The metro illusion in Dhaka: Where is the complete framework of mass transit?

Dhaka's mass transport crisis is not new. The city's population continues to grow, and its urban footprint keeps expanding, yet transport capacity and service quality have not advanced at the same pace. In this context, metro rail has increasingly been framed as the single, overriding solution to Dhaka's mobility problems. That framing is incomplete, and it risks pushing the city toward an unbalanced, high-cost trajectory.

Mass transit is not metro rail alone. It is a complete system, built in layers, where each tier performs a specific function. The core weakness in Dhaka today is the absence of an integrated, tiered approach that connects modes, corridors, and service standards into one coherent framework.

No major city functions on a single transport mode. Rail-based mass transit does not mean heavy metro (MRT) only. A complete toolkit includes trams, Light Rail Transit (LRT), monorail, suspended monorail, Personal Rapid Transit (PRT), Bus Rapid Transit (BRT), and, critically, a properly regulated conventional bus network. These modes are not competing labels. They are complementary instruments that must be deployed according to corridor demand, right-of-way constraints, and financial sustainability.

Internationally, the system is commonly understood as a pyramid. Ordinary buses form the base because they carry the broadest demand at the lowest unit cost and can be scaled quickly. Above the base sit medium-capacity systems such as BRT and LRT. At the top, heavy metro serves a limited number of very high-demand corridors where its capital intensity can be justified. Dhaka's most consequential planning error has been to leap toward the top of the pyramid while leaving the foundation weak.

The bus system was, and remains, disorganized, inefficient, and structurally mismanaged. Without establishing route rationalization, network integration, disciplined franchising, and dedicated priority where required, the city has attempted to substitute institutional reform with infrastructure symbolism. Skipping intermediate tiers, such as properly designed BRT or corridor-appropriate LRT, creates a planning short circuit, and the cost of that short circuit is paid through congestion, poor accessibility, and a fragmented network.

Heavy metro also has physical limitations. It cannot easily navigate narrow or highly curved alignments, and it cannot penetrate dense, irregular, and unplanned urban fabrics without extreme cost and disruption. Dhaka's eastern and western fringe areas and older neighborhoods, including Old Dhaka, Madertek, Goran, Golapbagh, and numerous dense informal settlements, cannot realistically be served comprehensively by heavy metro. The existing master planning documents implicitly acknowledge this reality. The policy question is unavoidable: will large populations in these areas remain structurally excluded from modern mass transit, or will complementary modes be deployed to close the gap?

In many global cities, this gap is addressed through medium-capacity systems designed specifically for constrained corridors. Monorails and LRT lines are frequently developed along canals, parks, medians, and narrow rights-of-way. They are far less expensive than heavy metro, require substantially less land acquisition, and can operate successfully on alignments that would be impractical for MRT. These modes do not replace metro. They complete the network where metro cannot reach.

The same logic applies to elevated BRT and guided bus systems. Like Indonesia, Malaysia, and China, where these systems have been adopted as highly cost-effective solutions for selected corridors and supported by self-reliant and sustainable supply chains, similar approaches can be appropriate for Dhaka under comparable conditions. This is not a downgrade. It is a rational matching of technology to geometry, demand, and financial reality.

Bangladesh's urban context strengthens the case for such pragmatism. Many urban areas remain unplanned and lack road networks that are mass-transit enabled. In these settings, underground systems become prohibitively expensive, not only to construct but also to operate and maintain. In parallel, non-operational revenue potential remains limited because transit-oriented development (TOD) opportunities are constrained by dense, irregular, and heavily built land-use patterns. When TOD leverage is weak, the financial case for capital-intensive underground construction becomes even more difficult to defend.

Dhaka's everyday mobility reality also demands a grounded response. In many areas where buses do not operate effectively, rickshaws and auto-rickshaws become the only practical option. Policy debates often focus on restricting these modes, but restrictions without substitutes cannot succeed. Until reliable, fast, and affordable public transport is made available across the city, dependence on small vehicles will persist as a structural outcome, not a behavioral choice.

The objective of mass transit is simple: once a person boards, the system should carry them to their destination reliably. Whether that ride is on a metro train, a BRT trunk, a monorail, or a high-frequency regulated bus is secondary. Efficiency, coverage, interchange quality, and affordability are the measures that matter. In Dhaka, the name "metro" has too often been treated as the goal itself, turning what should be a network-building exercise into a symbolism-driven mega project narrative.

This approach also carries fiscal consequences. Overpriced projects, design choices misaligned with local constraints, and long-term financial burdens create pressure that persists across generations. Dollar-denominated borrowing used to build infrastructure in corridors where demand has not matured introduces sustainability risks that cannot be managed by optimism alone.

MRT Line-6 provides a clear lesson. Its ridership performance is strongest where alignment intersects dense residential areas and major employment concentrations. That outcome is consistent with basic transport economics. Yet multiple future alignments are proposed in areas where demand and land-use readiness remain uncertain. Under those conditions, subsidy burdens will rise, and the network will become harder to operate as an integrated public service.

What is required now is a reset in framing. Metro rail should not be discarded, but it must be placed in its correct position within an integrated mobility pyramid. The pathway is straightforward. First, rebuild the base through bus system reform, route rationalization, disciplined service contracting or franchising, and corridor prioritization. Second, deploy elevated BRT and LRT where they match corridor conditions and demand. Third, introduce monorail or other medium-capacity systems where geometry and right-of-way constraints require flexible solutions. Only then should heavy metro expand, limited to corridors where it is economically and operationally justified.

Integration must be treated as a design requirement, not an afterthought. Stations must become multimodal interchange points, with seamless transfers between bus, monorail, metro, and other systems. When the network works, the public does not speak in modes. The public speaks in outcomes. The shift should be from "I will take the metro" to "I will use mass transit."

Dhaka's survival as a functional city depends on moving beyond a single-mode narrative and returning to a step-by-step, science-based development of a complete mass transit framework. Without this, development will remain fragmented, benefits will concentrate in limited corridors, and exclusion will persist across large urban populations. Congestion, disorder, and inefficiency will continue to define daily life.

The message is clear: the future of mobility in Dhaka does not depend solely on increasing the number of metro lines. Rather, it hinges on deploying appropriate forms of mass transit in the right place, at the right scale, within a network that is properly planned, adequately financed, and operated as a single integrated system.

Dr Shamsul Hoque. Sketch: TBS

Dr M Shamsul Hoque, Professor, Department of Civil Engineering, Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET)