Dissecting the anatomy of state failure

The transition from a "stable" state to a "failed" state accelerated rapidly over the last two decades. When a government cannot control its territory, maintain order, provide services, protect citizens, and uphold legitimacy, the country becomes a failed state. The pathway to failure is rarely sudden. 

Such a state emerges when a government becomes unable to perform its basic functions: providing basic security, delivering essential services, or maintaining legitimate institutions. A failed state unfolds gradually as institutions erode and trust dissolves. Countries like Haiti, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen are widely described as failed states.

Why these states remain failed today

The current status of these countries as "failed states" is not the result of a single event; rather, it is a cumulative process driven by centuries of repeated authoritarianism, a narrow ruling elite, external exploitation, internal corruption, the breakdown of law and order, weak security forces, exclusionary politics, and geographic misfortune. 

The fact is that the post‑dictatorship/authoritarian era does not produce a robust democratic state. Instead, fragmented elites and parties fight for control of a weak central apparatus. As parliament stalls and elections are delayed or disputed, the executive increasingly rules by order/decree, further eroding legitimacy and leaving a vacuum that anarchies fill. 

The external stakeholder plays an ambiguous role, sometimes stabilising but often deepening the country's fragility. Today, several concrete indicators show how far these countries have moved toward state failure.

Haiti is widely described as a failed state because its government no longer provides basic security, services, or legitimate political authority over much of its territory. This situation arises from a combination of external exploitation, domestic elites, repeated authoritarianism, and devastating disasters. 

The Duvalier family dictatorship (1957–1986) ruled through repression, corruption, and a private militia, bypassing and weakening the regular army, civil service, and judiciary. 

The absence of an elected president or a functioning parliament, long election gaps, and repeated postponements have left Haiti without a fully legitimate central government. As of late 2025, the country exists in a state of institutional collapse, with no elected officials in office.

Arab Spring protests escalated into civil war as the authoritarian Gaddafi regime (1969–2011) violently suppressed uprisings, prompting NATO intervention under humanitarian pretexts. 

Oil-rich Libya has collapsed into a "failed state", characterised by the breakdown of law and order, the absence of a unified central government, the loss of territorial control, and an economy paralysed by conflict over oil resources. Libya has become a proxy battleground for regional powers (e.g., Turkey, the UAE, Egypt, France, Russia, etc.), each backing different factions with weapons and mercenaries.

Somalia's transition into a failed state is also not a single event but the culmination of colonial legacies. The most critical period in the "how" of Somalia's failure was the 21-year dictatorship of Mohamed Siad Barre. 

Somalia became a failed state because it attempted to maintain a rigid, centralised government over a society that was traditionally decentralised and clan-based. Moreover, armed gangs, foreign dependence, and chronic institutional weakness have taken their place. 

Persistent problems such as corruption, weak security forces, uneven federal‑regional relations, and exclusionary politics keep Somalia on a fragile path where state functions exist but are often too weak to fully overcome its failed‑state legacy. 

Sudan, as a failed state, is the outcome of long-term structural problems—authoritarian rule, exclusionary politics, and corruption. Al-Bashir's 30-year rule (1989–2019) consolidated an authoritarian system that hollowed out civilian institutions. 

Omar Al-Bashir's overthrow in 2019 opened a chance for civilian-led reform.  Unfortunately, Sudan plunged into total anarchy instead of a transition to democracy. Its central government has largely lost the ability to provide security, basic services, and political order across much of its territory. 

In fact, state institutions have stopped functioning, courts and ministries are closed, and citizens cannot obtain documents like passports or birth or death certificates.  

In Syria, the Assad regime (1988–2024) built an authoritarian, highly centralised, and often sectarian security state, combining repression, patronage, and a narrow ruling elite that eroded legitimacy over decades. 

After the fall of the autocratic regime, the transitional government arranged a presidential election in 2025. The central government has still failed to have its monopoly on the legitimate use of force, can no longer provide basic public services, and lacks the authority to make collective decisions for its people.

Like other failed states, Yemen is also not the result of a single event but the culmination of decades of structural weakness, failed political transitions, and a devastating civil war. For 33 years, Ali Abdullah Saleh ruled through repression and corruption. 

Today, the country is split between the Houthi-run north, the "internationally recognised" government in parts of the south/east, and the Southern Transitional Council, which seeks independence for South Yemen. As of 2025, Yemen remains one of the world's gravest humanitarian crises, with the country effectively fractured under competing authorities.

What "failed state" means for Bangladesh

State failure is not an overnight event. Several concrete indicators show how far the failed states have moved toward state failure. The collapse of these countries can be attributed to three broader categories of failure: political, economic, and social. 

The transition from a stable autocracy to a failed state follows a specific, violent trajectory. A country is widely described as a failed state when its government no longer provides basic security and public services.

Bangladesh is not a failed state; its core functions have not collapsed. Yet the most direct path to state failure lies in the systematic erosion of institutions that uphold the rule of law. 

The Hasina regime governed the country from 1996 to 2001 and again from 2009 to 2024. The previous government monopolised power, bypassed legal processes, and manipulated courts and elections. As a result, corruption thrives, and the government becomes a tool for personal gain rather than a guardian of public interests.

The July 2024 uprising ended Sheikh Hasina's authoritarian rule, and an interim government was formed. Unfortunately, the interim government has failed to establish control on the ground and deliver the quality service to the people. 

The poor governance breeds resentment, prompting citizens to lose confidence in official structures.  Corruption and economic mismanagement are making Bangladesh chronically vulnerable, leaving the state dependent on expatriate workers and few sectors rather than a diversified and productive economy.

As the interim government struggles to guarantee security, a pressing question arises: is Bangladesh edging towards state failure? Disturbingly, many of the defining indicators of a failed state are now visible across the country.

Protests have erupted across Bangladesh following the murder of Sharif Osman Hadi, a key figure in the July mass uprising, amid the interim government's failure to ensure the swift arrest and exemplary punishment of those responsible. 

In the aftermath, escalating political violence has seen leading newspapers—Prothom Alo and The Daily Star—as well as cultural institutions such as Chhayanaut and Udichi set ablaze, while senior journalists, including Nurul Kabir, have come under attack. 

These developments starkly underscore the interim government's inability to uphold the rule of law, raising fears that Bangladesh may slide towards anarchy rather than a democratic transition.

Understanding the process of becoming a failed state should serve as a warning for Bangladesh. A state fails not only because the government loses power but also because it loses legitimacy. When citizens perceive their government as unjust, corrupt, or irrelevant, they withdraw their support.

This might be the case right now in Bangladesh. Institutions may still exist on paper, but they no longer function honestly and effectively. The collapse of legitimacy marks the tipping point to failure. 

Given that Bangladesh retains a unified and disciplined military and continues to exercise control over its borders, any endogenous or exogenous conspiracy to render the country a failed state is unlikely to succeed. 

However, political parties and civil society must not ignore the call to duty: they bear a responsibility to recognise early warning signs and act to prevent institutional collapse. Failure to do so would leave all stakeholders facing a collective lose-lose outcome.

Dr Sajjad M Jasimuddin is a professor (professeur senior) at Kedge Business School and head of the Geopolitics Strategy Lab (France). He previously held faculty positions at several universities based in Bangladesh (Dhaka University), Saudi Arabia, the UK, the UAE, and China. 

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and views of The Business Standard.