This is an era-defining moment for Bangladesh: ICG President Comfort Ero
In an interview with The Business Standard (TBS) in Dhaka, International Crisis Group President Comfort Ero discussed Bangladesh’s reform agenda, the Rohingya crisis and much more

International Crisis Group President Comfort Ero recently visited Bangladesh, where she met top officials, including interim government Chief Adviser Professor Muhammad Yunus.
In an interview with The Business Standard (TBS) in Dhaka, Comfort discussed Bangladesh's reform agenda, the Rohingya crisis, Bangladesh-US relations, as well as her insights on the Gaza crisis and the latest developments in the Ukraine war.
What is the ICG's position on the Gaza crisis and the way it is unfolding?
The collapse wasn't inevitable; it was a choice. I think we always had two scenarios: whether we would see an extended phase one of the ceasefire or whether it would collapse.
And it is very clear to us that, first, securing the ceasefire was a tremendous development. Then, to see the groundswell movement of Gazans back to their homes was crucial.
And to see the reactions of Israelis receiving their families – their children, cousins, sisters and brothers – who had been released and brought back to Israel, because the nation has been traumatised since 7 October, this was such an emotional and important moment.
But the process to getting a sustained ceasefire was always going to be tricky. As you'll be familiar, there was already tension within Netanyahu's coalition, with some wanting a continuation of the war and some wanting to see the complete destruction of Hamas.
And quite frankly, that goal of trying to destroy Hamas is going to be difficult to meet. I think there has to be a rethink of that strategy right now.
It was always going to be very difficult to get to phase two, which required discussions on a permanent ceasefire. There was always resistance around the idea of a permanent ceasefire within the coalition.
I also think the Gaza proposal, which would have seen the complete removal of Gaza's population, may have also triggered or compromised the ability for us to get from phase one to phase two because Israel started to redefine the terms of phase one of the ceasefire.
And, as you know, there are domestic factors at play here on the Israeli side. As we speak, the cabinet met to decide the fate of the Shin Bet leader, there's a budget being passed, and Prime Minister Netanyahu also playing for time for his political survival. So it's very delicate.
From a genocidal perspective, given that people are being killed in Gaza, do you think the West is losing its legitimacy in advocating for human rights across the world?
It's not just the West – I think it's global.
This didn't start with Israel and Gaza. It didn't start with how the West has handled the Israel-Gaza-Hamas war. There has always been a tension within Western foreign policy, but also with any government that projects or says it has core human rights principles while balancing them against national security interests.
If you overstate the human rights values, at one point, it's going to collide with what you claim your national interests are as well. It's clear that the Israel-Gaza war has only accelerated this tension.
But this isn't new. And there are questions, however, about the viability of the rules-based international order. Some people argue that it has been consigned to the museum. But it was never really an "international" rules-based order – it was Western-based. So yes, it is precarious.
European leaders are not caving in. I think they're reacting to Donald Trump's proposal, as is President Zelensky.
What is your view on the Ukraine ceasefire proposal? Do you think European leaders and Donald Trump are caving in to Putin?
Of course, it was very obvious – or at least apparent from the outset – that Putin wanted a permanent settlement that addressed Russia's core demands.
And two of those issues have already been conceded or addressed. The first is that Ukraine was never going to be part of NATO – that was always known in private. Even the Biden administration had already made it clear that Ukraine would not be joining NATO.
The second issue, which was also clear in the minds of even European leaders but also the Biden administration and has now been made public by the US, is that Ukraine was never going to be able to regain – at least not today – the annexed territories.So, those two things had already been agreed in private.
Then, there are the other issues: Putin wants to make Ukraine pliant and to ensure it has greater control over it. But he also wants to rebuild relations with the US and regain its own standing in the international community.
Regarding Bangladesh and the Rohingya crisis, what do you think Dhaka's approach should be to ensure that repatriation actually happens? Given that the Arakan Army now controls Rakhine State, how should Dhaka engage effectively to make them more open to accepting the Rohingyas back into Rakhine territory?
It's a good question – and partly why we've been coming to Bangladesh.
It's very instructive, given the new dynamics and realities, that Bangladesh is now seeking to engage with the Arakan [Army], recognising that it is not sustainable for it to continue hosting over a million refugees.
There are concerns about security in the camps, but there's also recognition of the dire humanitarian situation, especially in the context of dwindling international assistance.
So, this new initiative – off the back of the [UN] Secretary-General's visit and the discussions on a humanitarian corridor – is a crucial step in addressing the issue.
In the future, it paves the way to thinking through what repatriation could look like. But until we address the security situation in Rakhine State and improve the confidence of the Rohingyas, it will be hard to guarantee that repatriation actually happens.
Tulsi Gabbard recently commented on Bangladesh. Do you think this signals how Dhaka-Washington relations will evolve going forward?
I don't think so. The State Department itself has already clarified these issues as well.
Bangladesh has had good relationships with all previous administrations, and I wouldn't want to speculate on how things will unfold. I take my cue from what every official has said, which is that Bangladesh seeks to continue to have good relations with the United States.
You had several meetings with Bangladeshi officials. Where do you think Bangladesh's reform agenda is heading?
I think it's clear that there are a number of challenges ahead, but also significant opportunities. This is, I would say, an era-defining moment for Bangladesh to begin to try to crystalise agreement on the core issues it needs to address.
It can't settle everything before the elections, but it can at least begin to provide a framework that will shape the agenda of the newly elected government.
So, the first step is to get consensus around the July charter and use that as the basis to energise any new government and hold it to account on those issues.
Let's see how it unfolds, but this is an interesting moment and an opportunity that the country shouldn't lose – because last year, the cost was pretty high. It was a heavy price to pay for the country's stability.