‘Gupto’: How a word became a potent political weapon
What began as a murmur on social media has, by April 2026, hardened into a central organising principle of political accusation, identity and conflict
On 21 April 2026, at Chittagong Government City College, a violent conflict was ignited when Jatiyatabadi Chhatra Dal (JCD) activists edited campus graffiti that originally read 'Student Politics and BCL-free Campus', erasing 'Student' and replacing it with 'Gupto', meaning covert. This sparked two rounds of clashes between JCD and Islami Chhatra Shibir, leaving at least 10 people injured.
In the months following the July Uprising and the fall of the Awami League government on 5 August 2024, Bangladesh's political vocabulary acquired a new, loaded word: 'gupto'—hidden, covert, concealed. What began as a murmur on social media has, by April 2026, hardened into a central organising principle of political accusation, identity and conflict.
Today, gupto is no longer merely descriptive. It is accusatory, strategic and deeply political. It is invoked in speeches by top leaders, scribbled onto campus walls and shouted during clashes. Its evolution offers a revealing window into the anxieties of a post-uprising Bangladesh still grappling with legitimacy, accountability and narrative control.
The origins: Secrecy as survival
The idea of covert political activity is not new in Bangladesh. As writer and researcher Mohiuddin Ahmed notes, underground politics has long been part of the subcontinent's political culture.
During the Pakistan period, when the Communist Party was banned, its members operated within larger political platforms such as the Awami League and the National Awami Party. "Whenever a political organisation is banned or lacks security, its members often continue their activities from within other parties," Ahmed explains. "This is a common political practice—not just here, but globally."
In fact, according to his own interview, the current leader of the opposition and Amir-e-Jamaat-e-Islami, Dr Shafiqur Rahman, was himself a covert member of Islami Chhatra Shibir in the 1970s when he was formally affiliated with leftist politics.
In the 1980s and 1990s, when Shibir was banned in universities such as Dhaka University and Jahangirnagar University, its members operated within other organisations to carry on their activities.
This historical precedent is crucial. It suggests that gupto politics, in its original form, was less about deception and more about survival. Organisations facing repression adapted by embedding themselves within safer, more dominant structures.
Yet the post-2024 context transformed this practice from a necessity into a controversy.
How the narrative took shape
The earliest seeds of this discourse can be found in accounts by London-based investigative journalist Zulkarnain Saer on 22 February 2025. He mentioned a figure identified as Salman, later identified as Md Abu Shadik Kayem, the then president of Dhaka University Islami Chhatra Shibir.
According to this narrative, when key coordinators such as Nahid Islam and Sarjis Alam were detained by the Detective Branch and the movement risked collapse, it was Kayem who ensured continuity. He reportedly activated a "second line" of leadership, including Abdul Qader and Abdul Hannan Masud, preventing a leadership vacuum.
He was also credited with drafting the foundational nine-point demands and coordinating messaging during the nationwide internet blackout, hand-delivering documents to media houses and scripting video statements for other leaders.
The narrative culminates with Kayem allegedly confirming the flight of Sheikh Hasina and even contacting Muhammad Yunus to lead the interim government. Thus, the 'gupto mastermind' narrative was cemented.
Prominent online activist Imtiaz Mirza said, "The issue of gupto politics gained prominence through figures like Shadik Kayem, who was promoted by Zulkarnain Saer as someone who had operated covertly."
"At one point, Shibir was even being viewed as a potential allied organisation. But gradually, the nature of their covert operations became more apparent. There were allegations that individuals posed as members of the Chhatra League while engaging in violence, even attacking people while claiming to represent opposing groups. Initially, this was seen as an isolated issue, but it soon became clear that covert actors were attempting to operate within larger political organisations," he added.
Social media was flooded with revelations that several former leaders of the banned Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL) had resurfaced as leaders of Islami Chhatra Shibir. Past records, such as videos of Shadik Kayem chanting 'nouka nouka' or SM Farhad, the then DU Shibir general secretary, with prominent BCL leaders, resurfaced. Similarly, other leaders emerged from different universities. This period marked the transformation of gupto from a strategic descriptor into a term of suspicion.
Institutionalisation of the label
The discourse took a decisive turn in mid-2025. On 9 July, following a murder in Puran Dhaka, Nasir Uddin Nasir, general secretary of Jatiyatabadi Chhatra Dal (JCD), alleged that "gupto organisations" were orchestrating mob violence using general students as cover.
"If individuals were indeed part of organisations accused of serious crimes—such as torture and violence—then their past actions must be investigated, regardless of whether they operated openly or covertly." -Altaf Parvez, Political commentator
By 14 July, at a protest in Nayapaltan, Nasir formally labelled Shibir a "gupto organisation", accusing it of spreading propaganda against Tarique Rahman.
The most detailed exposé came on 3 August 2025, when DU student leader Abdul Qader published a viral Facebook post naming individuals allegedly engaged in gupto politics within BCL.
By 15 August, Meghmallar Basu of the Chhatra Union argued that Shibir had remained organisationally intact during the Awami regime precisely because it operated covertly while others faced repression.
Entry into mainstream political rhetoric
By early 2026, gupto had firmly entered electoral politics. In January, JCD president Rakibul Islam Rakib publicly challenged Shibir's role in the Uprising, questioning their absence from frontline protests.
On 19 January, the term became mainstream when BNP Chairperson and current Prime Minister Tarique Rahman used it casually at a rally, joking about "gupto" infiltrators among slogan-chanting supporters. Days later, on 31 January in Sirajganj, he formalised its political usage, urging supporters to label those spreading confusion as "gupto", citing their absence during the previous 16 years of repression.
The reaction was immediate. On 1 February, Jamaat Ameer Shafiqur Rahman condemned the term as "shameful", arguing that those who had themselves operated discreetly were now weaponising the label.
From rhetoric to clash
After the election, the word spilled onto the streets. Following the Chattogram clash, on 22 April, Nasir Uddin Nasir demanded trials for "gupto Shibir" members, while Abdul Qader challenged Shibir leaders to publicly disprove their covert status.
On 23 April, Jubodal leader Robiul Islam Noyon described gupto politics as a "toxic" practice, while DUCSU Literature and Cultural Affairs Secretary Musaddiq Ali Ibne Mohammad turned the accusation back on Tarique Rahman: "Tarique Rahman is gupto. He fled to London after signing a bond."
By 24 April, Jamaat Secretary General Mia Golam Porowar countered that the "real gupto" actors were inside the government.
Accountability versus distraction
For political commentator Altaf Parvez, the rise of gupto reflects a deeper failure of transitional accountability.
"The interim government should have conducted a comprehensive investigation into campus political culture," he argues. "That did not happen. Instead, elections were organised, and those claiming to have operated covertly were granted legitimacy without scrutiny."
Parvez raises a critical point: "If individuals were indeed part of organisations accused of serious crimes—such as torture and violence—then their past actions must be investigated, regardless of whether they operated openly or covertly."
Yet he also warns against the disproportionate focus on the issue. "Bangladesh today faces an economic crisis—rising prices, stagnant wages, declining real incomes. In that context, the sudden nationwide agitation over 'gupto' feels both surprising and somewhat mysterious."
His concern echoes a broader critique: that the term may be serving as a convenient distraction from structural challenges.
Mohiuddin Ahmed offers a more sceptical view of the discourse itself.
"What we are seeing around the term 'gupto' is largely a form of trolling," he says. "It lacks substantive political depth and has become a tool to attack opponents."
