India finds itself increasingly isolated in South Asia

An anti-India and pro-China Marxist leader recently won an election in Sri Lanka. The new president, Anura Kumara Dissanayake (AKD), the leader of the Marxist-leaning Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), is known for his Sinhala nationalism and historical anti-Indian stance. For India, this event marks the latest blow in the list of aggrieved neighbours that now surround India like a tightening noose. 

India's growing isolation in South Asia, driven by mounting hostile reactions from its neighbours, threatens to undermine its regional influence and strategic position, challenging its role as a regional hegemon. Without a fundamental strategic or even cartographic shift, these hostilities are poised to persist.

China has established a strong ally in Sri Lanka, reducing India's influence on the island and securing the strategically located Hambantota Port along key Asia-Europe shipping routes. This port control gives China a regional edge, especially concerning anti-India figures like AKD.

In July-August, a spontaneous, grassroots movement led by students successfully toppled a repressive regime in Bangladesh—a serendipitous feat that all previous efforts by opposition parties combined had been unable to achieve. Sheikh Hasina and her authoritarian regime, accused of killing thousands of political opponents, are finally gone after fifteen long years. Amid the usual public euphoria for the future and grievances over the past that accompany a revolution, such strong anti-Awami League and anti-India sentiment in Dhaka's streets is unprecedented.

The resentment toward India in Dhaka has intensified, despite the two countries' shared victory in 1971, when India helped Bangladesh achieve independence from Pakistan. While early Bangladeshi sentiment was marked by gratitude toward India, that feeling has faded over time. 

The Bangladeshi street is increasingly aware that India supported Sheikh Hasina internationally, allowing her to avoid accountability for alleged human rights abuses over three controversial election cycles. This diplomatic backing enabled Hasina's security forces to carry out enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and media suppression with relative impunity. 

Anger has also grown over alleged abuses by India's Border Security Force (BSF) along the Bangladesh-India border, with incidents like the recent killing of a 13-year-old Bangladeshi girl fuelling tensions. As anti-India sentiment rises, particularly toward Hasina's allies in New Delhi, the Indian High Commissioner expressed concern for the safety of India's envoy in Dhaka.

From the Indian perspective, the downfall of Hasina is equivalent to the fall of Dhaka, as Bangladesh has been India's friendliest neighbour, at least in economic terms. However, it would be extremely simplistic to view this as Hindu-Muslim tensions, as some commentators are prone to do. 

Nepal has a Hindu population of over 82%, exceeding the percentage in India (79%). Nobody in Bangladesh has any qualms about Nepal. A Nepali Hindu intern doctor was doing daily rounds at my father's ward in a Dhaka hospital and still feels at home in Bangladesh. 

Bangladesh is not India's primary security concern; instead, India faces significant challenges from its nuclear-armed neighbours, Pakistan and China. The India-China border, demarcated by the Line of Actual Control (LAC), remains one of the most contentious in the world. China controls the Aksai Chin region, which India claims is part of Ladakh, and disputes over this territory led to violent clashes in the Galwan Valley in 2020. 

China also claims Arunachal Pradesh as "South Tibet" and has recently advanced into Indian territory there. Although India recently announced a potential pact to address conflicts, China has only vaguely acknowledged it without clarification.

India faces complex relationships not only with Muslim-majority neighbours like Pakistan and Bangladesh or Communist-ruled China, but also with culturally and religiously similar neighbours like Nepal and the Maldives. 

Despite being an overwhelmingly Hindu majority country, Nepal's resentment toward India, reflected in the popular #BackoffIndia campaign, stemmed from India's perceived interference, including disputes over the Kalapani border and the 2015 blockade. 

This discontent spurred calls for Nepal to assert a more independent foreign policy, ultimately drawing it closer to China. Similarly, the #IndiaOut movement in the Maldives emerged to counter India's military presence and influence, leading to the recent expulsion of Indian troops under President Muizzu, who has since prioritised strengthening ties with China and Turkey.

In the east of India's already fragile Seven Sisters, India is on the verge of witnessing the complete dissolution of its long-time ally—the Burmese Junta. This marriage of convenience between the "world's largest democracy" and a military dictatorship was based on the idea that the Burmese generals could keep the numerous ethnic armed groups (EAOs) involved in cross-border conflicts at bay. 

These groups are fighting for the creation of a greater Nagalim, an independent homeland for the Naga people, including areas in Nagaland, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, and Assam in India, as well as the Sagaing Region and parts of Kachin State in Burma, and for the unification of the Chin/Mizo, Kuki, and Zomi people living on both sides of the India-Burma border.

On 7 September at least nine people were killed in the Indian state of Manipur during sophisticated insurgent attacks by independence-seeking groups that involved the use of drones. India has traditionally depended on Burma's military to balance such threats, believing it can offer security in exchange for arms transfers. 

This, however, is a case of misplaced belief that has been proven wrong in post-coup days as Burma's military has failed to either handle its insurgencies, or forget the ones in India. Decades of military dictatorship have merely emboldened Burmese EAOs. With the loss of territories, the junta has lost its grip over Indian EAOs from Burma. 

The Burmese civil war and the looming subsequent Balkanisation of Burma have paved the way for Indian rebels like the National Socialist Council of Nagaland to get safe havens and military support across the border from their Naga brethren who happen to live in Burma, e.g., the Kachin Independence Organisation and Shan State Army.

The Burmese Civil War-led security vacuum proved to be a tremendous boost for the operational capabilities of independence-seeking groups in the Indian Seven Sister states in the Northeast. The instability also poses existential threats to India's strategic economic projects in Burma—the India-Burma-Thailand Trilateral Highway and the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project. 

Not too long ago India's neighbours used to be part of a single political history, and even today, many of these cultures are almost interchangeable. The architecture in cities like Delhi and Kolkata, for instance, evokes a sense of this shared heritage throughout the subcontinent. What has India done to retain this soft power over its neighbours? 

Consider how Russia, in contrast, has a visa-free policy for the former satellite members of the Soviet Union, e.g., Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

Meanwhile, none from the South Asian neighbourhood can dream of visa-free access to India. New Delhi has made numerous fundamental missteps with its neighbours, and today it finds itself encircled by hostile entities from all sides. New Delhi's next moves could shape whether it remains a regional hegemon or finds itself increasingly isolated in a neighbourhood of its own making. 

Dr. Nirjhor Sakib is a lecturer in political science at the University of Kentucky. His opinion pieces have appeared in Newsweek, Forbes, TRTWorld, The National Interest, Middle East Monitor and elsewhere.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and views of The Business Standard