Left behind: Bangladesh's decade of rating decline
A comparative analysis against Vietnam, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Cambodia
In 2015, Bangladesh and Vietnam shared the same S&P sovereign credit rating: BB–. A decade on, Vietnam stands at BB+, one notch from investment grade. Bangladesh has fallen to B+, its banking sector near the bottom of global risk rankings, and Fitch issued a negative outlook just days ago. This is not a sudden crisis. It is the accumulated cost of a decade of governance failures that Bangladesh's policymakers refused to confront while headline growth numbers held up.
Rating record
The table below tracks S&P's sovereign rating trajectory for all five countries over the past decade.
The divergence is unambiguous. Vietnam earned two upgrades from the same starting point; Bangladesh suffered one downgrade. Uzbekistan, unrated until 2019, has already surpassed Bangladesh. Kyrgyzstan – smaller, poorer and landlocked – debuted at B+ in March 2025, level with Bangladesh today despite having no prior rating. Cambodia, which Bangladesh should outrank on every structural metric, sits on exactly the same shelf. Bangladesh and Vietnam were rated identically in 2015. Today they are four notches apart – and the gap is widening.
How a decade was squandered
Three structural failures drove the decline. Forex reserves collapsed from $48 billion in August 2021 to below $20 billion in 2024, compounded by the revelation that headline figures had been inflated for years through inclusion of illiquid instruments. The banking sector failure was deeper: S&P places Bangladesh in Group 9 out of 10 on its Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment.
When Fitch downgraded Bangladesh in May 2024, NPLs stood at 9%; by December 2025 they had reached 30.6% as regulatory forbearance unwound. This is not a banking sector with a problem – it is a banking sector whose problem has finally been measured. A fiscal system generating tax revenue of just 7-8% of GDP provided no cushion, and the interest-revenue ratio hit 29% by end-2025, more than double the B-rated peer median. The student-led uprising of mid-2024, the fall of the Hasina government, and political uncertainty over elections compounded every structural vulnerability.
What peers did differently
Vietnam held to one strategy: export-led industrialisation with consistent macroeconomic management. The China-plus-one manufacturing shift found Vietnam ready; S&P upgraded it twice in six years. Bangladesh had the same garment base and labour cost advantage – and let the window close. Uzbekistan debuted at BB– in 2019 and has since climbed to BB: it brought Franklin Templeton in to manage Uzbekistan National Investment Fund, listed the fund on the London Stock Exchange in May 2026, raised $604 million with four times oversubscription, and made state enterprise governance internationally legible. Kyrgyzstan – smaller and poorer than Bangladesh, unrated until 2025 – raised $700 million in a debut Eurobond with three times oversubscription months after receiving its first rating. Both countries demonstrated institutional credibility and immediately accessed international capital markets. Bangladesh cannot.
Fitch warning of May 2026
On May 13, 2026, Fitch revised Bangladesh's outlook from stable to negative, affirming B+. The proximate trigger is the Middle East conflict – nearly half of Bangladesh's remittances originate there, and crude oil accounts for 15% of imports. But the conflict is the match, not the fuel: limited reform progress is eroding Bangladesh's capacity to absorb shocks.
Revenue fell when the IMF programme required it to rise. Constitutional reform is stagnant. Reserves at $29.5 billion sit below the B-rated median. A negative outlook shifts the burden of proof – Bangladesh must now demonstrate improvement, not merely avoid further deterioration. The three most likely triggers for an unscheduled downgrade to B are a fracture in the IMF programme, reserves falling below three months of import cover, or a major bank failure. At B – Pakistan's cohort – most institutional mandates prohibit exposure to Bangladesh sovereign instruments.
Three scenarios
The base case without decisive action is a downgrade to B within 12 to 18 months. The second scenario – the negative outlook resolved without a downgrade – requires the conflict to de-escalate, reserves to hold above four months of cover, the IMF programme to stay on track, and NPLs to show credible improvement. Every condition must hold simultaneously. The upgrade path toward BB– is a 2028 to 2030 horizon at the earliest, requiring sustained reserve improvement, measurable NPL reduction, and tax revenue approaching 10% of GDP.
What a rating downgrade actually means
Rating downgrades are not abstract. Their consequences are concrete, immediate, and compound across every layer of the economy. Six transmission channels matter most for Bangladesh.
Borrowing costs rise system-wide. Treasury bill yields reached 12% by late 2024 – up from under 7% two years earlier – as investors demanded a higher premium to hold government paper. Higher yields feed the fiscal deficit, which feeds more borrowing, which feeds higher yields still: a self-reinforcing spiral that a further downgrade accelerates.
Trade finance becomes costlier and harder to access. Bangladesh's garment export economy runs on letters of credit. LC confirmation charges levied by foreign correspondent banks are directly linked to the sovereign rating. Exporters operating on 3 to 5% margins absorb those charges or lose orders to competitors whose banks carry no such premium. A move to B would make this materially worse.
FDI dries up. FDI fell 8.8% in FY2024; Standard Chartered Bank Bangladesh's CEO attributed the decline explicitly to rating downgrades reducing risk-adjusted returns. A B rating places Bangladesh alongside Pakistan – no multinational building a medium-term Asia investment case allocates to a B-rated country when BB-rated alternatives exist.
Portfolio capital exits in advance. Many institutional mandates prohibit exposure below BB–. Bangladesh crossed that threshold in 2024. Portfolio investment was already a $111 million net outflow in FY2024. The Fitch negative outlook will have triggered repositioning across mandated investors before any formal rating action occurs.
The sovereign-bank nexus tightens. Public sector credit growth surged to 24% by October 2025 against private sector growth of just 6%. As the sovereign's rating falls, state-owned banks' access to foreign credit lines weakens and their funding costs rise. A sovereign downgrade cascades through the entire banking system the government owns.
LDC graduation compounds the risk. Bangladesh is supposed to graduate from Least Developed Country status in November 2026, losing preferential tariff access that partly underpins its EU garment market. That graduation was designed for a Bangladesh growing at 6 to 7%. Fitch forecasts 3.7% for FY2026. The combination of LDC graduation and rating deterioration creates a double vulnerability with no coherent plan to manage both simultaneously.
A downgrade is not just a signal – it is a tax on every borrower in Bangladesh, from the government to the garment exporter to the bank issuing a Letter of Credit, eventually every individual in Bangladesh.
Conclusion
Bangladesh's rating decline is not irreversible – but it is accelerating. The economic fundamentals remain: a large remittance base, a competitive garment sector, a young labour force. What has been absent is the institutional commitment to make those fundamentals credible to external investors. The rating agencies are explicit about what recovery requires: reserves above the B-rated median, NPLs measurably reduced, tax revenue approaching 10 percent of GDP, and reform continuity through a post-election government. What is absent is not knowledge of what to do. The Fitch negative outlook of May 2026 is a final warning that the window is closing – and that the next action, if nothing changes, will not be an affirmation.
Ershad Hossain, director, Putnam Capital Advisory Pte Ltd, Singapore
This commentary is prepared for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice. Putnam Capital Advisory Pte Ltd is a Singapore-incorporated advisory firm active in Bangladesh's capital markets.
