies, consultants and staff. Their primary role is guidance, coordination and oversight — though this still requires deep project management knowledge.
Interestingly, competition is intense for technical infrastructure projects (roads, bridges, ports), while social sector projects attract fewer volunteers.
This imbalance is often driven not by patriotism but by corruption opportunities embedded in procurement-heavy technical projects. Non-technical projects offer fewer illicit gains.
Therefore, it is inaccurate to say officials are unwilling to become PDs. The real issue lies in the motivations behind willingness. When incentives are tied to corruption and informal power rather than service excellence, the system discourages integrity.
Until corruption risks are structurally reduced and PD roles are linked to career advancement, honest officials will remain reluctant. Without serious reform, improvement is unlikely in the near future.
Policy makers rarely recognise the importance of appointing skilled, reputable officials with integrity as PDs. Even when officers hold degrees in procurement or project management, they are often posted outside development work.
Experience in field administration is rewarded with promotion; similar institutional value should be attached to project leadership. Linking PD experience to career advancement, expanding the pool of professionally trained officers and ensuring structured training in procurement and project management could encourage capable officials — if policymakers truly prioritise reform.
Mamun Al Rashid is a former secretary of the Planning Division.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and views of The Business Standard.
