Will the surge in renewable energy spark a new era of global conflict?

As the world races to transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy, a new energy order is beginning to emerge — one that promises cleaner air and climate resilience but also portends fresh geopolitical tensions. 

The shift to solar, wind, hydrogen and rare earth-powered technologies is not merely a technological revolution; it represents a profound geopolitical reordering with the potential to ignite a new spectrum of global conflict. 

From the strategic control of critical minerals to green technology rivalry, energy access disputes, and economic power realignment, the green transition may ironically generate new fault lines even as it attempts to heal the planet.

The end of oil wars?

For much of the 20th and early 21st centuries, access to oil and gas has been a key driver of global conflict. The 1991 Gulf War, the 2003 Iraq War, and Russia's strategic hold over Europe via gas pipelines all reflect the centrality of hydrocarbons in world politics. 

As Daniel Yergin, author of The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power, notes, fossil fuels have underpinned not only energy security but also military logistics, alliance structures, and strategic coercion.

With the rise of renewables, some analysts — such as Meghan O'Sullivan in her book Windfall: How the New Energy Abundance Upends Global Politics and Strengthens American Power — argue that energy geopolitics will soften. 

Renewables are decentralised, locally producible, and harder to weaponise. However, this optimistic view overlooks a critical reality: while fossil fuels are geographically concentrated, the raw materials and technologies required for the green transition are also limited and unevenly distributed, introducing new battlefronts.

New strategic commodities: Lithium, cobalt, and rare earths

Unlike oil, which is pumped and transported via tanker or pipeline, renewable energy infrastructure is built with minerals — vast amounts of them. The International Energy Agency (IEA), in its 2021 report The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, warned that a single electric vehicle requires six times more mineral inputs than a conventional car, and a wind power plant requires nine times more mineral resources than a gas-fired plant.

This demand has turned materials like lithium, cobalt, nickel, graphite, and rare earth elements into the new "black gold". These minerals are geographically concentrated: 60% of global cobalt comes from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 50% of lithium from Australia, and 80% of rare earth processing is done in China. This imbalance introduces both supply chain vulnerabilities and potential zones of competition.

As noted by Foreign Policy (July 2023), China's near-monopoly on rare earth processing gives it leverage over the West, similar to OPEC's role in the 1970s. In 2020, Beijing threatened to cut off rare earth exports to Lockheed Martin amid tensions over Taiwan. The US has since responded with the CHIPS and Science Act, and new mining initiatives in Australia and Latin America, seeking to "de-risk" rather than decouple from China.

Resource nationalism and green colonialism

The strategic importance of these minerals has led to renewed interest in resource-rich nations, particularly in Africa and Latin America. 

Bolivia's vast lithium reserves — dubbed the "Saudi Arabia of lithium" — have become the centre of global bidding wars. Elon Musk's 2020 tweet about "couping whoever we want" in Bolivia (later deleted) after a pro-lithium government was ousted sparked accusations of "green imperialism".

As The Guardian (February 2023) reported, indigenous communities in Argentina, Chile, and Bolivia are increasingly protesting lithium extraction projects over water depletion, environmental degradation, and lack of benefit-sharing. The so-called "green transition" risks replicating the exploitative dynamics of past resource rushes, inflaming local unrest and geopolitical tensions as states compete for strategic access.

Moreover, as Nick Buxton and Ben Hayes argue in The Secure and the Dispossessed, there is a risk that climate action becomes securitised — framed as a zero-sum struggle over dwindling resources — leading to militarised responses to local opposition and migration pressures. In this framing, environmentalism itself could become a justification for conflict.

The hydrogen race: New rivalries in old geographies

Beyond minerals, green hydrogen — produced from renewable electricity — has emerged as the next frontier in clean energy. Countries like Germany, Japan, and South Korea, short on solar landmass, are looking to import green hydrogen from sun-rich nations like Namibia, Morocco, and Australia.

This shift introduces new geopolitical dependencies. For instance, Germany's multi-billion-euro hydrogen agreements with North African states could tie its future industrial competitiveness to the political stability of regions that have historically seen unrest. As Der Spiegel (April 2024) warned, over-reliance on green hydrogen imports from politically unstable regions may reproduce the same energy insecurity that plagued Europe's dependence on Russian gas.

