Election in February: The deadlock is over, but is it smooth sailing from here onwards?
TBS reached out to experts for their take on the prospects of the election.
Chief Adviser Dr Yunus on Tuesday read out the July Declaration, announcing that the 2024 student-led mass uprising will receive constitutional and state recognition. He also declared that the next general election will be held in February 2026, ending a long-standing deadlock over the polls and easing uncertainty. The big question now is whether the interim government can stick to the timeline and ultimately deliver a free and fair election. While British journalist David Bergman shared his initial reactions on the 'July Declaration' in a Facebook post, TBS also reached out to other experts for their take on the prospects of the election.
Government needs to be stricter to bring law and order under control
Muhammad Nurul Huda
Former Inspector General of Police
It is absolutely essential to ensure that the election is conducted properly and impartially — that voters can arrive at polling centres on time, cast their vote for whoever they choose, and return home safely and peacefully. One of the biggest challenges in this regard will be maintaining law and order. The law enforcement agencies will need to be more proactive in ensuring these basic conditions.
Those who create unrest or take the law into their own hands must not be given any opportunity to do so. They must be brought under the law without delay, taken into custody, and brought to justice.
Moreover, pre-emptive measures must be taken to ensure that no one even dares to commit such acts. If these arrangements can be made in advance, the public will gain a sense of confidence that the election will indeed be held peacefully and that they will be able to participate actively.
If the interim government can ensure just these fundamental issues, that will be enough.
Some people are suggesting that instead of holding elections in all 300 constituencies on the same day, it could be done over three or four days to better maintain law and order. However, I don't believe that is necessary.
Bangladesh is fully capable of holding a nationwide election in a single day. This has been the practice for a hundred years across this subcontinent. India may be an exception because of its size, but in our country, if law and order is kept under control, we have the capacity to conduct the election in a single day.
As for mob violence… we will understand in the coming days whether that has truly been brought under control. When the data and statistics start coming in, we will have a clearer picture. But the core point is this: the government needs to take a firmer stance. The stricter the government is, the less likely people will be to take the law into their own hands.
TBS' Jannatul Naym Pieal spoke to Muhammad Nurul Huda over the phone.
Govt must clarify stance on NCP to ensure neutral playing field
Abu Alam Shahid Khan
Former Secretary, Local Government Division
The organisation of a festive, free, fair, and impartial election depends entirely on the government of the day. With genuine intent and full sincerity on the part of the government, it is possible to arrange a proper election. The elections of 1991, 1996, 2001, and 2008 stand as proof of that.
A clear message must reach the 1.2 million to 1.4 million public servants and others who will be involved in election duties, that they are not to work in favour of any party, group, or individual. They must act in accordance with the law, and for that, they must be given full protection. Only then will it be possible to hold free, fair, and impartial elections in this country. However, nothing can ever be achieved with one hundred per cent perfection.
Among the personnel involved in an election, the greatest responsibility lies with the field administration and the police administration. In the past — particularly during the 2018 and 2024 elections — members of the field and police administration failed to follow the Constitution and legal procedures while performing their electoral duties, and instead worked in favour of the ruling party. This was either for their personal gain, for group interests, or under pressure from the ruling party.
However, when there is no pressure, they are able to carry out their responsibilities impartially.
Since the interim government led by Dr Yunus is not a partisan one, it may be assumed that this government will not exert undue pressure on the field administration, police administration, judiciary, or others during the election period.
Nevertheless, many believe that the current government holds a bias in favour of the new political party known as the NCP. The kind of security and protocol being provided to them at the grassroots level, as well as the way they are being invited into dialogues and discussions, has given strong grounds to this belief.
To ensure neutrality in the field and police administrations, the government must clarify its position regarding the NCP.
TBS' Shaikh Abdullah spoke to Abu Alam Shahid Khan over the phone.
Roadmap for quick elections will reduce uncertainty
Shams Mahmud
President, Bangladesh Thai Chamber of Commerce and Industry
The interim government has announced plans to hold the 13th National Parliamentary Election in February 2026, before Ramadan.
This is good news. The private sector awaits a fair election and political stability. Now we expect that the interim government will announce a roadmap for quick elections. This will be good for the private sector, as it will reduce uncertainty.
Over the past year, we have seen a slowdown in investment and reinvestment. Now we can plan accordingly, as many decisions — especially those concerning infrastructure development and long-term planning — can only be made by an elected government.
Moreover, the new government may pursue a different direction or introduce new policies to boost investment in line with its vision. This also provides businesses with clear direction, ultimately encouraging investment.
We also need to get FTAs and PTAs off the ground, which only a political government can initiate as it provides certainty. Moreover, having an elected government soon is imperative, as with LDC graduation, we need to secure GSP+ with the EU before the grace period ends.
