Why the China-Pakistan-Bangladesh initiative might backfire
With national elections knocking at the door and an interim government in place, the legitimacy of making this far-reaching move is under scrutiny

Bangladesh's interim government agreed to a trilateral cooperation framework with China and Pakistan in Kunming earlier this month, which caught even seasoned observers off guard. What was described by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an "informal" meeting has since unfolded into a diplomatic blunder with potential serious consequences.
In plain sight, this multilateral engagement might seem like future-proof diplomacy. But context matters. With national elections knocking at the door and an interim government in place, the legitimacy of making this far-reaching move is under scrutiny.
Independent analysts were quick to point out the lack of transparency and timing of the decision. "There's already no end to problems. Why are we [Bangladesh] adding new ones?" Ajker Patrika quoted a former High Commissioner to India as saying.
The Kunming meeting — held on the sidelines of the 9th China-South Asia Expo — produced a joint statement outlining cooperation in at least five sectors, including maritime affairs and think tanks, and was anything but routine diplomacy.
Major General (retd) ANM Muniruzzaman, president of the Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS), stated in an interview with Ajker Patrika, "Looking at the list of areas of cooperation, it does not seem like Bangladesh responded to this initiative on a whim or without prior consideration."
Adding to this, he also questioned the narrative of the meeting being "informal," stressing the formal-level participation belied such claims.
That participation included Acting Foreign Secretary Ruhul Alam Siddique, days before his retirement, and Additional Foreign Secretary Imran Ahmed Siddiqui, both of whom have held key postings in Pakistan.
Bangladesh expressed reservations about publicising the meeting. China agreed by sharing its statement beforehand, but Pakistan did not — an act described by a Bangladeshi government insider as a "betrayal."
This initiative goes beyond the constitutional remit of an unelected government. Dr Selim Raihan, executive director of the South Asian Network on Economic Modelling (SANEM), questioned the interim administration's intention to enter strategic discussions without parliamentary research.
"The interim government's main responsibility is to carry out reforms and prepare for the national election. Such critical decisions should be left to an elected government," he wrote on Facebook.
The implications are far from theoretical. India, which has consistently stood against Chinese activities in the region, is likely to view this move with suspicion. The US, a key development and security partner, will also be watching closely.
As Muniruzzaman highlighted, "These issues will not escape the notice of neighbouring India, the globally influential United States, or other countries with interests in South Asia and the Bay of Bengal."
Altaf Parvez, a researcher of South and Southeast Asian history and politics, pointed out, "None of the three countries share borders with each other."
He added that the initiative "has not matured yet" and remains unlikely to evolve into a commercial or security alliance of substance. Historical precedents — BBIN, BIMSTEC — suggest that such regional frameworks often struggle to gain traction when driven by external influence rather than organic consensus.
"These issues will not escape the notice of neighbouring India, the globally influential United States, or other countries with interests in South Asia and the Bay of Bengal."
Indeed, Bangladesh's real challenge may not lie in committing to or backing out of this initiative, but in managing the fallout. Even if future governments decide to distance themselves, the diplomatic damage, especially with China, may be difficult to undo.
What this shows is a worrying lack of clarity in Bangladesh's foreign policy direction. Over the past 15 years, ties with India have grown stronger, yet not without imbalance or cost. A change towards a more balanced strategy is overdue, but must be made with foresight, not rushed under an interim regime with limited authority.
Altaf Parvez concluded the whole scenario by saying, "Maintaining this balance — having relations with both China and India — is a matter of diplomatic skill. And that is precisely the challenge now."