'Bangladesh faces change on 3 fronts simultaneously; being reactive no longer enough'

Where does Bangladesh stand diplomatically at this moment, and how deep are the challenges?

We are caught in a multi-layered complexity. Change is happening simultaneously on three fronts, and I have never seen anything like this in Bangladesh's history.

The first layer is domestic. The 2024 mass uprising was driven primarily by economic grievance as the younger generation took to the streets over livelihoods and jobs. Yet even after the change of government, we have not been able to escape that economic crisis.

The second layer is regional. The fallout from the India-Pakistan conflict has not subsided, and Pakistan's role in the Iran war has added fresh tensions to South Asia. Add to that the China-India rivalry, and the picture becomes considerably more complicated.

The third layer is global. The competition between the United States and China is now openly visible. The two powers appear to be working, each in their own way, towards a bipolar world order. We have already seen the ripple effect in Dhaka: The American ambassador says one thing, and the Chinese ambassador immediately issues a rebuttal.

So we are under pressure on all three fronts at once: domestic, regional, and global. Bangladesh's relationships with both India and Pakistan are adding further tension to this already fraught equation.

What is the significance of the prime minister choosing China over India as his first foreign visit?

At its core, this is a political decision. India's prime minister extended a personal invitation, including to the family. That much cannot be denied. But post-2024 Bangladesh carries a deep public scepticism about India, and that reality simply cannot be ignored.

The economics matter too. Some groundwork was already laid during Professor Yunus's visit. An FTA to preserve trade ties after Bangladesh's LDC graduation had been discussed with interest on both sides. 

Beyond that, there are three possible avenues — budget support, project loans, and direct investment. If large infrastructure spending can accelerate growth, it may offer some relief from the current employment crisis.

Does China actually have the capacity to provide that kind of support?

The capacity is certainly there in forms of surplus capital, technology, and the ability to deliver. But the real question is: we want it, how much do they want it?

During Professor Yunus's visit, they pledged investment, but they also set out two conditions clearly: adherence to market principles and a competitive business environment. Chinese firms no longer operate to a lower standard than their Western counterparts. If they are to come here in a meaningful way, they will look at our regulatory framework, the confidence level in our banking system, and whether our dispute resolution mechanisms actually work.

These are not uniquely Chinese concerns, they apply to any investor. Even domestic investors have not yet reached that threshold of confidence. Last month, private sector credit growth fell below five per cent. That figure says it all.

The same logic applies to project loans. How effectively you use the money matters to them. From my own working experience, Chinese firms now operate with standards equal to, and in some areas exceeding those of Western companies. Where our workforce cannot match that standard, they bring their own people. 

If we want foreign investment, we must first make ourselves worth investing in. That is the fundamental point.

So what should Bangladesh's diplomatic strategy look like, caught between multiple great powers?

Our foreign minister made an important statement during his recent visit to Delhi: the relationship is not zero-sum, it is non-zero-sum. I agree entirely.

The core principle is to focus on areas where the United States and China are not in direct competition. Infrastructure, for instance, American investment does not come in that space, so seeking Chinese financing there gives Washington no legitimate grounds for complaint. The same logic applies to India.

This is not a novel path. Vietnam maintains deep economic ties with China while cooperating directly with the United States on security. Singapore is a treaty partner of the United States yet does most of its trade with China. Lee Kuan Yew was once asked about this, and he said he wanted to be like them. Many countries around the world navigate this same reality successfully. We must start thinking along the same lines.

The difference now is that we can no longer afford to be reactive. We need to be proactive in carving out that space. If working with China creates tension with India or the United States, we must factor that in and focus on the areas where such tension does not arise. There is room to work with everyone, but it requires deliberate choices.

How has the relationship with India evolved since the 2024 uprising?

Even before the January 2024 election, the great powers had divided. The United States was pushing for a credible election and had threatened visa restrictions. India, China, and Russia stood behind the Hasina government and helped neutralise that pressure. Then came the uprising, the fall of the government, and Hasina's departure to Delhi. The relationship Bangladesh had built with India over 15 to 17 years collapsed virtually overnight.

After a year and a half of an interim government and a hundred days of the new government, we are now in what I would call the resetting phase. The old structure is gone, but a new one has not yet been built.

Doubt exists on both sides. Among Bangladeshis, the question remains whether India has genuinely understood the spirit of the 2024 uprising. From India's side, the question is whether this government is sufficiently attentive to matters India considers important and their watchful eye on Bangladesh's recent closeness with Washington and Beijing only adds to that uncertainty.

Both sides do agree, in principle, that the relationship needs to be restructured. For India, security remains the top priority. Over 15 years, they committed close to $10 billion in investments, roughly half of which has been implemented. What happens to those investments, and whether their security concerns are addressed; these are the two questions that will determine whether the relationship can move forward.

What about relations with the US? Why has the trade agreement attracted so much controversy?

Of all our major bilateral relationships right now, the one with the United States is the most settled. Alongside the trade agreement, an energy MoU has been signed, and a senior State Department official has visited.

I was personally uncomfortable with certain provisions of the agreement. Some of the terms create constraints for us. But I am not willing to read it purely as a negative. If this agreement becomes the catalyst for domestic reform like better regulation, reduced corruption, a business environment brought up to global standards, the benefits will extend well beyond the American relationship to our dealings with the EU, China, and Japan.

It is worth remembering why American companies are often reluctant to invest in markets like ours. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act means that any involvement in bribery, however indirect, exposes them to legal liability back home. If we want American investment, we must create conditions where they can operate without that fear.

Is there a risk of friction with the European Union?

I would not call it a deterioration, but we will face questions. The EU is our largest export market with over $20 billion, compared to $8 billion with the United States. If they come to us and say, "You gave the Americans certain concessions, will you extend the same to us?" that is a question we will have to answer carefully. 

The LDC graduation decision at the UN General Assembly in September adds another dimension. We have requested a three-year extension, but there are indications the outcome may be conditional, tied to specific benchmarks. The EU and the 46 LDC countries in Africa will play a significant role in that process. I am not seeing the level of engagement with these stakeholders that the situation demands.

How would you assess the new government's diplomatic performance in its first hundred days?

Three months is too short a period for a thorough assessment. Broadly, the government is making an effort to maintain relationships across the board. Relations with the United States are settled. Relations with China are progressing smoothly. With India, the journey has not yet properly begun, and some recent developments are adding to the complications.

What I will say is this: at a moment of this much pressure, simply reacting to events is not enough. Space must be actively created. Building Bangladesh's capacity like skilled human resources, institutional reform, a sound business environment, these are ultimately the most powerful instruments our diplomacy has.