Middle powers and the art of the deal
Donald Trump’s transactional approach to foreign relations depends on bargaining power: the ability to compel other countries to reach agreements that serve your interests. But it turns out that middle powers have plenty of advantages in such a world, even when they are smaller, poorer, and militarily weaker than great powers
The week of Donald Trump's return to the White House may seem like an odd time to emphasize the growing strength and agency of non-Western middle powers such as India, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Mexico. After all, Trump declared in his inaugural address that "America will reclaim its rightful place as the greatest, most powerful, most respected nation on earth, inspiring the awe and admiration of the entire world," before announcing that the United States would "take back" the Panama Canal.
But after three weeks of traveling in Asia, which included many conversations with academics, government officials, tour guides, and hotel staff, it is clear that much of the rest of the world is decentering America. Of course, many of the people I spoke to have strong opinions about the US: some admire the country and its new president, while others could barely contain their contempt. Overall, however, they were more concerned with how their own country fits into a complicated world than with what America will or will not do.
Ironically, the Trump administration may well accelerate the shift toward a global order in which many countries feel freer to flex their muscles. In Trump's vision of the world, he and the leaders of other great powers – those known for their nuclear, military, economic, or strategic might – can determine the course of future events by cutting deals with no regard for the opinions of neighboring states or for international rules and norms. At the same time, Trump sees very little value in fighting other peoples' wars. He would prefer to talk loudly and brandish big tariffs, before sitting down to negotiate.
This thoroughly transactional perspective casts a different light on the sources of national power in the twenty-first century. In a world of deals, what matters most is bargaining power: the ability to compel other countries to reach agreements that serve your interests. And in such a world, it turns out that middle powers have plenty of advantages, even when they are considerably smaller, poorer, and militarily weaker than traditional great powers.
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In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when countries could use force with impunity, power was a function of military and economic might, which in turn depended on territory and population size, the availability of natural and human resources, and the ability to extract and harness them for government purposes. Great powers used their armies and markets to create spheres of influence where they could intervene almost without limit.
But in today's world of "multi-alignment," as India calls it, middle powers can reach agreements with great powers and with one another for different purposes. India can bargain with Japan, Australia, and the US for enhanced security, with Russia for oil and gas, and with Singapore and other ASEAN countries for green energy. Trump's mantra of "America First" suits the middle powers just fine, as it allows them to follow a similar model.
As the Harvard economist Dani Rodrik has highlighted, middle powers want to be able to create shifting coalitions. Many of these countries are members of BRICS+, a self-described "informal group" that began with Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (after which the group is named). It has since expanded to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and Indonesia, with Turkey, Thailand, and Malaysia applying for membership. Above all, the organization is a vessel for ad hoc alliances – a way for members to increase their collective bargaining power within traditional Western-led institutions.
Trade among BRICS+ members is growing fast. Moreover, the UAE, Iran, and Indonesia, as well as new BRICS+ partners Nigeria and Kazakhstan, are all major or mid-size oil producers and exporters. If Saudi Arabia, which is still "assessing" its membership, decides to join, a sizable contingent of OPEC countries could hold meetings on the sidelines of BRICS+ summits. The question for the Kingdom, a G20 country seeking to broker important Middle East and East-West deals, is whether membership would increase or decrease its bargaining power.
Some observers dismiss BRICS+ as the twenty-first-century equivalent of the G77, a coalition at the United Nations of non-aligned countries that was created in 1964. But while the non-aligned sought power by banding together, the multi-aligned can make use of a wide range of formal and informal ties to enhance their individual or plurilateral bargaining power with the US, China, the European Union, and others.
The most powerful asset in any negotiation is the ability to walk away from the table. This depends on what alternative dispute-resolution experts call a BATNA, the party's "best alternative to a negotiated agreement." Middle powers are building alternatives to agreements negotiated on what they see as Western terms.
Four years ago, former US President Joe Biden focused his inaugural speech on restoring and strengthening democracy at home and abroad. He set out to build a global democratic bloc to counter the rise of autocracy, although he modified his position over the course of his presidency to include non-democracies with which the US had to do business. Call it "Democracies+."
Trump invited Chinese President Xi Jinping to his inauguration, to signal his commitment to diplomatic engagement – by which he means negotiation. This week, Trump announced his intent to be a "peacemaker and a unifier," to end wars and prevent new ones from beginning. He wants above all to "win," and keep winning, but through deals, not arms.
In such an environment, the hardest bargainer is king. Many countries will be eager to come to the table, bolstered by the power to walk away when the proposed deal is not to their liking. Rather than a unipolar or multipolar system, this world resembles nothing less – and nothing more – than a bazaar.
Anne-Marie Slaughter, a former director of policy planning in the US State Department, is CEO of the think tank New America, Professor Emerita of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, and the author of Renewal: From Crisis to Transformation in Our Lives, Work, and Politics (Princeton University Press, 2021).
Disclaimer: This article first appeared on Project Syndicate, and is published by special syndication arrangement.
