Why the 2026 referendum matters for Bangladesh’s future

If the 2026 election is viewed merely as another parliamentary contest, a significant historical opportunity may be overlooked. For the first time in Bangladesh's history, a national referendum will be held alongside the general election on the same day.

While the parliamentary vote will determine who governs the country for the next five years, the referendum will determine what kind of Bangladesh future governments will govern. 

Understanding this fundamental distinction is essential. Governments come and go through general elections. However, the structure of the state—such as the balance of power, the role of Parliament, executive accountability, and the limits on constitutional amendments—does not ordinarily change through routine electoral processes. These elements are shaped through structural and institutional decisions. The referendum offers a rare opportunity to make such foundational choices.

At its core, the referendum will decide how much authority future governments may exercise, how constrained that authority will be, and how independently state institutions can function. Reforms to the parliamentary system, rebalancing the relationship between political parties and the executive, and preventing the discretionary alteration of constitutional and legal provisions—all of these issues fall within the scope of the referendum. 

In this sense, the referendum will determine the "rules of governance," not merely the identity of the rulers. This is why the referendum is not less important than the general election; in many respects, it is as much consequential. Interpreting the July Uprising of 2024 solely as a movement for a change of government would significantly understate its meaning. Citizens did not mobilise merely to replace one administration with another; they rose in opposition to a dysfunctional system.  

The central aspirations of that movement were to curb excessive concentration of power, establish a system of accountability, and create institutional safeguards so that no future government could alter the rules to suit its immediate interests. The referendum provides an opportunity to translate those aspirations into constitutional and institutional reality.

In this context, some confusion has emerged regarding the role and position of the interim government. In practice, however, the national consensus-building process undertaken through the National Consensus Commission was never limited to questions of when or how elections would be held. Its broader purpose was to deliberate on the future character of the state, the implementation of the July aspirations, and the scope and direction of necessary institutional reforms. As the organiser of this consensus process, the interim government's position on the referendum warrants careful consideration. 

A vote against the referendum would not merely signal disagreement on a specific proposal; it would represent a rejection of the broader reform agenda, the consensus-building effort, and the post-July initiative to reconstruct the state. Conversely, a vote in favor would constitute an endorsement of those reforms and shared commitments. 

Viewed from this perspective, the interim government's support for a "Yes" vote cannot reasonably be described as unjustified or partisan; rather, it reflects continuity with the mandate under which it operates. The interim administration is not the product of a conventional electoral cycle—it derives its legitimacy from the July uprising, whose mandate was not simply a transfer of power, but a transformation of the governing system.

It is in this light that certain arguments advanced by segments of the intellectual community merit closer scrutiny. Some suggest that governments and political parties should refrain from taking positions for or against the referendum. However, a referendum is not a neutral academic exercise; it is an inherently political and historical decision. The movement that gave rise to the demand for a referendum involved political parties, civil society actors, and citizens alike, united by expectations of meaningful change. Remaining detached from that question lacks both moral and political grounding. Voter participation presents another critical consideration. 

Over the past seventeen years, declining voter turnout has emerged as a serious challenge for Bangladesh's electoral democracy. In this context, the referendum may serve as a strong incentive for citizens to engage with the electoral process. Notably, many young voters—while often viewing parliamentary elections as repetitive contests for power—perceive the referendum as a decisive moment for shaping the future structure of the state. For them, it embodies the promise of change and the institutional realization of the July aspirations. 

Both the parliamentary vote and the referendum will take place on the same day, at the same polling centers. If political parties are genuinely committed to increasing voter turnout, prioritising the referendum is not only a political responsibility but also a practical strategic necessity.

The 2026 election, therefore, represents more than a routine transition of government; it marks a pivotal moment for state reconstruction. While the general election will determine who governs, the referendum will determine how governance itself is structured—how powerful future governments will be, how accountable they must remain, and where institutional balance will ultimately reside. 

For these reasons, a "Yes" outcome in the referendum is essential. This is not a matter of partisan preference, but a political and ethical consequence of the July uprising. The agreements forged through the National Consensus Commission, the reform initiatives undertaken, and the broader effort to shape a future-ready Bangladesh are all intrinsically linked to a favorable referendum result.

Democracy does not endure through voting alone; it endures through sound and just rules. The 2026 referendum offers an opportunity to redefine those rules. To forgo that opportunity would be not merely to reject a proposal, but to relinquish a vital possibility for the country's democratic future.

Mohammad Fakhrul Islam is an assistant professor (on study leave) in the Department of Business Administration (HRM & Management) at Stamford University Bangladesh. 

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and views of The Business Standard.