As citizens of Bangladesh, we want to see a free, fair and participatory election that gains international acceptance. We need to resolve our differences and move the nation forward, ensuring investment, job creation, and a stable law-and-order situation.
TBS' Ariful Hasan Shuvo spoke to Shams Mahmud over the phone.
Those responsible for controversial elections are still in office
Firoz Mia
Former Additional Secretary, Ministry of Public Administration
Conducting an election fundamentally requires the cooperation of the administration, namely the police and the civil administration. However, both of these pillars are currently in a severely weakened and unstable state.
In such circumstances, the extent to which the present government is truly capable of holding a fair and proper election remains highly questionable.
It does not appear that they have the capacity to deliver a genuinely good election. Perhaps a reasonably acceptable election could take place, but it will certainly not be one of historic excellence.
Another crucial matter is that of the Election Commission itself. Those who were responsible for conducting the previous controversial elections still remain in office. No cleansing initiative has taken place within the commission. The same individuals who were there before continue to hold their positions.
While they may not be able to manipulate the polls to the same extent this time, there is no guarantee that they will refrain from doing anything at all.
There are many who are simply waiting for the opportunity to make this election controversial.
If the current government does not act with vigilance and fails to prepare a proper and strategic operational plan, then holding a credible election will not be possible.
If, from this point onwards, the administration is reorganised and a reform campaign is undertaken within the Election Commission — removing those who played questionable roles in the past — then perhaps a moderately acceptable election can be expected. But under this administration, an election that stands out as the best in history is simply not possible.
The kind of elections that previous caretaker governments have delivered, this government lacks the capacity to conduct polls of that standard.
TBS' Anonno Afroz spoke to him over the phone.
Possibility of internal conflicts within political parties is concerning
Altaf Parvez
Researcher, South and Southeast Asian History
A major concern at this moment revolves around the country's increasingly fragile law and order situation. The political atmosphere remains highly volatile, and it is almost inevitable that political parties will engage in fierce confrontations with one another as the election approaches.
However, what is even more alarming is the possibility of internal conflicts erupting within the parties themselves. The factions that are perceived to have a stronger likelihood of coming to power may witness internal strife that could turn violent and bloody.
Given the performance of the current government over the past 12 months, serious doubts arise as to whether it possesses the institutional capacity, strategic readiness, or political stability required to effectively manage such unrest. The signs point towards a looming crisis of considerable scale — one that may be difficult to contain once it begins to unfold.
Moreover, this government is the result of an uprising. The question now is whether the government can successfully bring all those who were actively involved in that movement into the fold of the electoral process. Failure to ensure their inclusion may weaken the moral authority of the election.
I sincerely hope that everyone gets the opportunity to participate in the election.
But there remains a strong possibility that not everyone will take part. And if that happens, the overall appeal and legitimacy of the election will inevitably be diminished.
Furthermore, the government has yet to make its position clear regarding the Awami League. At one point, it stated that the party's activities and registration would remain suspended until the ongoing trials are concluded.
This raises questions about whether the party will be allowed to participate in the election or not — the matter remains somewhat ambiguous.
So the government should clarify its official position on this matter without delay, in the interest of transparency, fairness, and the overall integrity of the electoral process.
TBS' Anonno Afroz spoke to Altaf Parvez over the phone.
History, role of AL in July Declaration highly biased
David Bergman
British Journalist
These are my initial comments on the "July Declaration" read out [on 5 August 2025] by the leader of Bangladesh's interim government, Dr Muhammad Yunus.
Much of the history, as well as the description of the Awami League, set out in this declaration is highly biased and partial, and seems to just represent the views of those who hate the Awami League, not just for what the party has done whilst in government, but for what the party is to them, that is to say a political adversary. That is to say, much of it reads like a political tract written by long standing adversaries and critics of the Awami League.
As a whole, the politicised narrative contained in this declaration is arguably far more problematic than the politicised history that the Awami League deployed in relation to the 1971 war — which had been (ironically) so strongly criticised (by its critics) during Awami League times. This Declaration is replacing one highly partisan and politicised version of history by another even more politicised version. Who knew that was what 5 August was about!
The historical narrative contains the following omissions, errors and misrepresentations:
In the Declaration, Awami League's rule between 1972 to 1975 is simply represented by the one-party-state BAKSAL, omitting all the post-war nation building that the Awami League government also earlier undertook (para 4).
It rather bizarrely seeks to lay the blame for the Awami League's "failure to materialise the people's aspirations" post-1971, on the "weaknesses in the procedures of drafting and in the structure of the constitution". There are no doubt many reasons why the Awami League was not as successful as it should have been between 1972 to 1975, but I have never heard that the "drafting" and "structure" of the constitution is one of them. (I guess that this "constitutional" argument emerges from a niche political grouping now powerful in Bangladesh who want to find reasons to justify a new constitution.)
