What does ‘conservation diplomacy’ look like for Bangladesh?

Over the past few months, diplomacy has been dominating the media more than ever before: devastating armed assaults on Ukraine and Gaza, trade tariffs, countries trying to buy other countries, repatriation of refugees, and political leaders, and so on. But, in Bangladesh, we hardly talk about diplomacy in the environment sector.

Bangladesh's participation in the climate change conferences (or Conference of the Parties/COPs) has increased a lot after the Covid-19 pandemic. While the purpose of hundreds of attendees is often questioned, our government delegations have been making a mark in climate diplomacy for a long time. 

Some diplomatic milestones include chairmanship (2005-06) of the Least Developed Countries (LDC) Group on Climate Change for the UNFCCC, chairmanship (2011-13; 2020-22) of the Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF), and positively influencing the outcome of the Loss and Damage Fund at the COP27 in Sharm-El-Sheikh.

I strongly believe Bangladesh should link the sustainable management of its transboundary rivers, forests, and landscape with transnational energy, trade, and transport negotiations through effective diplomacy. The government has already started talking with China for long-term management of its waters, including transboundary ones, during the Chief Advisor's visit in the last week of March 2025.

Besides being a member of many climate change-related UN and funders' bodies, opening the South Asia Regional Office of the Global Centre on Adaptation (GCA) in Dhaka in September 2020 is also a milestone.

On the other hand, on the topic of sharing natural resources with the neighbours, effective water diplomacy is crucial for Bangladesh, which falls within the purview of environmental diplomacy. Nevertheless, with India having the 30-year Ganges Treaty expiring in December 2026 and not having a treaty for Teesta and other rivers, but still signing the Feni River MoU (2019), for instance, leaves us confused over Bangladesh's hydrodiplomacy.

But what about diplomacy in biodiversity conservation or 'conservation diplomacy'? Let me share three examples to show where we stand.

First, starting in 2014, UNESCO's World Heritage Committee (WHC) took a strong stand over the Bangladesh Sundarbans (a World Heritage Site) and the controversial Rampal power plant. In its 43rd session (2019), the WHC even threatened Bangladesh to put the Sundarbans on the 'List of World Heritage in Danger' if the country didn't comply with its decisions.

Bangladesh, however, positively responded to the WHC by preparing annual State of Conservation reports, the Strategic Environmental Management Plan for the southwest region, and an ecological monitoring framework for the Sundarbans, among others.

But the Rampal power plant wasn't moved or stopped operating. Yet, two decisions the WHC took in its 45th session (September 2023) indicate that its tension with Bangladesh had calmed down through the latter's conservation diplomacy: i) The WHC appreciated the government's measures taken on the Rampal power plant to avoid impacts on the Sundarbans, and ii) Bangladesh doesn't need to submit the State of Conservation annually anymore. The next report is now due by 1 February 2029.

Second, in November 2023, Bangladesh received the highest vote at UNESCO to get elected as a member of the International Coordination Council of its Man and the Biosphere (MAB) programme (MAB-ICC). The MAB-ICC is the governing body of the 55-year-old MAB. It is interesting to note that the MAB's flagship activity is the declaration of 'Biosphere Reserves' around the world.

Although Bangladesh will be part of governing the MAB until 2027, it doesn't have a single biosphere reserve. We also can't ignore the fact that the MAB-ICC election happened just two months after the 45th WHC meeting mentioned above. That election, therefore, is a great success of conservation diplomacy by the Bangladesh Mission at UNESCO in Paris.

Third, as noted earlier, while water diplomacy at the government level is a sensitive issue, Bangladesh has long been involved in hydrodiplomacy outside the government channel by engaging civil society and academia.

In 2010, the Ecosystem for Life: A Bangladesh-India Initiative (E4L) became a pioneering project, which brought in elements of hydrodiplomacy by using a relatively neutral 'ecosystem lens'. With Dutch government funding, IUCN organised joint research, dialogues, exchange visits, advocacy campaigns, and capacity-building programmes with a wide range of stakeholders from both countries. This experience helped a lot to frame the narrative of transboundary cooperation in the water sector in wider South Asia.

The foundation built by the E4L is still continuing through a couple of multi-phased regional projects. IUCN and its partners are implementing the Building River Dialogue and Governance in Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna River Basins (BRIDGE GBM) project (2016-2026) in Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India, and Nepal. 

The Transboundary Rivers of South Asia (TROSA) (2017-2027) is being implemented by Oxfam Novib in the GBM basin with Swedish support. Aquatic systems and their intricate relationships with people remain the key element of these hydrodiplomacy projects.

So, how can we take our 'conservation diplomacy' forward? I strongly believe Bangladesh should link the sustainable management of its transboundary rivers, forests, and landscape with transnational energy, trade, and transport negotiations through effective diplomacy. The government has already started talking with China for long-term management of its waters, including transboundary ones, during the Chief Advisor's visit in the last week of March 2025.

Bangladesh's new BIMSTEC chairmanship also gives us an opportunity to capitalise on conservation diplomacy. Focusing on the sustainable management of biological resources of the Bay of Bengal and linking it with the Blue Economy and Blue Justice agenda could be a key development here.

Bangladesh could explore further and link its stewardship of the Bay to the biodiversity-rich eastern region of India as a 'Blue-Green Regional Cooperation Track' —similar to what the former Japanese PM Fumio Kishida envisioned as the Bay of Bengal Industrial Growth Belt (BIG-B) in 2023. Thus, conservation diplomacy could be a legacy of Bangladesh's current BIMSTEC chairmanship.

Dr Haseeb Md Irfanullah is an independent consultant working on environment, climate change, and research system; a visiting research fellow at the University of Liberal Arts Bangladesh (ULAB). Email: hmirfanullah@outlook.com.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and views of The Business Standard.