Declassified US reports warn of nuclear risk from 'irrational response' between India and Pakistan
One of the released documents, a 1981 US intelligence estimate titled “India’s Reaction to Nuclear Developments in Pakistan,” assessed the potential for India to strike Pakistan’s nuclear facilities if it perceived a significant threat to its national security, reports Times Of India

As tensions between India and Pakistan grow over the recent Pahalgam massacre, recently declassified US intelligence documents from the 1980s and 1990s suggest that while the overall likelihood of war between India and Pakistan remains low, a "miscalculation or irrational response" could escalate a conventional conflict into a nuclear exchange.
One of the released documents, a 1981 US intelligence estimate titled "India's Reaction to Nuclear Developments in Pakistan," assessed the potential for India to strike Pakistan's nuclear facilities if it perceived a significant threat to its national security, reports Times Of India.
According to the Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE), "India would probably take a wait and see approach before striking in Pakistan and make a decision based on whether Pakistan produced nuclear weapons or stockpiled them."
Also included in the release is a memo from the US State Department, published for the first time, referencing a study conducted by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The study analysed the potential radiological impact of an Indian strike on the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant, concluding that Karachi "could suffer heavy casualties" in such an event.
The documents also recall that after Pakistan's defeat in the 1971 war with India, President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became even more committed to developing a nuclear weapons programme—so much so that he reportedly declared Pakistan would "eat grass" if necessary to fund it.
Indian policymakers, however, were cautious about any pre-emptive strikes, as they feared a Pakistani retaliatory attack on Indian nuclear sites could result in equally devastating consequences. The possibility of an Indian preventive strike remained a serious concern for the Reagan administration, especially as Pakistan continued to advance its nuclear weapons programme.