July proclamation: Late, lacklustre and full of questions

The much talked-about July Proclamation finally made its appearance earlier this month, a full year after the fall of former prime minister Sheikh Hasina. But soon after the head of the interim government Dr Muhammad Yunus finished reading the 28 points, the Proclamation looked dead in the water.

The document, written in the style of Bangladesh's 1971 Proclamation of Independence, aims to "reflect the aspirations of the people of Bangladesh at the event of the victory in the mass uprising of 5 August 2024". It refers to people's "aspirations for establishing a society and a democratic state system that upholds rule of law and human rights and moral values, and is free from corruption and exploitation".

However, the document appeared designed to malign one political party, the Awami League, which was blamed for all the ills afflicting Bangladesh since the nation's birth. It avoided mentioning any historical figures except two — Hasina in the most negative terms, and Yunus, to confirm the "legality" of his appointment as Chief Adviser.

Surprisingly, the content of the document appears to have left most groups directly involved with the protest movement of 2024 rather unhappy, for different reasons. Parties such as the Gono Odhikar Parishad complained that history of the anti-Hasina movement was distorted in the document through omission of any reference to struggles of 2018. Others complained that they were not consulted about the final wording of the document.

"I'm not giving much attention to the Proclamation, because after a year, it has lost its glitter," said Mahmudur Rahman Manna, leader of left-wing Nagorik Shokti in a TV talkshow on the day. "It no longer has the brightness it could have had, it's unlikely to have any historical impact."

Signal from the seaside

The message from the National Citizen Party (NCP), which was formed by student leaders who spearheaded the 2024 movement, was less subtle. While their top man Nahid Islam attended the event on top of the stairs outside parliament house, other key leaders went to Cox's Bazar for a bit of recreation by the sea.

Only the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) appeared to feel they could live with it without complaints. That's probably because the overall narrative presented in the Proclamation conformed to key BNP talking points, particularly as they related to events in 1975 and 2006-08.

With so many parties either unhappy or even contemptuous of the document, the Proclamation lost much of its lustre even before Yunus made it to the end of his narration. Now the next elected government has the task of including it in the schedule of the Constitution, but given the lukewarm reception so far, there is no guarantee that the next parliament would have the appetite to include such a declaration in the supreme legal document of the land.

BNP's narrative

It appears that, in an effort to keep key players, especially the BNP, on-side, a fair amount of doctoring was done to history through omissions and commissions in the Proclamation.

For instance, it accuses the first post-independence Awami League of failures, but fails to acknowledge that it was the AL which led the Liberation War. This set the tone which looked increasingly like an anti-AL political manifesto with a nod to the BNP's narrative of contemporary history.

It refers to AL establishing one-party rule in 1975 and thereby taking away freedom of speech. Then the narration jumps to 7 November and says that a revolt by soldiers and people led to reintroduction of multi-party democracy, freedom of expression, etc.

The idea that the events of 7 November ushered in an era of freedom and democracy may well have its merits. But the document conveniently airbrushes the brutal killing of country's founding-president Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and almost his entire family on 15 August 1975.

The Proclamation refers to the military intervention of 11 January 2007 as "domestic and external intrigues", which led to the "domination and fascism of Sheikh Hasina through the conspiratorial arrangement of so-called 1/11".

This is exactly how the BNP would like to distort history, by omitting reference to their attempt to rig the 2007 elections, and describing the highly credible 2008 polls and the landslide AL victory, as the result of some sort of "conspiratorial arrangement". It is extraordinary to see the Nobel peace laureate Yunus buy into such falsehood.

Once the Proclamation delves into the 15-year rule of Sheikh Hasina, it becomes comparatively more credible. The Proclamation also avoided some contentious issues such as the blame game over the 2009 BDR Mutiny and the trial of Jamat-e-Islami leaders for crimes against humanity committed in 1971.

The Proclamation hit the right notes towards the end where it sought to articulate the democratic aspirations of the people. But given the delay and politically-biased nature of the Proclamation, it remains to be seen whether it will serve any purpose.

Examples of 1971 and 1990

It can be argued that the Proclamation was probably one year too late in coming. Such proclamations — if deemed necessary — are normally announced at the beginning or earliest stage of major political developments. There are plenty of examples, although in various formats, from around the world, including two in Bangladesh itself.

The Proclamation of Independence of Bangladesh was announced on 10 April 1971, just weeks after the launch of the Liberation War. The Proclamation set out in detail the reasons why the elected representatives of the people of Bangladesh had formed a Constituent Assembly and confirmed the Declaration of Independence of 26 March. The Proclamation further set out the structure and powers of the Provisional Government headed by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

The Proclamation acted as the legal framework for the war-time as well as post-war government of Bangladesh until the Constitution was passed by the Constituent Assembly on 4 November 1972.

Such proclamations may also be required when political parties embark on programmes which aim to dislodge an incumbent government outside the Constitutional framework. This happened in 1990 when opposition political parties, grouped in three different alliances, collaborated to find a way to remove military strongman Hussain Muhammad Ershad.

Street agitation to bring down Ershad were launched within a year of the Army chief seizing power on 24 March 1982, but it was not until 1990 that there was enough unity of purpose among political parties to force the President out.

On 19 November 1990, the three alliances issued a joint declaration which articulated the goals of the parties and the aspirations of the people for democracy and human rights. Crucially, the Joint Declaration laid out a road map, by which President Ershad could be replaced and a caretaker acting President could conduct elections without messing with the Constitution. The Declaration convinced the military that an orderly transition would be possible, which enabled them to cut Ershad loose.

Acting President Shahabuddin Ahmed then held new elections within three months, which were hailed as the most credible polls in the country's history. All political parties were committed to the roadmap of the joint declaration and competed in the elections on the basis of their own manifestos.

Revolution that wasn't

Unlike 1990, the situation in Bangladesh since 5 August last year has been anything but clear-cut. The lack of a proclamation or declaration of intent by the protesters and their backers meant there was no roadmap for the immediate future, no plans for the "day after". It was almost as if the "uprising" happened by accident, as if the government fell without anyone having much inkling about it.

At a Clinton Global Initiative event in New York on 26 September 2024, Yunus described the student protests as "an amazing meticulously designed thing". But subsequent confusion over the direction of the government exposed serious flaws.

The student leaders saw themselves as "revolutionaries" but apparently without the wherewithal to stage a revolutionary take-over of the state. They wanted to form a "revolutionary government" and issue a proclamation to that effect. But the military opted for continuity, and engaged political parties to discuss the formation of an interim regime, with a goal of holding new elections.

From the outset, the student leaders engaged in a tussle with established political parties and the military over the direction their "revolution" should take. They probably feared that the goals they had in mind would not be delivered by an elected government. They wanted constitutional recognition of the goals of their uprising.

One of the student leaders' desire was to see some sort of legal protection against future prosecution, and this was delivered in point 24 of the Proclamation, "Therefore, the people of Bangladesh express their desire to…provide necessary legal protection to the students and people participating in the movement."

Despite that, the NCP appears upset by the fact that the Proclamation would be included in the Constitution by the next parliament. They expected the Proclamation to be given force of law by the interim government.

But now, with the delayed announcement and unconvincing content, it would not be surprising if not much is heard of this document again.

The writer is former head of BBC Bangla and former managing editor of VOA Bangla. He can be contacted at: sabir.mustafa@gmail.com; X handle: @sabir59

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and views of The Business Standard.