Bangladesh and the lessons of the Arab Spring

Bangladesh entered a new political phase on 5 August 2024, when Sheikh Hasina's government fell after weeks of student-led protests and a violent state crackdown. The uprising ended a 15-year period of increasingly authoritarian rule, but it also opened a more uncertain period in which political actors had to decide what should replace the old order.

The fall of a government is usually the most visible part of an uprising. What follows is less dramatic but often more consequential. New authorities must respond to public expectations, manage political rivalries, investigate past abuses and decide how much of the existing state system should be preserved, reformed or replaced.

The Arab Spring offers several examples of how difficult that process can become. Tunisia, Egypt and Libya all removed long-standing rulers in 2011, but their transitions developed in sharply different ways. Each began with demands for dignity, justice and political change, yet the years that followed produced different combinations of elections, institutional conflict, repression and instability.

Bangladesh is not a continuation of the Arab Spring, and its political institutions, military, economy and social structure differ from those of the Arab states. The comparisons are therefore not predictions. They are a way of examining the pressures that emerge once the unity of an uprising gives way to the competing demands of governing, reforming institutions and distributing political power.

Looking at what happened after the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya can help place Bangladesh's post-2024 transition within a wider history of movements that succeeded in removing governments but then faced the more complicated question of what should come next.

Tunisia and the limits of compromise

Tunisia's uprising began after Mohamed Bouazizi, a young street vendor, set himself on fire on 17 December 2010. Municipal officials had confiscated the goods he sold in Sidi Bouzid, and he had failed to obtain redress. He died on 4 January 2011.

His act captured the despair of young Tunisians facing unemployment, corruption and police harassment. Protests spread nationwide, growing into demands for jobs, dignity and an end to President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali's rule.

An estimated 338 people were killed during the uprising and related unrest. Police used live ammunition and made mass arrests, but the violence failed to stop the movement. On 14 January, Ben Ali fled, ending his 23-year rule.

In both Tunisia and Bangladesh, frustration over employment provided the spark, while state violence turned a socioeconomic protest into a movement against authoritarian rule.

"Removing a government does not automatically transform the institutions and political practices that supported it." 

Tunisia was initially regarded as the Arab Spring's only democratic success. It held competitive elections and adopted a new constitution. When political assassinations and ideological divisions threatened the transition in 2013, the National Dialogue Quartet mediated between rival forces. The compromise kept the process alive and earned it the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize.

Yet unemployment remained high, poorer regions felt neglected and institutional reform remained incomplete. Public trust fell as governments failed to deliver economic progress.

That disillusionment created an opening for President Kais Saied. In July 2021, he suspended parliament, removed the prime minister and concentrated authority in his own hands. Parliament was later dissolved, and many post-revolution freedoms were weakened.

Tunisia shows Bangladesh that a political charter can stabilise a transition, but elite agreement alone cannot sustain democracy. Citizens also need jobs, fair opportunity, accountable policing and effective institutions.

Egypt and the system that survived

Egypt's 2011 uprising emerged from decades of political repression, police brutality, corruption and economic frustration. Hosni Mubarak had ruled for nearly 30 years, while the country had remained under emergency or martial-law conditions for more than three decades. Political opposition was tightly restricted, and almost a quarter of the population was living in poverty by 2011.

Inspired by the fall of Tunisia's president, Egyptians began mass protests on 25 January 2011 under the demands of "bread, freedom and social justice". For 18 days, people from different classes, religions, generations and political backgrounds gathered in protest. Mubarak resigned on 11 February, creating a widespread belief that collective action could bring political change.

The unity of the uprising, however, gradually gave way to political division. Egypt held elections that were more competitive than those of the Mubarak era, and Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood became the country's first democratically elected president in June 2012. His government soon faced growing opposition, economic difficulties and accusations that the Muslim Brotherhood was attempting to dominate state institutions.

In July 2013, the military removed Morsi following mass demonstrations. Security forces later violently dispersed protests by his supporters, killing large numbers of people. The military's intervention brought Egypt's brief democratic experiment to an end and restored the political influence of institutions that had remained powerful after Mubarak's departure.

The consequences extended beyond formal politics. The uprising initially opened new space for freedom of speech, political participation and public debate. But the political conduct of Islamist groups, the military's return to power and the violence that followed led many young Egyptians to reconsider their views of religion, political authority and established institutions. Although the uprising's democratic and economic goals were not realised, its social and generational effects continued.

Egypt therefore did more than replace one ruler, but it did not succeed in establishing a durable democratic order. The military, police, intelligence agencies, bureaucracy and judiciary retained considerable influence, while meaningful accountability and civilian oversight remained limited.

