From marginal force to opposition party: The rise of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami

Jamaat-e-Islami supporters and activists during an election campaign in Dhaka. Photo: TBS

For decades, Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami was seen as a coalition-dependent junior partner, rarely able to translate its organisational depth into standalone electoral power. Its best performance came in 1991, when it won 17 seats. In 1996, contesting independently, it secured only three.

However, this year's result has been a landmark for the party.

In the 13th national parliamentary elections, Jamaat won 68 seats on its own, and 77 including allies. It polled around 30-35% of the vote in roughly 225 constituencies it contested – a dramatic leap from its long-standing 5-10% vote share. 

Although the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) secured a landslide with 209 seats alone, Jamaat's transformation into one of the country's two principal political forces marks a historic shift.

BNP's victory is significant. The party endured years of repression under Sheikh Hasina's authoritarian regime. Thousands of its activists were jailed, disappeared or killed, yet it survived and returned to power. 

But parallel to that story is the Jamaat's reinvention from a marginal force into a serious national contender.

"If you simply glance at the seat distribution, it looks like a landslide to the BNP. But as Bangladesh has seen, first-past-the-post tends to create this landslide effect, even when the share of votes is fairly evenly distributed between the parties," Thomas Kean, the Bangladesh and Myanmar consultant at International Crisis Group told The Business Standard. 

"There were quite a few seats in which Jamaat and its allies came close to defeating even high-profile BNP candidates. We don't have a confirmed breakdown for vote share by alliance, but the difference between the BNP alliance and Jamaat alliance could be smaller than it first appears," he added. 

How did this happen?

No analysis of Jamaat's rise can ignore the role of its student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir.

For decades, Shibir has built a structured network that recruits students from school level and systematically grooms them through ideological training, study circles and organisational training and operates year-round.

Illustration: TBS

Across universities and colleges, it creates leadership pipelines. Student members often transition seamlessly into professional associations, social organisations and eventually the party structure itself. This continuity has given Jamaat something rare in Bangladeshi politics: a disciplined, ideologically committed cadre base.

In recent campus elections, Shibir made notable gains, reinforcing perceptions among young voters that Jamaat represents organisation and order rather than chaos. In an election shaped by frustration with traditional parties, such discipline proved attractive.

No analysis of Jamaat's rise can ignore the role of its student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir. For decades, they have built a structured leadership pipeline recruiting students from school, college, and universities. This continuity has given Jamaat something rare in Bangladeshi politics: a disciplined, ideologically committed cadre base.

Jamaat's influence is not confined to formal politics. Over the years, it has developed a broad ecosystem of institutions – coaching centres, financial organisations, hospitals and charities – that collectively employ thousands of people across the country.

These networks do two things.

First, they provide livelihoods. In towns and districts where state services are weak, Jamaat-linked institutions often fill gaps in education, healthcare and microfinance. This creates embedded loyalty among beneficiaries and employees alike.

Second, they offer visibility. Coaching centres associated with Jamaat-linked networks are present in many district towns. Their branding, educational results and structured discipline reinforce the party's image of efficiency.

Unlike sporadic electoral alliances, these institutions function continuously. They generate local goodwill that can later translate into votes.

One of the most striking – and least discussed – aspects of Jamaat's surge has been the role of women.

From the outside, Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami is often perceived as a party of men. No doubt it's male-controlled party but it has a large number of women in its ranks. 

Women activists went door to door across the country, campaigning in towns and villages alike. In many areas, especially in rural communities, they were able to reach households directly, speaking to mothers and daughters in ways male activists could not. Their outreach was systematic and sustained.

They also organised large rallies in several districts. In some places, women activists reported facing intimidation and attacks, but continued their campaign activities. 

However, controversy followed. Leaders of BNP and other parties alleged that some activists misused religious messaging, telling ordinary village women that voting for Jamaat would guarantee heaven – effectively "selling tickets to heaven" for political support.

Such allegations, which Jamaat denies, reflect the broader debate over the role of religion in electoral politics and how faith-based narratives are deployed during campaigns.

Charity work has also played a visible role in reshaping Jamaat's public image.

During floods from Feni to Sylhet, party leaders – including Jamaat Ameer Shafiqur Rahman – were seen distributing relief. Images of him personally handing out aid circulated widely on social media. 

Relief work is not new in Bangladeshi politics. But Jamaat's messaging carefully framed these efforts as service rather than spectacle

At the grassroots level, another dynamic shaped perceptions: allegations of localised extortion and heavy-handed tactics by activists of larger parties.

In parts of the country, BNP activists were accused by opponents of engaging in extortion once the political environment loosened after the uprising that toppled Hasina. 

Against that backdrop, Jamaat benefited from a simple contrast: it was not widely associated with localised muscle power in the same way. 

Religion remains deeply embedded in Bangladesh's social fabric. While most voters describe themselves as moderate and pragmatic, religious identity often shapes emotional attachments.

Jamaat's campaign messaging avoided explicit calls for sweeping ideological change. Instead, it emphasised moral governance, honesty and accountability. In many rural areas, Jamaat leaders signalled – sometimes implicitly – that voting for Jamaat aligned with religious values.

Some analysts, however, caution against over-reading the religious factor. Mushtaq Khan, professor at SOAS University, had argued to Al Jazeera English that ideology alone would not decide elections.

"This election will not be about Islam versus secularism, nor about left versus right," he said earlier. "It will be about reform versus the status quo. The coalition that provides a more convincing agenda for reform while keeping stability will have an advantage."

Khan's framing helps explain Jamaat's recalibration. Rather than presenting itself as a theological alternative, it positioned itself as a reformist force. 

Jamaat's revival also drew fuel from the very repression that once decimated it.

Under Hasina's government, Jamaat and Shibir activists became the victim of enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention and killings. 

Like the BNP, Jamaat presented itself as a victim of authoritarian overreach. But unlike the BNP, which had previously governed, Jamaat could frame itself as persecuted yet untested at the highest level – a combination that appealed to protest-minded youth.

A two-party future?

Jamaat's jump from a 10% party to one polling above 30% reshapes the political map. For decades, Bangladeshi politics revolved around two poles: the Awami League and the BNP. With the Awami League banned and weakened, Jamaat has stepped into the vacuum as the principal challenger to the BNP.

Considered in light of Jamaat's historical performances, and the suppression it faced for 15 years, the result is a significant achievement for the party, Thomas Kean said. Party leaders seem confident that with their large contingent in parliament, they will be well-positioned to record an even stronger result at the next election, and possibly even claim victory. 

"However, that is a long way off and politics is unpredictable - who would have thought we would be here just over 18 months ago. There are many challenges for Jamaat, including appealing to a broader cross-section of society – the people who remain sceptical and voted BNP – and holding on to those who voted for them this time, particularly the ones who are not traditional Jamaat voters but gravitated to the party due to concerns over corruption or a desire to see something new," he said. 

So whether the surge proves durable is yet to be seen. Electoral momentum can be fleeting. Governing experience can expose weaknesses. And domestic as well as regional politics may test Jamaat's adaptability.

For now, however, one fact is undeniable that Jamaat has moved from the periphery to the heart of national politics. In doing so, it has forced Bangladesh to confront a new reality – one in which organisational discipline, welfare networks, religious symbolism and post-repression sympathy have converged to produce the party's strongest showing in history.