The Declaration omits the assassination by the military of Sheikh Mujib and 16 members of his family in August 1975 which brought in years of military rule (para 4).
In the Declaration, the post-Mujib period between November 1975 to 1982, when Ziaur Rahman (who became the leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party) was in power is glossed over and is represented as simply "an uprising in the army ranks joined by common people" which laid the way "for reintroducing multi-party" democracy" (para 4). This is a highly pro-BNP version of that period.
The Declaration suggests that "1/11" — when a military controlled government replaced the caretaker government in January 2007 — was the result of a "conspiratorial arrangement" (para 6). It in fact came about as the BNP government was trying to rig the elections, and the only way that it could be stopped was for the army to intervene, a decision that appeared very popular at the time.
The Declaration also implies that this "conspiratorial arrangement" of 1/11 brought the Awami League into power (paras 6,7). However, whilst there may have been some rigging of the 2009 elections, the election was generally seen as amongst the fairest elections in Bangladesh's history, and at the time Awami League was clearly the most popular party (the BNP having squandered its good reputation during its period in power between 2001-6.)
Apart from failing to note that the Awami League came into power through elections in 2008, the Charter gives the impression that throughout the 16 years of power the party was "fascist, undemocratic and anti-people" (para 7). This is simply untrue. The reality was that the Awami League government grew increasingly undemocratic and authoritarian as its period in power progressed.
The Declaration portrays the Awami League's period of government between 2009 and 2024 in a totally one dimensional manner, a representation more typically seen in an adversary's political party campaign literature than in any kind of legal document.
So these are the adjectives used by the Declaration to describe the Awami League's period of government: "anti-people", "autocratic", "against human rights" "mafia and failed state", "rampant corruption", "looting of banks" and "pursued policies adversely affecting the environment, ecology and climate." Some of these descriptions are of course true. But there is another side of the Awami League completely omitted in the Charter. It also achieved a huge amount in terms of economic growth, education of girls, infrastructural development, and indeed on climate change. There have always been two parallel narratives of the Awami League's time in government, though as time went on, of course, the negative began to outweigh the positive.
It also says (para 11). "Whereas all sections of the society including political parties, student and labour organisation, continuously became victims of imprisonment and torture, indictment and assault, murder by abduction and unlawful killings during almost last sixteen years because of their democratic opposition to Sheikh Hasina's fascist government." Whilst all these things described did happen, they did not happen in the exaggerated way they are described here.
The Declaration refers to an opinion given by the Supreme Court on 8 August 2024, under Article 106 of the constitution, which it claims legitimised the interim government (para 20). However nobody, as far as I am aware has seen the signed order, raising questions about whether it was ever signed by the judges.
Whilst it is right that those "students and people participating in the movement" in July/August 2024 should be given some kind of "legal protection" to stop them from being subject to politicised prosecutions in the future (para 24), the wording used seems also to seek to give immunity to those involved in the killing of Awami Leaguers and police officers during the protests (in whatever circumstances those killings took place.) This is problematic in terms of "rule of law" which, as seen below, the Charter itself argues is what the people of Bangladesh aspire to.
The Declaration says that the document will feature in the "schedule of reformed constitution as framed by the government formed through the next general election." (para 27). Surely, it would be a disgrace if such a historically partial and politicised document could ever be included in the constitution.
There are some positive aspects of the Declaration.
In particular, it places 1971 in its rightful position in the nation's history and states that the fight was for a "liberal democratic" state. (paras 1, 2); it describes the protests and uprising pretty accurately; it sets out the aspirations of the people of Bangladesh well.
It also says that they express their desire for "ensuring good governance and fair elections, rule of law, and economic and social justice and for introducing lawfully democratic reforms for all state and constitutional institutions" (para 22); and for a "democratic state system that upholds rule of law and human rights, and moral values and is free from corruption and exploitation" (para 25).
Furthermore, it accurately states that the numbers killed in July/August 2024 by state security forces etc were "nearly one thousand" (rather than the more inflated numbers that are commonly used.)
All in all, It is remarkable that Yunus, who came to lead the Interim government from a vantage point of not having been involved in partisan party politics, actually agreed to put his name to this Declaration. Who knows what the future lies for Yunus after the elections, but for many his involvement in this Charter will be the nail in the coffin of his once stellar reputation.
This Declaration should have been much shorter and concise. It should not have included, other than paras 1 and 2 on the 1971 war, any political history; skipped to a revised version of para 13 concerning the increasingly authoritarianism of the Awami League; and then included revised versions of paras 15 to para 27.
The reaction has been taken from Bergman's Facebook post.
