Greenland and Trump’s strategic calculus: Power, sovereignty, and the erosion of multilateral restraints

President Donald Trump bluntly justified his renewed focus on Greenland just a day after asserting leverage over Venezuela's President Nicolás Maduro, framing both moves as matters of US national security.

Greenland, a remote Arctic island with a population of roughly 57,000, is a self-governing territory within the Kingdom of Denmark. It has been tied to Copenhagen for more than seven centuries, long before the United States emerged as a nation.

Yet Greenland's strategic location has propelled it to the centre of contemporary geopolitics. Situated between North America and Europe, the island lies along the shortest trajectories for missiles, bombers, and satellites linking the United States with Russia and China.

Climate change has transformed the Arctic from a frozen buffer into a navigable frontier. Arctic ice is melting at roughly four times the global average, opening shipping routes that could reduce travel times between Europe and Asia by up to 40 per cent.

Greenland lies at the heart of this transformation, adjacent to critical North Atlantic sea lanes and emerging Arctic corridors. Control or influence over Greenland therefore offers advantages in maritime access, surveillance, and strategic mobility — leverage that resonates strongly with Washington's evolving security calculus.

A longstanding US interest, revived

American interest in Greenland dates back more than a century. Following the 1867 purchase of Alaska, US Secretary of State William Seward floated the idea of acquiring Greenland and Iceland from Denmark.

Although the proposal failed to materialise, US strategic engagement persisted. Today, the United States operates a major military base at Pituffik, integral to missile detection, space surveillance, and the control of Arctic airspace.

Any ballistic or hypersonic missile launched from Russia across the Arctic would likely be detected early due to the presence of surveillance and early-warning assets in Greenland. This capability alone renders the island indispensable to Washington.

Greenland also anchors the GIUK gap — Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom — a critical naval chokepoint through which Russian and Chinese vessels must pass to reach the Atlantic. President Trump has repeatedly cited the presence of Russian and Chinese commercial shipping in Greenlandic waters as a growing threat, arguing that Denmark lacks the capacity to adequately protect the territory.

Beyond security considerations, Greenland holds significant untapped reserves of rare earth elements — including uranium (U), lithium (Li), cobalt (Co), and dysprosium (Dy) — which are vital to advanced electronics, defence industries, and renewable energy technologies. US dependence on foreign supply chains could be substantially reduced with access to these resources, particularly as China currently dominates global rare-earth processing.

Notably, none of these objectives requires territorial seizure. Denmark has historically allowed US companies to compete for mineral rights, and the United States once maintained a far larger military footprint in Greenland without challenging Danish sovereignty.

NATO, sovereignty, and a dangerous precedent

Any attempt to forcibly occupy Greenland would carry consequences far more severe than confrontations with non-allied states. Greenland is part of a NATO member's territory, and the very premise of collective security and respect for sovereignty is undermined when the alliance's most powerful member openly threatens to seize land from a smaller ally.

Such a move would strain transatlantic relations, risk fragmenting NATO, and ultimately benefit the very adversaries — Russia and China — that Washington seeks to counter in both the Arctic and the Western Hemisphere. It would also destabilise the Arctic region and weaken the broader international order grounded in territorial integrity.

Bypassing Copenhagen and courting Nuuk

Denmark remains a close military ally of the United States. Yet the Trump administration has departed from diplomatic convention by engaging directly with Greenland, bypassing Copenhagen — an approach that reportedly caught Danish officials off guard.

Proposals have included a compact of free association offering duty-free trade and expanded US military access. Simultaneously, Washington has signalled support for Greenland's independence option, a right enshrined in 2009. While approximately 56 per cent of Greenlanders express support for eventual independence, surveys suggest overwhelming opposition to becoming part of the United States.

Greenland is more than territory; it is leverage. Control over the island means dominance in Arctic early-warning systems, influence over emerging sea lanes, and enhanced Atlantic denial capabilities. In this calculus, minerals are secondary. The primary objective is military advantage — early detection, decisive control, and strategic denial — pursued with little regard for diplomatic restraint.

The waning of multilateralism

When a great power threatens the sovereignty of an ally, the purpose of multilateral institutions — built after the Second World War to protect weaker states and restrain unilateralism — comes into question. The prevailing shift towards "national interest first" policies signals a steady erosion of multilateral norms, with consequences already visible across multiple regions.

This moment demands a serious debate: how can international order be preserved, and how can the rights of small and weak states be protected if multilateralism continues to fray?

Strategic lessons for Bangladesh

For countries such as Bangladesh, the Greenland episode offers sobering lessons. Even formal alliances and international law may not shield smaller states when great-power interests are at stake; sovereignty increasingly appears conditional in a power-centric world.

Geography can bring opportunity, but it can also invite pressure, as strategic location cuts both ways. Multilateralism therefore, requires active reinforcement, and small states must invest in regional and global institutions rather than assume their protection.

Finally, diplomatic diversification is essential. Balancing relationships, strengthening regional cooperation, and avoiding overdependence on any single power are no longer optional.

As global politics tilt towards raw power and strategic leverage, Bangladesh — and other small states — must navigate with heightened vigilance, diplomatic agility, and a renewed commitment to collective norms that restrain the strong and protect the sovereign rights of the weak.

Sketch: TBS

Mustafa Kamal Rusho is a retired brigadier general who now works with the Osmani Centre for Peace and Security Studies.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Business Standard.