Despite laws and pledges, migrant workers remain prey to exploitation

Highlights:

• Bangladeshi migrants face exorbitant recruitment costs despite official ceilings
• Majority pay intermediaries; few receive job contracts or receipts
• High costs force loans, asset sales, and long debt recovery
• Laws exist but are poorly enforced against fraudulent recruitment practices
• Remittance costs remain high, pushing migrants toward informal channels

For decades, Bangladesh has grappled with the unenviable distinction of having some of the world's most exorbitant overseas recruitment and migration costs. Despite the government occasionally setting nominal maximum cost ceilings—far removed from the actual financial burdens borne by aspiring overseas workers—a comprehensive official cost structure remains elusive.

While fees levied by government institutions or under government-to-government agreements are intended as benchmarks for private recruiters, the limited involvement of these institutions in overseas employment renders their impact on overall migration costs negligible. This vacuum effectively leaves the field open to local recruiting agents and their counterparts in destination countries, often to the detriment of vulnerable workers. Consequently, migrant workers frequently face crippling expenses, forcing them to liquidate family assets, incur usurious loans from commercial lenders, and endure years of financial hardship to recoup their initial outlay.

A joint publication by the Government of Bangladesh and the International Labour Organization (ILO) on the Asia-Pacific Decent Work Decade 2006-15 starkly illustrated the significant discrepancies between officially stipulated charges and the real costs shouldered by migrants.

In 2013, a government-to-government arrangement between Bangladesh and Malaysia set a recruitment cost ceiling of Tk40,000 per worker, with the initial cohort paying even less. Concurrently, the Bureau of Manpower Employment and Training (BMET), a government institution, established a maximum recruitment cost of Tk20,000 per female migrant for Hong Kong, Singapore, Jordan, and various Gulf nations. For private recruiters targeting job markets in the UAE, Oman, Singapore, and Malaysia, BMET suggested ceilings ranging from Tk44,000 to Tk84,000 per worker.

Similarly, the state-owned Bangladesh Overseas Employment and Services Limited (BOESL) charged Tk25,000 for low-skilled, Tk35,000 for skilled, and Tk60,000 for professional workers.

Wide gap between guidelines and reality

However, these well-intentioned measures proved ineffective. Migrant workers continued to face significantly higher costs, and the chasm between official guidelines and actual expenses only widened over time.

A 2010 survey by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) revealed that the average Bangladeshi migrant worker spent over Tk300,000 per person, with a staggering 77% ending up in the pockets of sub-agents and intermediaries. The IOM attributed this exploitation to flawed recruitment and migration processes in both Bangladesh and destination countries. Alarmingly, nearly 90% of migrant workers lacked written job contracts before departure, and recruiting agencies routinely failed to provide receipts for the substantial sums they collected. The report also highlighted alleged visa trading in certain Gulf states and the Kafala system, rife with allegations of kickbacks demanded by overseas employers (Kafeels). Recruitment agents, vying to acquire visas, reportedly passed on these costs to the workers seeking their services.

The 2010 IOM survey provided a cost breakdown: while government fees and air tickets accounted for a mere 0.8% and 2.5% of the total cost, respectively, agencies absorbed 10.3%, and intermediaries a massive 59.5%. Regrettably, the situation has seen little improvement. A 2024 report by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) indicated that approximately 52% of international migrants still paid their migration costs to brokers.

Last year alone, over 1.3 million Bangladeshi workers ventured abroad. For many, recruitment costs exceeded their annual income. According to the 2020 BBS migration cost survey, low-skilled workers who migrated between 2015 and 2018 paid an average of Tk478,000 in migration costs, resulting in a recruitment cost indicator (RCI) of 17.6. This signifies that a worker needed approximately 17 months to recoup their migration expenses. Workers bound for Saudi Arabia faced the longest recovery period at 19.7 months, compared to 16.9 months in Malaysia, 18.1 months in Qatar, and 15.1 months in Singapore.

The disparity becomes even more pronounced when compared to migrants from other nations.

A joint World Bank and ILO report found that Vietnamese workers needed 2.7 to 4.5 months' salary to repay migration costs for Malaysia, while Pakistani workers in the UAE or Saudi Arabia required 7 to 9 months to recover an average of $3,100, including airfare, visa, and agent fees—still $500 less than what a Bangladeshi worker typically pays for Saudi Arabia. According to a 2020 BBS report, the average migration cost for Bangladeshi workers was Tk436,000 for Saudi Arabia and between Tk300,000 and Tk400,000 for Oman, Qatar, and Malaysia. These figures have undoubtedly escalated since then.