Moreover, Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE are pivoting from oil to green hydrogen, using their capital and geopolitical clout to dominate future energy markets. NEOM's green hydrogen project in Saudi Arabia is being positioned as a global hub. As highlighted in The Financial Times (March 2024), this could reshape regional power hierarchies and revive competition among Gulf states for energy hegemony, potentially destabilising an already fragile Middle East.

Infrastructure conflicts and grid colonialism

Control over electricity transmission infrastructure could also become a source of conflict. Unlike oil, which is stored and traded in tankers, solar and wind energy require extensive grid interconnectivity to stabilise supply. Initiatives like the EU's "SuperGrid," the African Union's "Desert to Power" initiative, and China's "Global Energy Interconnection" plan reflect growing ambitions to build transnational electricity networks.

However, as scholar Andreas Goldthau points out in The Geopolitics of the Global Energy Transition, such mega-grids require political alignment, technical interoperability, and shared regulatory norms. If these grids are dominated by a few players — China in Asia, the EU in Africa — they risk becoming tools of political influence. Nations left out of these infrastructures may become energy-insecure and marginalised.

Conflicts may also arise within states. In India, land acquisition for solar parks in Rajasthan and Gujarat has led to protests by farmers and indigenous communities. As Al Jazeera (January 2024) reported, the clash between national climate goals and local livelihoods is emerging as a new axis of internal tension.

Technological protectionism and green trade wars

The green race is also spurring techno-nationalism. The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), passed by the US in 2022, which includes subsidies for domestically produced electric vehicles and solar panels, has provoked backlash from allies like the EU and South Korea. Brussels responded with its own Green Deal Industrial Plan to defend European industry.

As The New York Times (October 2023) reported, this has triggered a green trade war between the West and China, which still dominates the global solar panel, battery, and electric vehicle markets. In 2024, the US imposed new tariffs on Chinese EVs over alleged "overcapacity," while Beijing filed WTO complaints, threatening retaliatory action.

These skirmishes could escalate as countries compete not just to go green, but to own the green economy. Intellectual property disputes, export restrictions on key technologies, and investment screening in critical sectors are likely to rise, creating an environment of suspicion and economic fragmentation.

Water and climate security intersections

Renewable energy is also highly water-dependent. Hydropower, green hydrogen production, and even lithium extraction consume significant water resources. In water-stressed regions like Central Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East, this may intensify competition over transboundary rivers and aquifers.

For instance, Ethiopia's Grand Renaissance Dam, intended to supply renewable hydropower to millions, has triggered regional tension with Egypt and Sudan. As noted by the Carnegie Endowment (2022), the dam's completion could lead to prolonged geopolitical friction if water-sharing mechanisms fail.

Climate change will act as a conflict multiplier, creating migration flows, agricultural decline, and energy demand spikes. In this volatile context, renewable energy infrastructure becomes both a lifeline and a target — vulnerable to sabotage, cyberattacks, and geopolitical leverage.

Who controls the narrative?

Lastly, the question of global leadership in the energy transition is itself a geopolitical contest. China has positioned itself as the green manufacturing superpower. The EU sees itself as the norm-setter, pushing for global standards through its Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). The US is attempting to lead on innovation and capital allocation.

But the Global South, often cast as a supplier of resources or a site of carbon offsetting, is demanding a voice. At COP28 and beyond, countries like India, Brazil, and South Africa have argued for "just transitions" that include technology transfers, debt forgiveness, and inclusive governance.

As Jason Bordoff of Columbia's Center on Global Energy Policy argues, the green transition could either entrench existing hierarchies or democratise energy access. Which path is chosen will depend on whether energy justice becomes a serious global commitment — or an afterthought.

The shift to renewable energy promises a cleaner, more sustainable planet. Yet, as with all transformative technologies, it will redistribute power, provoke competition, and — if mismanaged — ignite conflict. From critical mineral rushes and techno-protectionism to hydrogen geopolitics and infrastructure rivalries, the green revolution carries risks that mirror and magnify existing global tensions.

Policymakers must anticipate these flashpoints. Strategic stockpiling, diversified supply chains, fair mining practices, and multilateral coordination over technology and standards are essential. But perhaps most critically, the world must ensure that the energy transition uplifts rather than exploits. If not, the age of renewables could become not the end of energy conflict — but its green reawakening.

Syed Raiyan Amir is a Senior Research Associate at The KRF Center for Bangladesh and Global Affairs.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and views of The Business Standard.