To fix governance, Bangladesh must fix its street-level bureaucracy

Street-level bureaucrats — teachers, police officers, health workers, agricultural extension officers and local administrators — form the operational backbone of Bangladesh's public administration. They translate national policies into tangible public services, directly shaping citizens' perceptions of the state. 

Yet, despite numerous reform efforts, the performance of street-level bureaucracy in Bangladesh remains uneven. Chronic issues such as excessive workload, political interference, limited autonomy, low motivation and weak accountability continue to hinder effective service delivery. 

But improving street-level bureaucracy performance is essential for achieving Bangladesh's goals of inclusive development and responsive governance.

The concept of street-level bureaucracy emphasises the discretion that front-line public officials exercise when implementing policies. In Bangladesh, this discretion is particularly significant because of limited monitoring, resource shortages and complex socio-political environments.

To understand the dynamics of street-level bureaucracy in Bangladesh, it is important to recognise the context in which these officials operate. Street-level bureaucrats work under high demand pressures arising from population density and poverty. They face persistent resource constraints in logistics, staffing and digital tools. Moreover, frequent political directives often override formal procedures. This combination of discretion, low oversight and political influence often results in inconsistent service quality and policy distortions.

Most field-level offices are understaffed and underfunded. Many officers manage multiple jurisdictions or functions simultaneously. The lack of digital record systems and outdated administrative procedures reduces efficiency and transparency. Street-level bureaucrats frequently face interference from political actors, local elites and higher administrative echelons. This undermines professional judgment and creates incentives for patronage-based decision-making. 

While there are formal rules and inspection procedures, these are often compliance-oriented rather than performance-oriented. Citizen complaints rarely translate into administrative consequences, and performance appraisal systems prioritise seniority over service outcomes. Low pay relative to living costs, limited promotion opportunities and lack of recognition further discourage initiative and innovation. Informal payments and political connections often substitute for formal rewards, perpetuating inefficiency and corruption. 

Although Bangladesh has made progress in e-governance, digital platforms are not yet fully integrated into the daily operations of field officials, and many rural offices still lack reliable internet connectivity or training for digital service delivery.

Improving street-level bureaucracy performance requires a multi-dimensional reform strategy focusing on capacity, autonomy, accountability and citizen engagement. These four dimensions form an interdependent framework for sustainable performance improvement. Enhancing operational autonomy is key, and this can be achieved by introducing clear guidelines that define the limits of political and administrative interference in front-line functions. 

Decentralised decision-making for routine service delivery — such as small-scale infrastructure and local resource use — can allow local officials to respond flexibly to community needs. Establishing performance compacts between ministries and field offices, specifying measurable targets while granting discretion in achieving them, can also be instrumental. Bangladesh can learn from the United Kingdom, where local councils have considerable discretion in adapting national policies to local needs, promoting flexibility and innovation.

There is no alternative to building professional capacity. Bangladesh can deploy evidence-based staffing models to ensure adequate personnel allocation per administrative unit. Targeted training programmes focused on problem-solving, citizen interaction and ethics should be institutionalised through training academies. 

The use of micro-learning modules and digital learning platforms can make continuous professional development accessible even in remote areas. Countries such as Singapore and India offer useful models. In India, the Aspirational Districts Programme uses data-driven monitoring and targeted training to improve local administrative capacity in lagging regions. Bangladesh could replicate this model to identify and support underperforming upazilas (sub-districts).

Strengthening accountability and transparency is crucial. Compliance-based supervision should be replaced with results-based performance evaluation using measurable indicators of service quality and citizen satisfaction. Expanding social accountability mechanisms — such as citizen charters, participatory audits and digital complaint systems — can also improve performance at the front line. 

Integrating digital record-keeping and data dashboards would allow real-time tracking of service delivery. Platforms like South Korea's OPEN (Online Procedures Enhancement for Civil Applications) enable citizens to track service requests and reduce corruption. Similarly, expanding Bangladesh's online grievance redress system can strengthen accountability and citizen trust.

Fostering citizens–bureaucrat trust is equally important. Citizen feedback loops in local service delivery — for example, through SMS or app-based satisfaction surveys — should be institutionalised. Co-production models, where community members collaborate with local officials in planning and monitoring small-scale projects, should be encouraged. In the Philippines, the Citizen Participatory Audit engages communities in monitoring government projects; embedding similar audits in Bangladesh can better align bureaucratic discretion with citizen priorities.

Performance-linked allowances or recognition schemes for exemplary service delivery should also be introduced. Career progression pathways that reward innovation, community engagement and ethical conduct — rather than merely tenure — can be effective. 

Publicising success stories can create positive peer competition. In Brazil, administrators receive incentives for accurate targeting and performance under the Bolsa Família programme, improving efficiency and reducing leakages. Bangladesh could adopt similar performance-linked rewards for frontline workers in programmes such as social safety nets or education.

Field offices should be equipped with mobile-based reporting and feedback systems to reduce bureaucratic delay and data manipulation. AI-driven analytics can help identify performance bottlenecks and target training or incentives accordingly. Estonia's e-Government ecosystem, which allows real-time data sharing across agencies, empowers local officials to make informed decisions. Bangladesh can build interoperable systems between ministries and local governments.

However, reforms will only succeed if they are politically and administratively feasible. Political commitment at both ministerial and local government levels must support bureaucratic neutrality. Pilot projects should be launched in selected districts to demonstrate success before a national rollout. Additionally, stronger cross-agency coordination is essential for better performance.

Bangladesh can improve public services by strengthening the capacity, autonomy, and accountability of street-level bureaucrats through clear reforms and better use of technology. The aim is not just to make administration faster, but to build a fair, transparent, and citizen-focused bureaucracy at every level of government.

Sketch: TBS

Dr Mohammad Kamrul Hasan is a Public Administration and Public Policy Analyst.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and views of The Business Standard.