To shoulder these exorbitant costs, a staggering 67% of migrant workers resort to loans, 24% sell land, and 23% mortgage their property. Access to formal financial institutions remains a significant hurdle, despite the existence of a specialised Probashi Bank, whose reach is woefully inadequate to meet the immense financing needs of migrant workers. This lack of access forces them into the clutches of high-interest moneylenders. The combination of flawed recruitment and financing systems frequently leads to debt bondage and human trafficking, as highlighted in the IOM survey.

Despite a plethora of laws ostensibly designed to protect migrants—whose hard-earned remittances continue to bolster the nation's foreign reserves, reaching a record $3.29 billion in March alone, ironically coinciding with the government's arduous negotiations with the IMF for a comparatively small $1.3 billion loan instalment—the situation persists.

The Overseas Employment and Migrants Act 2013, Emigration Rules 2002, Recruiting Agents Conduct and License Rules 2002, and the Overseas Employment Policy 2006 represent some of the legal instruments, some of which have been updated or reviewed.

Routinely cheated

However, these legal frameworks have failed to significantly reduce migration costs or dismantle the pervasive and fraudulent networks of intermediaries. Bangladesh has also ratified the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and signed bilateral and regional Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with major destination countries. Yet, these efforts have not prevented migrants from being routinely cheated and exploited in foreign workplaces.

The limited implementation of existing laws and regulations, coupled with a lack of robust mechanisms to enforce stricter labor market oversight both domestically and in destination countries, are key factors contributing to the ongoing plight of migrant workers, as emphasised in "The Cost," a joint publication by the IOM and the Government of Bangladesh.

The publication recommended a multi-pronged approach to reducing migration costs, including demand-side interventions, rigorous enforcement of laws to improve the supervision of recruiting agencies, encouraging banks to finance migrant workers under Corporate Social Responsibility initiatives, establishing BMET offices at the district level, and setting up dedicated migration corridors with destination countries.

Migrant workers, who constitute 12% of the country's total workforce and contribute 7-8% to the GDP, are offered a meager 2.5% incentive and frequently lauded for channeling remittances through formal banking channels.

High costs to send money home

However, the financial burden doesn't end with recruitment. Bangladeshi workers also face exorbitant transaction costs when sending money home. A 2016 World Bank brief noted that remittance transaction costs from Malaysia and Saudi Arabia to the Philippines were 3% and 5% respectively, figures that are even higher for Bangladesh and not covered by the cash incentive.

Remittance transaction costs remain a global challenge, with the World Bank's remittance database indicating costs more than double the UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) target. Banks consistently emerge as the most expensive channel for sending remittances, charging an average of 12% in 2023, while money transfer operators charged 5.5%, and mobile operators 4.4%. Despite being the cheapest option, mobile operations account for less than 1% of total remittance transaction volume.

This cost disparity partly explains the enduring popularity of informal channels like "hundi" among migrant workers. Bangladeshi bank officials, however, attribute the recent surge in inward remittances to a decline in "hundi" transactions amid intensified surveillance against money laundering.

Bangladesh still has a long and arduous journey ahead to achieve the UN target for safe and decent migration by 2030. Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 8 aims to protect labor rights and ensure a secure working environment for all workers, including migrants. SDG 10 seeks to facilitate responsible migration and mobility through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies and aims to reduce remittance transaction costs to 3% or below by 2030.

A waiting lounge established at Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport (HSIA) last November is a superficial gesture and falls far short of addressing the systemic humiliation and maltreatment migrant workers endure upon departure and arrival. The foreign currency they diligently remit home comes without conditions, unlike the stringent terms attached to loans from global lenders.

The rapidly evolving global geopolitical landscape is making migration increasingly challenging. Competition for overseas jobs is intensifying, with African migrants increasingly seeking opportunities in Asia, particularly in Saudi Arabia, the primary destination for Bangladeshi workers. Simultaneously, Bangladeshis seeking visas for various purposes, including tourism, education, and medical treatment, are facing growing delays and rejections. For migrant workers, the struggle is even more acute due to their often limited education and heightened vulnerability to fraud. They are in dire need of robust protection and unwavering support, for they are often the voiceless pillars of the nation's economy.