Trump’s UN wager and a global peace body losing its grip

Donald Trump's reported choice for the world's most difficult diplomatic post is not a diplomat, former head of government or international jurist. It is Gianni Infantino, the president of Fifa. The US president reportedly believes Infantino is "respected by everyone around the world" and possesses a "special ability to bring people together". 

Paolo Zampolli, Trump's special envoy and Infantino's friend, called it an inspired proposal. "Only President Trump could have such a genius idea." Infantino, he said, "would do a great job" and was "liked by everybody". 

His reasoning was corporate and numerical, "At the UN, you have to deal with 193 member states. In FIFA, there are more than 200 members [and] Gianni's great record shows he knows how to manage."

The position is Secretary-General, not UN president, and it is not Trump's to award. Under Article 97 of the UN Charter, the General Assembly appoints the Secretary-General only after a recommendation from the Security Council. 

Yet the suggestion is revealing. It places the selection of the world's chief international civil servant inside the orbit of one powerful state and one unusually personal political relationship.

Infantino cultivated Trump's favour from the United States' 2018 World Cup bid onwards, visited the White House, attended the 2020 Abraham Accords signing and joined Trump's Board of Peace meeting this year, pledging a stadium, a Fifa academy and football pitches for Gaza within a $7 billion relief package. 

He later gave Trump Fifa's first Peace Prize, after the president missed the Nobel, and presented him with a golden trophy and medal at the World Cup draw. Trump remained on stage during Spain's victory celebrations. 

FIFA also overturned the red-card suspension of US striker Folarin Balogun after Trump intervened, prompting criticism. Advocacy group FairSquare complained to Fifa's ethics committee that Infantino's support for Trump's "actions and policies" breached political-neutrality rules.

A report by The Telegraph said Trump wants Infantino to replace António Guterres when his second term ends in December. It also named Michelle Bachelet and Rafael Grossi among the contenders, although UN records show Chile withdrew Bachelet's nomination on 25 March. Whoever wins must survive the preferences, and potential vetoes, of the five permanent Security Council members.

That is where American influence becomes unavoidable. Washington can block a candidate, veto substantive Security Council action and shape the institution through money. The United States is assessed at a maximum of 22% of the UN regular budget and was responsible for 26.95% of assessed peacekeeping contributions under the published 2024-25 scale. 

Graphics: TBS

When it pays late, cuts voluntary assistance or withholds funds, the consequences travel from New York offices to food lines in Cox's Bazar. Trump has accused the UN of enabling "uncontrolled migration" and "sabotage", reduced funding and payments, and created a US-led Board of Peace that generated speculation about a rival structure.

This leverage reflects a wider recalibration. A SAIS Review analysis describes the US as moving from global policeman towards transactional global arbitrator. China is building parallel financial and technological systems, including CIPS, the digital yuan, 5G and satellite networks, while Europe, responsible for roughly 16% of world trade and 22% of global research and development spending, is rearming and debating whether its security must be built against Russia or eventually with it.

The incoming Secretary-General will inherit competing systems. Trygve Lie called the post "the most impossible job in the world". The Charter names its holder the "chief administrative officer", but Articles 98 and 99 created political space. 

Dag Hammarskjöld developed preventive diplomacy; U Thant supplied a 'face-saving' channel during the Cuban Missile Crisis; Javier Pérez de Cuéllar helped secure the 1988 Iran-Iraq ceasefire. Boutros Boutros-Ghali's "An Agenda for Peace" met US opposition, while Kofi Annan emphasised development and global norms.

Guterres entered office on 1 January 2017 promising a "surge in diplomacy for peace". His record instead maps the erosion of collective security. He inherited unresolved wars in Syria, Yemen, Libya, South Sudan, Somalia and the Central African Republic. 

Cameroon's Anglophone conflict intensified. Myanmar's military drove the Rohingya into Bangladesh in 2017; Mozambique's Cabo Delgado insurgency followed. South Sudan's 2018 revitalised agreement and the UN-backed Stockholm Agreement in Yemen reduced violence but did not settle either conflict.

The pattern continued. The UN documented possible crimes against humanity in Xinjiang but secured no independent accountability or policy reversal. The Tigray war's largest battles ended through an African Union-brokered agreement, with UN support. UN-led talks delivered Libya's 2020 ceasefire, but political transition stalled. 

Trump wants Infantino to replace António Guterres when his second term ends in December. Rafael Grossi is among the contenders, and UN records show Chile withdrew Michelle Bachelet's nomination on 25 March.

The UN condemned Myanmar's 2021 coup but could not restore civilian rule; the Taliban took Kabul after a process led chiefly by Washington and the Taliban.

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 exposed the Security Council's central absurdity: an aggressor with veto power. Russia blocked a resolution addressing its own offensive. Yemen's UN-brokered truce produced the longest relative calm of the war, but not peace. 

M23 returned to the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo; ceasefires failed. Mali demanded MINUSMA's withdrawal in 2023, showing that peacekeeping ends when host-state consent disappears. Sudan then descended into war, atrocities and famine risk; the United States later determined that the Rapid Support Forces and allied militias had committed genocide in Darfur.

In Gaza, Guterres condemned Hamas's attacks, demanded hostage releases, humanitarian access and a ceasefire, but repeated US vetoes delayed or blocked Security Council action. 

