The future of Middle East: War, dependence and the emergence of a new order
This time, the question is not just who wins the war, but who defines the future that follows
The Middle East stands at yet another historical inflection point.
A widening conflict between the US–Israel axis and Iran has begun to redraw the strategic map of the region in real time. Iranian strikes on multiple Gulf countries hosting US military bases have exposed a fragile security architecture, one built less on sovereign strength and more on external guarantees.
The pattern of targeting is not random, but rather purely strategic. Countries hosting US bases or those deeply embedded in US economic networks have found themselves on the receiving end of Iranian attacks. The implication is that in the absence of these bases, such countries may not have been drawn directly into the conflict. Geography has been weaponised, but so has dependency.
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For decades, Gulf states have relied on US military protection as the backbone of their security. This dependence allowed them to prioritise economic expansion over military self-sufficiency. Oil wealth funded infrastructure, global investments, and modernisation projects, but not necessarily autonomous defence capabilities.
The current war has exposed this imbalance. When Iranian missiles struck, the response from these states was notably restrained. Not because the threat was insignificant, but because the capacity to respond independently remains limited.
This moment of hesitation is telling. It signals not weakness alone, but a realisation that reliance on external power comes with strategic vulnerability. As the conflict escalates, these nations are confronting a new reality: security cannot be indefinitely outsourced.
History is a sobering guide; the Middle East has witnessed cycles of war that have consistently reshaped borders, alliances, and power structures.
The 1948 Arab-Israeli War marked the violent birth of Israel as a state. Triggered by the United Nations' partition plan for Palestine, the war saw neighbouring Arab nations invade following Israel's declaration of independence.
The outcome was decisive: Israel not only survived but expanded its territory beyond the original UN lines. Jordan took control of the West Bank, Egypt occupied Gaza, and approximately 700,000 Palestinians were displaced in what is remembered as the Nakba.
Nearly two decades later, the Six-Day War of 1967 fundamentally altered the regional map again. Rising tensions, coupled with Egypt's military mobilisation and blockade of the Straits of Tiran, prompted Israel to launch pre-emptive strikes.
The result was a swift and overwhelming Israeli victory. Israel captured the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria, territorial gains that continue to define geopolitical tensions today.
In 1973, the Yom Kippur War briefly reversed the narrative. Egypt and Syria launched a surprise offensive to reclaim lost territories. Although Israel eventually regained the upper hand, the initial Arab successes restored political confidence across the Arab world. More importantly, the war paved the way for diplomacy, culminating in the Camp David Accords and Egypt's peace treaty with Israel.
Beyond the Arab-Israeli conflicts, the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) demonstrated the devastating consequences of regional rivalry. Sparked by fears of revolutionary spillover and territorial ambition, the war devolved into a brutal stalemate after eight years of trench warfare, chemical attacks, and immense human loss. Borders remained unchanged, but the region was left deeply scarred.
The Gulf War of 1990–1991 further entrenched the role of external powers. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait triggered a US-led coalition response that swiftly liberated Kuwait. While Iraq faced severe sanctions, the war cemented the US as the dominant external military force in the region.
The 2003 invasion of Iraq extended this influence, but at a cost. Although Saddam Hussein was overthrown, the absence of weapons of mass destruction and the dismantling of the Iraqi state triggered sectarian conflict, insurgency, and the rise of extremist groups such as ISIS. The long-term consequence was instability rather than order.
Each of these conflicts carries a lesson that wars in the Middle East do not end cleanly. They transform the region in unpredictable ways, often creating as many problems as they resolve. The current war appears to follow a similar trajectory. Three broad scenarios are emerging.
The first is a decisive victory for the US and Israel. In such a case, Israel could consolidate its position as the dominant regional power. This would represent a significant shift, from a state historically under threat to one exercising strategic primacy. However, such dominance could deepen regional resentment, potentially fuelling long-term instability rather than securing lasting peace.
The most likely scenario is a negotiated ceasefire. History suggests that outright victories in the region are rare; settlements, however fragile, are more common. Yet even a ceasefire would not restore the previous status quo. Instead, it could give rise to a new regional order.
The second scenario is an Iranian victory. This would fundamentally alter the balance of power. Israel's position would be severely weakened, and US influence in the Middle East could diminish dramatically.
The extensive network of US military bases and alliances would face unprecedented challenges. For Washington, this would represent not just a regional setback but a global strategic loss.
