Yunus charts a path full of potholes towards referendum

The head of Bangladesh's interim government, Professor Muhammad Yunus, has taken a decision that many believe ought to calm frayed nerves and steady the wobbly ship. In a televised speech on 13 November, Yunus sought to balance the conflicting demands of key political parties. Yet, despite this balancing act, his charted path remains strewn with potholes.

The timing of Yunus's speech coincided—possibly deliberately—with the Awami League's (AL) first declared political action programme since being overthrown last year. Yunus's address, outlining the much-trumpeted referendum, dominated both the real-time news cycle and the next morning's headlines.

The AL, whose activities remain banned, clearly lost the media narrative but did not leave empty-handed. Scenes of heavy military and police presence on otherwise empty streets and intersections offered them some visual leverage too.

Considering that the AL was pronounced a "closed chapter" not so long ago by one of the leaders of last August's uprising, the party's so-called "Lockdown" programme probably gave Yunus and his allies food for thought. The AL's capacity, even in its greatly weakened state, to challenge the interim government in the months ahead is an unknown quantity—but it is undeniably one of the major potholes on Yunus's chosen path.

Placating the BNP and Jamaat

Yunus's decision to hold the referendum on constitutional reform proposals and the parliamentary elections on the same day, in the first half of February, serves two purposes. Firstly, it placates the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which had long been demanding such an arrangement. Secondly, scheduling both on the same day could help ensure a decent voter turnout.

The Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), however, has continued to press for a much earlier referendum. This is despite concerns that an earlier vote could derail the February target for general elections. Unlike the BNP, Jamaat does not appear to be in any rush to hold the elections and would likely not protest if the polls were delayed.

Yet JI's insistence on holding the referendum well before the elections may be more political posturing than a firm red line. Should elections go ahead in three months' time, Jamaat is unlikely to be absent.

Yunus did not ignore JI's demands. Far from it. His speech was followed by the issuance of the "July Charter Implementation Order 2025" by President Shahabuddin—a move backed by JI but opposed by the BNP.

Yunus also signalled support for JI by suggesting that elections to the yet-to-be-formed upper chamber would be based on the proportion of votes obtained by parties in the lower-house elections. The BNP was sidelined again, as the upper house was given a decisive role in passing constitutional amendments.

Asking voters to say Yes or No to 30 different constitutional topics risks turning the process into little more than a mockery.

Crucially, the next parliament will double as a "constituent assembly" tasked with implementing the changes outlined in the Charter. The BNP had opposed this, arguing that it had never been discussed, let alone agreed, during talks with the Consensus Commission.

Avoiding voter apathy

The real challenge the referendum faces is the referendum itself.

Referendums are a rarely used tool in Bangladesh. Of the three held in the past 50 years, two were designed primarily to "legitimise" military rule.

The first, held in 1977 by General Ziaur Rahman, received a 99% Yes vote on an 88% turnout. The second, in 1985 under General HM Ershad, garnered a 94% Yes vote on a 72% turnout. These results reflected a familiar global pattern: military dictators securing near-unanimous approval in referendums where almost the entire electorate voted.

The only credible referendum took place in 1991, when a significant constitutional change was submitted to the public for endorsement after being passed by parliament. It received 85% approval, though the turnout was a far more realistic 35%.

Holding the referendum and elections together would at least ensure that the Yes/No exercise on the constitutional reform proposals avoids the pitfalls of voter apathy.

A greater concern, however, is Yunus's decision to submit proposals for constitutional amendments to a referendum before they have been passed by parliament. In a normal parliamentary democracy, constitutional amendments are first passed by parliament and only then, if required by law—as in 1991—put to a public vote.

Flawed by design

The design of the referendum itself has raised eyebrows. According to the Chief Adviser's speech, voters will be asked to cast a single Yes or No vote on a set of four proposals, each addressing a variety of constitutional amendments outlined in the July Charter.

The first proposal suggests that the election-time caretaker government, the Election Commission, and "other constitutional institutions will be formed in light of the July Charter." Needless to say, this requires a considerable understanding of constitutional processes and the full scope of the Charter from the voter. How many are likely to even read—or fully comprehend—the question?

The third proposal is even more problematic. It requires parties winning the next elections to implement 30 amendment proposals, ranging from increasing the President's powers to limiting the Prime Minister's terms in office, and even boosting women's representation.

Many of these 30 proposals may well be beneficial for the country and necessary to strengthen democracy. But how many of the 126 million eligible voters would truly know what these 30 proposals entail?

Referendums are most appropriate when they deal with a single issue that is particularly important or contentious. Asking voters to say Yes or No to 30 different constitutional topics risks turning the process into little more than a mockery.

One Yes or No to Four

The second proposal suggests setting up an upper house with 100 members. This alone might have been a more suitable subject for a referendum, had parliament first passed such an amendment with the two-thirds majority required by the current constitution. The proposal also states that constitutional amendments would then require a majority vote in the upper house. Yet, the elected parliament must first amend the constitution to create the upper house in the first place—a circular and confusing arrangement.

The fourth proposal suggests that "other reforms" described in the Charter will be implemented by the parties according to their promises. But what exactly are these "other reforms"? Do the designers of this referendum seriously expect voters to read all 25 pages of the Charter, absorb the meaning of the 84 reforms listed, and make an informed decision?

On top of all this, voters will have only two options: one Yes to all four proposals, or one No to all four. There is no scope to say, for example, "I support the caretaker system, so that's a Yes, but I am not convinced by the upper house, so that's a No." Voters must either take the whole package or reject it entirely.

Attempts to approve such a sweeping set of constitutional amendments through a single referendum risk reducing the elected parliament to a mere rubber stamp. Rather than strengthening democracy, this path could easily edge the country towards authoritarianism.

The writer is the former Head of BBC Bangla and former Managing Editor of VOA Bangla. He can be contacted at: sabir.mustafa@gmail.com Follow on X: @Sabir59