Bangladesh's circumstances are different. The armed forces did not formally assume power after August 2024, and the country did not follow Egypt's exact political path. Egypt's experience nevertheless shows that removing a government does not automatically transform the institutions and political practices that supported it. It also demonstrates how the unity created during an uprising can weaken when competing groups struggle over the new political order.

Libya and the danger of a weakened state

Libya's uprising began in Benghazi in February 2011 after the arrest of Fathi Terbil, a lawyer representing families of victims of the 1996 Abu Salim prison massacre. The protests soon expanded into demands for accountability, political freedom and an end to Muammar Gaddafi's 42-year rule.

The government responded with lethal force, and the uprising developed into an armed rebellion as military personnel defected and opposition forces seized territory. NATO intervened after the United Nations authorised measures to protect civilians. Gaddafi's government collapsed, and he was captured and killed in October 2011.

The end of the first civil war did not bring a stable political order. Gaddafi had deliberately weakened national institutions and governed through personal loyalty, security networks and regional patronage. After his removal, the transitional authorities could not establish effective control over the armed groups that had fought in the uprising. Many militias retained their weapons and began controlling territory, detention centres and state facilities.

Libya held elections in 2012, but political disputes and militia competition led to a second civil war in 2014. Rival authorities emerged in the east and west, supported by competing armed groups and foreign governments. The conflict intensified in 2019 when forces led by eastern commander Khalifa Haftar attempted to capture Tripoli. The offensive failed, and a ceasefire was reached in 2020.

A UN-backed government was formed in 2021 to prepare the country for elections, but voting scheduled for December that year was postponed. As of 2026, Libya remains divided between the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity and eastern authorities aligned with Haftar. Large-scale nationwide war has not resumed, but militias continue to exercise considerable influence, elections remain stalled and foreign powers retain a military and political presence.

Libya therefore experienced not only the removal of an authoritarian ruler but two civil wars, foreign intervention and the prolonged division of state institutions. Bangladesh's circumstances are fundamentally different. Its uprising did not become an armed conflict, and national institutions continued functioning after the change of government. Libya nevertheless shows the risks of weakening an authoritarian state without establishing legitimate institutions capable of maintaining security, delivering services and resolving political disputes.

Bangladesh's unfinished institutional battle

Bangladesh has made important gains since August 2024. Reform commissions examined the constitution, electoral system, police, judiciary, public administration and anti-corruption institutions. Their proposals contributed to the July National Charter, signed by major political parties in October 2025.

The charter included prime-ministerial term limits, stronger opposition representation, judicial independence and reforms to constitutional appointments. The February 2026 election restored political competition, while serving military officers were brought before a civilian tribunal over enforced-disappearance cases.

But implementation of the charter is contested, some judicial reforms were later reversed and police reform has fallen short. Allegations also persist that officers linked to earlier abuses received favourable appointments.

The bureaucracy remains vulnerable to political influence, while major parties have shown little progress in internal democracy, transparent financing or open candidate selection.

These weaknesses matter because authoritarianism in Bangladesh was not built by one leader alone. It was sustained by politicised institutions, selective law enforcement, weak parliamentary scrutiny and a culture in which party loyalty often mattered more than professional independence.

Jobs, justice and the meaning of July

The uprising began with anger over government jobs. Two years later, youth employment remains a central test of whether the transition can address the grievances that brought students onto the streets.

A 2026 government policy brief placed youth unemployment at just over 8 per cent. Around 5.5 million people aged 15 to 24 were outside employment, education or training, while unemployment among National University graduates was estimated at more than 28%.

Young Bangladeshis will judge the new order through fair recruitment, employment, education and freedom from political discrimination.

The rule of law is another test. Political clashes, mob attacks, custodial deaths and crimes involving politically connected groups have weakened confidence in institutional authority.

An uprising cannot claim success if one form of political fear is replaced by another.

The harder revolution

Bangladesh has avoided the worst outcomes of the Arab Spring. It has not returned to direct military rule, collapsed into civil war or fractured between rival governments. But avoiding disaster is not the same as completing a democratic transformation.

Tunisia shows that political compromise without economic delivery can exhaust public confidence. Egypt shows that unreformed coercive institutions can outlive the ruler they protected. Libya shows that weakening state authority without building legitimate institutions creates space for armed and factional power.

For Bangladesh, the harder revolution is institutional. It requires oversight of the security agencies, judicial autonomy, protection of the Election Commission and a professional administration free from partisan control. Political parties must also reform, while violence must be prosecuted through law rather than revenge.

The final verdict on the July Uprising will not be determined by the fall of one government. It will be determined by whether another mother can question those in power without losing her child, and whether institutions, rather than rulers, parties or crowds, answer her demand for justice.