Mob violence returns to the fore: A test of the BNP government’s early promises
The home minister has repeatedly emphasised that lawful protests, assemblies, and speech will remain protected, while coercive tactics, particularly those involving crowds exerting pressure, will be curbed. Yet, since April, the commitment is being strained
When Home Minister Salahuddin Ahmed stood before reporters on his first working day in February and declared that "mob culture in Bangladesh ends," it signalled a clear break from the turbulence of the interim period. Less than two months later, that promise is facing its first serious test.
Over the last few days, the brutal killing of a pir in Kushtia, beaten and hacked to death inside his own darbar, and the assault on gender-diverse individuals in Shahbagh were both reportedly carried out in full public view. These incidents have brought the issue of mob violence back into public focus.
Together, these incidents point to a troubling continuity from the mob culture during the interim government rather than a clean break from the past. They also raise a deeper question—has the state been able to reassert its monopoly over violence, or are mobs still operating in the gaps of governance left behind by a turbulent transition?
"This is really unfortunate. The first and foremost duty of the government is to ensure the safety and security of the citizens. In its absence, anyone can fall victim to this mob any day." -Dr Samina Luthfa, professor of sociology, Dhaka University.
A shadow of the past
Human rights activist Nur Khan Liton offers a stark assessment of the broader pattern that has unfolded since last August.
"Since 5 August, we have witnessed a sustained wave of mob violence against individuals with differing views; minorities, politicians, professionals, and teachers have all been attacked. In effect, no one was spared. We saw close to a hundred people fall victim to such killing."
His observation suggests that what is being witnessed today is not an isolated spike, but the continuation of a trend that began during the interim government period—one that the new administration had pledged to reverse.
Dr Samina Luthfa, professor of sociology at the University of Dhaka, said, "What we are witnessing is the same playbook we have seen during the interim government."
From promise to persistence
The BNP-led government has been careful to frame its stance as both firm and democratic. The home minister has repeatedly emphasised that lawful protests, assemblies, and speech will remain protected, while coercive tactics, particularly those involving crowds exerting pressure, will be curbed. Yet, since April, the commitment is being strained.
In Kushtia, law enforcement officials acknowledged prior intelligence about possible unrest. Police were present in the area. The planning was conducted in broad daylight. And yet, a mob reportedly numbering several hundred managed to storm the shrine, vandalise it, and carry out a murder with both blunt and sharp weapons.
In Shahbagh, the dynamics were different but equally concerning. A smaller group of 70-80 people, allegedly mobilised under a banner of 'Azadi Andolon', were able to identify, surround, and assault individuals by tagging them as homosexuals. Victims later alleged not only physical violence but also harassment inside a police station and reluctance from authorities to formally record their FIR.
A question of political will
Nur Khan Liton points out this pattern to show a deeper institutional gap, "What is most alarming is the absence of effective and decisive action to curb this trend. While police often arrive at the scene after the incident, file cases, and in some instances make arrests, these attempts have failed to establish any meaningful deterrence. There is no clear example being set to counter mob violence in a systematic way."
Samina Luthfa said, "I believe the government still lacks the political will. They may still think these mobs or such social fascist forces are useful. This is really unfortunate. The first and foremost duty of the government is to ensure the safety and security of the citizens. In its absence, anyone can fall victim to this mob any day."
Human rights activist Barrister Manzur Al Matin also pointed out the lack of political commitment from the government.
"One of the main aspirations of July Uprising is that we will make an inclusive society for everyone. BNP also mentioned it in their manifesto. The interim government had no political power, but the current government possesses that power. Yet if these mobs persist, it would clearly show the lack of political commitment."
This lack of deterrence, experts suggest, is precisely what allows mob violence to persist—even in the face of strong official rhetoric.
For researcher and cultural activist Mir Huzaifa Al Mamduh, the issue is ultimately less about capacity and more about intent.
"If the government truly wishes, incidents of this nature can be prevented altogether. Ensuring that no citizen is harmed is ultimately a question of political will. The state has the capacity to guarantee equal rights—religious freedom, freedom of belief, and freedom of thought and practice—for every individual. If it commits to that principle, no one would be able to attack another with impunity."
The Kushtia killing appears to reflect precisely the sort of situation where ideological contestation, social media mobilisation, and local grievances converge into violence. Yet, even within this complexity, Mamduh is clear about the limits of state intervention:
"The government's responsibility is to ensure the safety of its citizens. Once it steps into questions of 'right' and 'wrong' belief, it risks reinforcing binary divisions that can legitimise violence. In the end, this is not a philosophical problem but a governance issue."
Expanding targets, deepening risks
If Kushtia shows religious tensions, Shahbagh highlights another dimension of mob violence: the targeting of marginalised communities.
LGBTQ rights activist Muntasir Rahman recalled the time when the police at Shahbagh police station did not prevent the mob. He said, "These are criminal offences when people are being attacked and even beaten after being labelled as LGBTQ, and such mob violence must be addressed through firm legal action. The government has a responsibility to prosecute those involved and ensure accountability. Otherwise, this pattern of violence will inevitably spread, putting other citizens at similar risk."
His warning is not merely about one community. It is about the logic of mob violence itself that, once normalised, it rarely remains confined to a single target.
"There is also a clear failure of law enforcement. Victims have struggled to even file complaints. Police initially refused to take reports, and when they did, the documentation was incomplete or improperly recorded. Despite prior warnings being given about potentially violent processions and inflammatory slogans, preventive action was not taken."
These accounts, if substantiated, point to a systemic issue that goes beyond isolated lapses and raise questions about preparedness, responsiveness, and institutional confidence.
It would be premature to conclude that the BNP government has failed in its commitment. The administration is still in its early days, and institutional reforms, particularly within law enforcement, take time to implement. However, the incidents in Kushtia and Shahbagh show the urgency of visible, consistent action, and most importantly, a clear message from the government to the people regarding its commitment towards ending mob violence, as promised.
As Nur Khan Liton puts it, "At present, law enforcement agencies have not reached a level where they can address this phenomenon effectively. Without strong and unequivocal messaging from the government, it is difficult to break this cycle of violence."