The third and perhaps most likely scenario is a negotiated ceasefire. History suggests that outright victories in the region are rare; settlements, however fragile, are more common. Yet even a ceasefire would not restore the previous status quo. Instead, it could give rise to a new regional order.
Early signs of this shift are already visible. A meeting of foreign ministers from Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey in Islamabad has drawn attention as a potential foundation for a new geopolitical bloc.
This grouping may represent, "The embryo for a new order designed to curb Israeli and Iranian dominance after the war," as noted by Patrick Wintour, Diplomatic Editor of The Guardian.
The significance of this development lies not just in its composition but in its intent. These countries bring complementary strengths: Saudi Arabia's financial resources and oil wealth, Turkey's military capabilities, Egypt's strategic geography, and Pakistan's nuclear deterrence. Together, they form a potential counterweight to both Israeli and Iranian influence.
The Islamabad meeting aimed to establish a pathway towards de-escalation. As noted in the report of The Guardian, "The group's first goal... is to persuade all sides to stop the escalation and agree to a ceasefire." This initiative reflects a broader recognition that prolonged conflict poses existential risks to the region.
Yasmine Farouk, a Gulf specialist at the International Crisis Group, highlighted the urgency in a report by The Guardian, "This group of four started becoming very active because this is really a dangerous stage of the war."
She warned of cascading consequences, adding, "We've already seen Israel damage nuclear plants inside Iran and the potential deployment of troops. This is the nightmare ... that could make some of the Gulf countries, who so far say they do not want the war to stop, realise that this is getting out of hand."
Her concerns extend beyond immediate military threats. "Because if you target desalination waters and the power plants, if you have a nuclear leak in the waters of the Gulf, this is when it becomes a nationwide crisis inside those countries."
The Islamabad discussions had modest but meaningful outcomes. Iran agreed to allow vessels operating under the Pakistani flag to pass through the Strait of Hormuz, "Possibly two a day," a confidence-building measure in a tense environment, as noted in a report by The Guardian.
The group also positioned itself as a key intermediary, maintaining indirect communication channels between Tehran and Washington.
The broader diplomatic landscape remains complex. Pakistan's foreign minister travelled to China to brief Beijing, raising the possibility of Chinese involvement as a guarantor in any future agreement, a prospect likely to be viewed with suspicion by the US.
Within the quartet, motivations differ. Saudi Arabia, despite being perceived as aligned with US objectives, appears to be hedging its bets. As Farouk noted, "All the options for the Gulf states are costly."
She added, "They want to see Iran pay a cost for the attacks on them… On the other hand, they cannot know whether the US will 'finish the job' without creating chaos and then leaving."
Turkey, perhaps the most invested member, has advocated a broader regional approach to negotiations. Its leadership has warned against the long-term consequences of the conflict.
Patrick Wintour cautioned in his report that the war could lead to "the laying of the groundwork for a conflict that could last decades among the region's foundational nations... It would pave the way for a prolonged civil war and blood feuds."
İbrahim Kalın, the director of Turkish intelligence, also warned, "Attacks by Iran on Gulf countries are unacceptable... But we must never forget who started the war."
At the same time, concerns have been raised about strategic manipulation. "Unfortunately, the region is being drawn step by step into a game scripted by Israel," Hakan Fidan, Turkey's foreign minister, argued, cautioning that Gulf states "should not fall for Israel's game."
He also shared an undercurrent of scepticism towards Washington. "If America is going to reach an agreement on negotiations with Iran, it needs to be prepared to exert very serious influence on Israel... We will see who will prevail here. We will see who governs whom and to what extent."
These statements reflect a broader shift; regional actors are no longer content to remain passive participants in externally driven conflicts. Instead, they are seeking to shape outcomes on their own terms.
This shift is likely to extend beyond diplomacy into defence policy. Much like Germany's recent reassessment of its security posture following uncertainties around NATO commitments, Middle Eastern countries are expected to increase defence spending significantly. The lesson is clear: strategic autonomy requires investment.
Whether through individual military expansion or collective security arrangements, the region is moving towards a more self-reliant model.
The proposed alliance between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey could serve as a cornerstone of this transformation, and an "Arab NATO" in all but name.
The current war, therefore, is not just a confrontation between states. It is a catalyst for structural change.
No matter how it ends, whether through victory, defeat, or uneasy compromise, the consequences will be far-reaching. Alliances will shift. Military doctrines will evolve. Dependence on external powers will be questioned, if not reduced.
Because this time, the question is not just who wins the war, but who defines the future that follows.
