Government failure and police silence: Who will stop the mob?
TBS spoke with four experts, who noted that the police played only a minimal role during the attacks, acting under instructions or a lack thereof from the government.
Bangladesh today stands at a perilous crossroads, where political transition has given way to lawlessness, social fracture, and systemic failure.
The recent assassination and subsequent death of youth leader Sharif Osman Hadi has triggered fresh waves of protests, attacks on media offices, and threats to cultural institutions across the country. Mobs targeted major newspapers such as The Daily Star and Prothom Alo, as well as cultural centers like Chayanat and Udichi, halting activities and revealing the fragile state of press and artistic freedom amid this volatile transition.
The Business Standard spoke with four experts. Experts noted that the police played only a minimal role during the attacks, acting under instructions or lack thereof from the government. The assaults were neither spontaneous nor unforeseen: in some cases, lists of targeted institutions circulated beforehand. The authority had the opportunity to intervene decisively with minimal force but failed to do so. This inaction, whether due to fear, incompetence, or tacit approval, allowed perpetrators to operate with impunity.
The state's intelligence apparatus appears to have failed at a critical moment
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Nurul Huda; Former Inspector General of Police (IGP)
What is clearly evident is a serious intelligence failure on the part of the government, along with a lack of adequate and timely preventive measures.
The developments suggest that the country is facing a deepening political divide, in which right-wing groups have become increasingly organised, confident, and vocal. The government not only failed to anticipate the scale and intensity of this shift, but also showed little preparedness to contain its consequences. Whether this situation could have been predicted earlier is a separate debate. What is undeniable, however, is that the authorities were negligent in preventing these incidents once warning signs were visible, and the state's intelligence apparatus appears to have failed to function effectively at a critical moment.
From the very beginning the Interim Government did not have that control
Asif M Shahan
Associate Professor, Department of Development Studies, University of Dhaka
I think there are two factors at play here. From a classic political science perspective, a state cannot truly function unless it can exercise control over the principal means of coercion. From the very beginning, this Interim Government did not have that control. The problem, however, is that it neither attempted to establish that control effectively nor succeeded in doing so.
As a result, we were extremely vulnerable. Within this context, the second factor became relevant. We are undergoing an 'agony of transition,' during which extremist wings and far-right forces see an opportunity to impose their agenda over others while disregarding the political and democratic process.
Unfortunately, the interim government has not taken a clear stance, allowing these forces to grow. The combination of these two factors is what is driving the current situation.
Authority's inactivity suggests likely silent support
Altaf Parvez
Researcher and Writer
Clearly, the reason we did not see any decisive role from the police is that the government did not want it. How the police act, and to what extent they will act, is determined by the relevant cabinet, the government, or the advisers.
In the recent incidents, the police were either almost inactive or only minimally involved, and whatever role they did play was certainly carried out under instructions from the advisers or the government. It is their duty to remain obedient to the government. Since the advisory council has taken an inactive or minimally active position in this case, it suggests that there is likely silent support from them.
Failure to intervene signals uncertainty in Bangladesh's democratic path
Firoz Ahmed
Member of the Constitution Reform Commission
These attacks were carried out after hours of provocation. In some cases, even lists of which institutions would be attacked were circulated beforehand. Under these circumstances, the government cannot claim that it did not know or that it did not have time to prepare. Yet we saw no initiative to secure the buildings.
Given the size of the gathering and the level of prior preparation, the government could have disarmed the situation without using much force at all. The fact that this number could not, or was not stopped, suggests that there was no real intention to intervene. Whether this came from fear or silent approval, the interim government did not want to stop it.
Even their initial response came much later. If we assume they failed to anticipate or understand what was happening, then that points to failure, incompetence, and a serious lack of political judgment. Or, an even more disturbing possibility is that some within the interim government wanted this to happen, which is why the entire administration remained inactive.
Such inaction not only reflects immediate administrative failure but also casts a shadow over Bangladesh's political stability and democratic future.
