Escape from Dhaka

On 16 December 1971, at 1:05 pm, an Alouette III helicopter of the Pakistan Army took off from near Dacca airport and flew past the airfield, where preparations were under way at the VIP helipad at the foot of the air traffic control (ATC) tower to receive General Jagjit Singh Aurora, the commander of the Indian forces that had entered the war in East Pakistan earlier in the month.

Flying at deck level, the helicopter — piloted by Major Mohammad Zareef Bangash — headed southwards towards the Burmese city of Akyab, at the northern tip of the country.

Also on board were Major Tauhid ul Haq, another Alouette pilot; Major Ijaz Minhas, an aviation engineer; and a Pakistan Air Force squadron leader. In the rear seat were 10 jerry cans of spare jet fuel for refuelling en route, as this type of helicopter did not have the endurance to reach its destination on the fuel in its tanks alone.

After about four and a half hours of flying — skimming the Bay of Bengal and hugging the terrain to avoid detection by Indian naval forces, which had a strong presence in the Bay — and an additional hour spent refuelling in the Arakan jungles south of Chittagong, the helicopter touched down safely at Akyab towards dusk.

That same day — a fateful one in Pakistan's history and an inglorious one for the Pakistan Armed Forces — Lieutenant General Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi signed the Instrument of Surrender. 

As Lt General Kamal Matiuddin notes in his book on the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, "Lieutenant General Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi, HJ, SJ, MC, Mention in Despatches, signed the Instrument of Surrender at 4:31pm on 16 December 1971 and handed over control of Pakistan's eastern province to its bitterest enemy."

Early deployment to East Pakistan

When I recently spoke to Zareef — now a retired colonel — he recalled that his association with East Pakistan had begun months earlier, soon after the military crackdown of March 1971.

"In the early part of April 1971, soon after the 'military crackdown' of 25 March 1971, I was ordered to proceed to East Pakistan for duty with the Aviation Logistic Flight attached to Eastern Command," he said. "There were three other fixed-wing pilots with me."

At Karachi airport, they boarded a PIA Boeing 707 from the Hajj Terminal, along with a company-strength contingent of the Khyber Rifles, whose men carried their arms and ammunition on board.

"Soon after we were airborne, the pilot called me to the cockpit and enquired what we had loaded onto the aircraft," Zareef recalled. "He said he had barely managed to lift it off the end of the runway because it was far too heavy, and advised us to be more careful about weight in future."

The flight remained uneventful until Colombo. Direct flights over India to Dacca had been banned following the Ganga hijacking incident.

"When we reached Colombo, the pilot called me into the cockpit again," Zareef said. "This time he reported that two Indian fighters were tailing him. He climbed higher and applied more throttle to gain speed, losing the fighters, but while flying up the eastern coast of India we were harassed by Indian aircraft several more times."

Despite this, the aircraft landed safely in Dacca, and the pilots reported for duty.

Flying without an air force

Zareef explained that the absence of Army aircraft in East Pakistan meant improvised arrangements had to be made.

"Since there were no Army aeroplanes in East Pakistan, we were converted onto Cessnas of the flying club and Beavers of the Plant Protection Department," he said. "We were tasked with flying all kinds of missions — command and liaison, observation, reconnaissance — apart from conducting the occasional artillery shoot from the air onto Indian concentrations close to the border."

One such mission, he said, stood out vividly even decades later.

"One of the most memorable missions was an artillery shoot in the Feni area, with Major General Qazi — if I recall correctly — the GOC 33 Division himself sitting in the aircraft, along with one of his artillery unit commanders," Zareef recalled.

There was a Plant Protection pilot at the controls of the Beaver, with Zareef acting as co-pilot and observer.

"We flew for over five hours that day, registering targets across the border," he said.

To maintain visibility, the aircraft flew at around 5,000 feet above ground level.

"During the flight, at times we felt as though the aircraft had been hit by ground fire, but there was no physical evidence," he said. "Later, we learnt that we were being fired upon by Indian air defence artillery guns. Since the fuses were designed to detonate at around 4,500 feet, the shells were bursting below us. Mercifully, the Indians did not call up any fighters to engage us."

Conversion to helicopters

In early May, Zareef returned to West Pakistan.

"Around the first week of May, I reported back to Dhamial Camp near Rawalpindi for conversion onto Alouette III helicopters," he said. "In October, I was sent back to East Pakistan."

By then, the Army Aviation Squadron had arrived in full strength.

"There were six Mi-8s and six Alouette IIIs operating under Eastern Command," he said.

In the months leading up to open hostilities, the squadron was kept busy flying a wide range of missions.

