Foreign expertise, local ownership: The balance Bangladesh must get right

Bangladesh stands at a familiar crossroads. The country is building complex, capital-intensive infrastructure at a pace unmatched in its history, yet repeatedly struggles to operate what it builds. The debate is often framed poorly: foreign operators versus local capability, global expertise versus national control. That framing misses the point.

Foreign expertise is necessary. Foreign dominance is not.

The real question is not whether Bangladesh should involve foreign operators, but how it structures that involvement so capacity is built at home, accountability remains clear, and strategic assets do not drift beyond domestic control.

Why this debate matters now

Over the past decade, Bangladesh has moved decisively into technically demanding territory: offshore fuel handling, deep-sea port infrastructure, automated container terminals, and increasingly, rail-based urban transport. These are not incremental upgrades. They require advanced systems engineering, digital controls, risk management, and operational discipline developed over decades in global logistics hubs.

Local capacity has grown, but not evenly. Bangladesh produces capable engineers and planners. What it lacks is institutional continuity, incentives that retain talent, and exposure to operating at global scale.

The unease around foreign participation does not stem from xenophobia. It stems from opacity.

This gap explains why foreign participation keeps expanding beyond equipment supply into management and operations. The danger is not the presence of foreign operators. The danger is locking the country into permanent dependency.

The SPM paradox: world-class asset, idle system

Nothing illustrates this better than the Single Point Mooring (SPM) project off Maheshkhali, Cox's Bazar.

Completed at a cost of around Tk8,300 crore, nearly double the original estimate, the SPM was designed to transform fuel imports. By allowing crude oil to be offloaded directly from mother vessels into onshore storage, it promised to cut transfer time from 11 days to two and save roughly Tk800 crore a year in freight and charter costs.

On paper, it is a textbook efficiency upgrade.

In reality, more than a year after commissioning in March 2024, the system remains largely idle. Not because the infrastructure failed, but because Bangladesh has been unable to appoint a qualified operator. A recent tender collapsed after one bidder was deemed non-compliant and another exceeded budget limits. The government is now exploring government-to-government options with China and Indonesia.

The original plan was sensible: bring in a foreign operator for 18 to 36 months while training local staff to take over. But delays and failed procurement have pushed authorities closer to the idea that long-term foreign management may be unavoidable.

This is the paradox. Bangladesh built a sophisticated offshore system but did not prepare its operational ecosystem to absorb it.

Why foreign operators often make sense

There are solid reasons why governments turn to foreign operators for high-tech infrastructure.

First, technical depth. Global terminal operators such as APM Terminals, DP World, and MEDLOG operate across continents. They bring standardised systems for vessel scheduling, yard optimisation, safety protocols, and digital tracking that reduce turnaround time and losses. These are not easily improvised.

Second, investment confidence. Bangladesh's logistics performance still trails regional peers. Port congestion, slow clearance, and coordination failures hurt exporters. Foreign operators connect local assets to global networks, improving predictability for shippers and investors alike.

Third, structured capability building. When contracts are well designed, foreign firms become training grounds. Local engineers learn advanced operations, suppliers upgrade standards, and secondary service industries emerge. This model has worked elsewhere. It can work here too.

Fourth, global best practice. The issue in Bangladesh is rarely the ability to run a port or pipeline at a basic level. It is the lack of consistent systems that minimise errors, manage risk, and optimise capacity. These systems are honed where efficiency is a competitive advantage.

In short, foreign operators can accelerate learning curves by years.

Where things go wrong: secrecy and weak governance

The unease around foreign participation does not stem from xenophobia. It stems from opacity.

Major port and terminal deals in recent years, including long-term leases at facilities like Laldia and Pangaon, have been signed with limited public disclosure. Bidding processes, performance benchmarks, and long-term obligations are rarely discussed openly.

This creates a trust deficit.

When deals are struck behind closed doors, even well-intentioned partnerships attract suspicion. Questions shift from operational efficiency to whether national interests are protected, whether costs are inflated, and whether exit paths exist.

Transparency is not an administrative luxury. It is economic infrastructure.

Without it, foreign involvement becomes politically fragile, and every delay or cost overrun reinforces cynicism.

Accountability cannot be outsourced

There is another structural problem with foreign-managed systems: accountability diffusion.

When operations remain foreign-controlled, failures are harder to own. Responsibility sits offshore. Remedies take longer. Local institutions do not develop the reflexes needed to manage crises.

Sustainable infrastructure requires local ownership of knowledge. Machines can be imported. Decision-making competence must be grown.

This does not mean abrupt localisation. It means structured transition.

Clear timelines for skill transfer. Measurable benchmarks. Mandatory localisation of key roles. Penalties for failure to train. Incentives for success.

Without these, "temporary" foreign management quietly becomes permanent.

Lessons from the high-tech push

The same pattern appears in Bangladesh's high-tech ambitions.

The country has invested heavily in physical infrastructure: hi-tech parks, software zones, telecom networks, spectrum auctions. Over 90 parks are planned, with 18 operational. Flagship sites like Bangabandhu Hi-Tech City and private initiatives such as Walton's Gazipur park show what is possible.

Yet outside Dhaka, many parks remain underutilised. Around 60% of built space sits empty. The constraint is not buildings. It is skills, market access, and integration into global value chains.

Telecom policy reforms, including spectrum auctions and licensing updates, signal progress. But high spectrum prices and slow implementation dampen network investment. Again, ambition outpaces execution.

The lesson is consistent: hardware without human systems delivers limited returns.

What a better model would look like

Bangladesh does not need to reject foreign operators. It needs to govern them better.

That means publishing contract frameworks, even if sensitive commercial details are redacted. It means open, competitive bidding where local firms can participate and global firms compete on merit. It means embedding skill-transfer requirements that are tracked and audited.

It also means independent public value assessments. How much will a project save? Over what timeline? Under what risks? These should not be internal documents.

Most importantly, it means aligning foreign participation with a national capacity roadmap. Every foreign-operated system should have a clear localisation horizon.

Bangladesh cannot leap into advanced infrastructure without foreign expertise. Pretending otherwise is unrealistic. But allowing that expertise to dominate indefinitely is equally dangerous.

The goal is not independence from the world. It is competence within it.

Foreign operators should be partners, not custodians. Transparency should be the rule, not the exception. And every deal should leave Bangladesh more capable than before.

Secrecy does not protect national interest. Strong institutions do.

That, more than any terminal or pipeline, is the infrastructure Bangladesh must now build.

Mizanur Rahman Yousuf. Sketch: TBS

Mizanur Rahman Yousuf is a Senior Staff Correspondent at TBS Chattogram Bureau.