What is Trump's new Iran strategy, and can it work?

The conflict between the US and Iran is entering its seventh month with direct fighting resuming after a month-long lull, while the Trump administration weighs a strategy aimed at containing the conflict rather than pursuing either a full-scale war or an immediate diplomatic settlement.

The approach, described by analysts as "no war, no peace", would combine intermittent US military strikes with intensified economic pressure on Tehran. Its immediate goals would be to deter Iran, protect shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and limit the cost of a prolonged military campaign, says Al Jazeera.

But the strategy faces significant obstacles, including US ammunition constraints, the collapse of shipping through the Strait, domestic political pressure and increasingly different priorities between Washington and its Israeli ally.

What has changed?

Direct hostilities resumed on Monday, 31 August, when US forces struck targets on Larak Island in the Strait of Hormuz to prevent Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from laying sea mines.

Iran retaliated by firing missiles at two airbases hosting US personnel in Jordan. Eight of the missiles were intercepted.

The escalation followed the collapse of a June ceasefire Memorandum of Understanding, which failed in part because of vague language over control of the Strait of Hormuz.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has offered a ceasefire if Washington lifts sanctions and returns to the MoU. The Trump administration, however, has indicated that it does not currently see a need for a diplomatic settlement.

That leaves Washington facing a conflict that has neither ended nor developed into an easily sustainable conventional war.

What is the "no war, no peace" strategy?

Rather than maintaining continuous large-scale combat operations, the proposed approach would use periodic military strikes to keep pressure on Iran and respond to threats to US forces and international shipping.

The idea is to make military action more limited and intermittent while using economic sanctions to impose a continuing cost on Tehran.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent is leading the economic component of the campaign. Washington has sanctioned 60 entities involved in Iranian oil sales and threatened secondary sanctions against international partners that do business with Tehran.

The administration argues that the economic pressure is forcing Iran to respond through military action. Iranian officials reject the idea that the country's economy is close to collapse.

The strategy therefore seeks to maintain leverage without committing the United States to an open-ended ground or air war.

Why is Washington considering it?

A sustained military campaign carries growing costs.

US forces are reportedly facing shortages of critical munitions in the Middle East, particularly Patriot interceptor missiles used to defend against Iranian attacks. The administration denies that its forces are running short.

At the same time, the conflict has become an economic and political problem at home. Petrol prices have risen, while Trump's approval rating has fallen to 33% as the November midterm elections approach.

The Strait of Hormuz is another major concern. Despite US efforts to escort shipping, traffic through the strategic waterway has fallen from an average of about 100 ships a day before the war to just seven.

For Washington, reopening the waterway while avoiding the costs of a much larger war has therefore become a central objective.

Can sporadic strikes reopen the Strait?

That is one of the biggest tests of the strategy.

US military action could raise the cost for Iran of disrupting shipping and potentially deter further attacks or mining operations. But periodic strikes may not be enough to provide the security that commercial shipping companies need to resume normal operations.

If ships remain reluctant to use the Strait, the United States could find itself repeatedly conducting military operations without resolving the underlying problem.

Critics argue that this could amount to an open-ended commitment rather than a cheaper alternative to war — effectively turning containment into a "forever war".

Can economic pressure force Iran to compromise?

The administration is betting that sanctions can strengthen the impact of limited military action.

By targeting Iranian oil sales and threatening companies and countries that continue doing business with Tehran, Washington can attempt to restrict the revenue available to Iran without maintaining a constant military campaign.

But sanctions alone have not produced a settlement so far. Iran has continued to resist US demands and has responded to pressure with military action.

The effectiveness of the strategy will therefore depend on whether the combined economic and military pressure changes Tehran's calculation enough to bring it back to negotiations.

What about Israel?

A further complication is the growing divergence between Washington and Israel.

The conflict began as a joint military campaign, but the two allies increasingly have different priorities.

Washington is focused on finding an exit strategy, reopening the Strait of Hormuz and limiting the political and economic costs of the conflict before the November elections.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, by contrast, remains focused on preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Israel has also obstructed wider peace efforts by refusing to withdraw from southern Lebanon, violating terms tied to the earlier ceasefire framework.

That difference matters because a US strategy built around limited strikes and pressure requires some control over the pace and scope of military escalation.

If Israel continues pursuing broader or longer-term objectives, Washington could find it harder to contain the conflict.

So, can Trump's strategy work?

It could work as a short-term containment strategy if three conditions are met: Iran is deterred from major attacks, shipping through the Strait gradually resumes, and sanctions create enough economic pressure to bring Tehran back to negotiations.

The problem is that each of those objectives is uncertain.

Limited strikes may deter Iran but can also trigger retaliation. Sanctions can weaken Iran's economy but may not be sufficient to force concessions. And US escorts may protect individual ships without restoring confidence in the safety of the entire waterway.

The strategy also depends on the United States having enough military resources to respond whenever Iran escalates, while avoiding a cycle in which each round of retaliation leads to a larger one.

For Trump, the central challenge is therefore to use military and economic pressure without allowing that pressure to produce the prolonged conflict his administration is seeking to avoid.

With the midterm elections approaching, petrol prices elevated and shipping through the Strait severely disrupted, the success of the strategy is likely to be judged less by whether Washington can inflict further damage on Iran than by whether it can restore deterrence and eventually create a path out of the conflict.