"These included resupply of arms and ammunition, transporting General Niazi and his staff to various formations and headquarters, and carrying regular troops and commandos to regain positions taken by the Mukti Bahini," Zareef said.

Another frequent task involved ferrying international observers and media teams.

Although primarily an Alouette pilot, he also flew aboard Mi-8s when required.

"Apart from flying Alouettes with senior captains like the late Nauman Mahmood and Saghir, I occasionally sat in the co-pilot's seat of the Mi-8s when there was a shortage of crew," he said.

Escalation of hostilities

On Eid day in November, General Niazi toured various headquarters by helicopter to meet troops.

"That day, we learnt that one of our PAF aircraft, which had intruded into India, had been shot down and the pilot had bailed out," Zareef recalled. "The other damaged aircraft — flown, if I recall correctly, by PQ Mehdi, the recently retired Air Chief — managed to make it back to Dacca."

By then, the security situation had deteriorated rapidly.

"The Mukti Bahini had become very active, and all our troops deployed in various sectors were bracing for the impending Indian invasion," he said. "Because of the Mukti factor, communications by land and riverine craft became extremely hazardous, and in some cases impossible, so helicopters and their crews were constantly pressed into service."

Casualty evacuation became a major responsibility, alongside directing artillery fire.

"One of my most painful missions was conducting a shoot onto my own battalion — the 4 Bengal Regiment at Bhairab Bazar — into which I had been commissioned and with which I had spent the first four years of my service," Zareef said. "This was when Pakistani forces were attempting to retake the town."

Despite the pressure, he paid tribute to the maintenance crews.

"I must say that the EME maintenance crew did a remarkable job keeping the helicopters serviceable despite their non-stop commitment, especially when removed from their main logistical and maintenance base in West Pakistan," he said.

The war breaks out

When full-scale war broke out in December, Army Aviation operations became even more constrained.

"As soon as the war broke out in December, the helicopters were dispersed throughout Dacca cantonment," Zareef recalled. "The Indians bombarded Dacca airfield and disabled it at the outset, preventing PAF aircraft from taking off."

Indian forces soon dominated the skies.

"Thereafter, the Indians dominated the airspace completely, restricting most of our flying to night operations," he said.

Flying conditions were perilous.

"We flew extensively during this period, mostly at night, often flying blind," Zareef said. "Even switching on landing lights drew intense ground fire. My earlier service in East Pakistan proved invaluable, as I knew the terrain well."

Delivering the news of surrender

A few days before the surrender, Zareef was assigned a particularly grim task.

"A couple of days before the surrender, I was tasked with flying a staff officer from Eastern Command to subordinate headquarters whose communications had been cut off," he said.

At each stop, sealed envelopes were handed over.

"The reactions ranged from resigned acceptance to outright fury," Zareef recalled. "The envelopes contained news of the impending surrender."

The most intense reaction came at Chittagong.

"The officer commanding the Chittagong garrison flung the orders in our faces," he said. "He said he would not accept an abject surrender when his troops had not even been bloodied."

Despite his anger, the commander allowed senior civil officials to leave.

"He allowed the Commissioner and the DIG Police — both West Pakistanis — to be evacuated to Dacca in my helicopter," Zareef said.

The decision to escape

On 15 December, Squadron Commander Lt Col Liaqat Asrar Bukhari convened a conference.

"He informed officers that Eastern Command had permitted him to evacuate all serviceable aircraft that night to Akyab in Burma, along with the maximum number of women and children," Zareef recalled. "One Alouette and its crew were to remain behind at the disposal of General Niazi."

Zareef and Tauhid ul Haq were selected.

"We were both bachelors," he said.

What followed was chaos.

"That night, chaos reigned as everyone attempted to get their families onto the helicopters," he said. "There was pushing and shoving as far more than authorised loads attempted to board."

According to Lt Gen Matiuddin, 139 women and children were evacuated — nearly double the permissible number.

"At about 3:00am on 16 December, four Mi-8s and two Alouettes got airborne and headed south," Zareef said.

A final escape

Later that morning, after some delay, Zareef sought permission to attempt a daylight escape.

"After much persuasion, I received permission to try," he said.

The helicopter lifted off, passing over the reception party assembled to receive General Aurora.

"We flew low over the trees and headed south," Zareef said.

Near Chittagong, a warning light came on.

"The fuel filter warning light illuminated, forcing an emergency landing in the Arakan forests," he said.

What followed was a tense refuelling operation.

"We refueled directly from jerry cans — something never normally done," Zareef recalled. "Local tribesmen approached and had to be kept at bay at gunpoint."

After several failed attempts, the engine finally started.

"We reached Akyab at dusk," he said.

The article was first published in February 2001 on Defence Journal and later reposted on online forum Make Pakistan Better in January 2013.