The International Court of Justice ordered provisional measures in South Africa's genocide case against Israel but has not ruled on the merits. Israel-Hezbollah fighting escalated despite UN peacekeepers and Resolution 1701. Syria's Assad government fell in December 2024, but no inclusive, accountable settlement followed.

Israel and Iran fought directly in June 2025. In 2026, the conflict widened into US-Iran warfare. Regional mediators, Pakistan, Qatar, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and others, drove ceasefire efforts while the UN again appealed from the margins. 

The June agreement subsequently broke down, with attacks resuming and Pakistan, Qatar, Egypt and other regional governments continuing the search for another ceasefire. Across more than 60 active armed conflicts, the Security Council does not act, and the General Assembly cannot enforce.

There were partial successes in Libya, Yemen and South Sudan, as well as UN support for African-led diplomacy in Ethiopia. The Secretary-General cannot impose sanctions, command armies or compel states to accept peace. But accumulated failure has damaged the office's credibility when moral urgency is not matched by sustained political pressure.

Bangladesh sees that gap with painful clarity. Guterres visited the Rohingya camps in 2018 and again in March 2025. On the second trip, during Ramadan, he called Cox's Bazar "ground zero" for aid cuts. "We are at risk of cutting the food rations in this camp," he warned. "That would be an unmitigated disaster that we cannot accept because people will suffer and even people will die."

He called the journey "a mission of solidarity" and said, "I am here to shine a global spotlight on the plight — but also the potential — of Rohingya refugees." The more than one million refugees, he said, "are proud. They are resilient. And they need the world's support." 

Bangladesh's contribution of land, forests, water and resources was "enormous". The 2017 military campaign had already been described by the then UN human-rights chief as a "textbook example of ethnic cleansing".

Outside the UN’s Geneva headquarters stands Daniel Berset’s Broken Chair, which reads as an unintended portrait of the institution behind it, still standing, still symbolically powerful, but visibly damaged. Photo: Collected

Guterres promised, "We cannot accept that the international community forgets about the Rohingyas." Peace, rights and an end to discrimination and persecution were essential, he said; the solution "must be found in Myanmar". "We will not give up until conditions allow for the voluntary, safe and sustainable return for all refugees here."

He also described camps exposed to scorching summers, fires, cyclones, monsoons, floods and landslides, and ended the visit with an iftar: "Fasting and having an Iftar together with you are proof of my deep respect for your religion and your culture." Cutting assistance during "the month of solidarity", he added, would be unacceptable.

Yet nearly nine years after the exodus, safe, voluntary and large-scale repatriation has not begun. Earlier warnings make this more than a failure of recent diplomacy. Researcher Liam Mahony recalled aid workers saying, "this was all screwed up… this was not going to help the Rohingya population". One worker in the detention camps said: "I just feel like I've spent six months as a jailer."

A UN review later found "systemic failure" and said "the overall responsibility was of a collective character". Activist Nay San Lwin replied, "The system failed because individuals didn't fulfil their obligations. This is blaming the system to avoid accountability." 

His coalition said Myanmar's intention to commit international crimes had reached the most senior UN levels, "yet no action was taken".

The institutional culture was described as "softly-softly". A UN statement defended its Myanmar coordinator as "a tireless advocate for human rights", while a staff member recalled: "Renata won't even let us in the room." Another said: "The UN does not encourage people to step out of line." 

Analyst David Mathieson compared officials to "members of a dysfunctional rich family who despise each other". Mahony argued that there had been "a very well-coordinated agreement to comply with the government's constraints". Diplomats also admitted: "we didn't want to embarrass Aung San Suu Kyi by talking about the Rohingya."

China and Russia's protection of Myanmar narrowed the possible response. One diplomat argued that accountability would be clearer if officials had converted "a strong position into a weak one", but "the UN's position in Myanmar was always weak". Richard Horsey said individual failures occurred within institutional problems that would repeat unless repaired. 

Even later threats to restrict camp assistance to "beyond life-saving assistance" without "tangible progress" inspired scepticism. "The UN isn't serious about changing its approach," Mathieson concluded.

Now weakness is becoming measurable in cash and staff. Guterres's revised 2026 budget fell from $3.715 billion to $3.238 billion, 15.1% below the 2025 appropriation. Funded posts dropped from a proposed 13,809 to 11,594, an 18.8% cut. 

Arrears reached $760 million; returning roughly $300 million in credits removed nearly 10% of available cash. The UN entered 2025 with a $135 million deficit and had collected only 66.2% of assessments by September, down from 78.1% a year earlier; only 136 of 193 states had paid in full.

"Any delays in collections early in the year will force us to reduce spending even more," Guterres warned, potentially requiring hundreds of millions of dollars to be returned in 2027. "That means a race to bankruptcy."

Consolidated payroll, cheaper duty stations and common administrative platforms may improve efficiency; 37 special political missions, the $53 million Resident Coordinator system and the $50 million Peacebuilding Fund remain protected. 

But, as Guterres said after members deferred a liquidity remedy, failure to agree "could jeopardise critical elements of our programme of work".

Outside the UN's Geneva headquarters stands Daniel Berset's Broken Chair: 5.5 tonnes of wood, 12 metres high, balanced on three legs since 1997 as a warning about landmines. It now reads as an unintended portrait of the institution behind it, still standing, still symbolically powerful, but visibly damaged.

Guterres did not create the veto, America's transactional turn, China-Russia obstruction or member-state arrears. But an office built to convene, mediate and provide a common vocabulary must ultimately be judged by whether adversaries still enter the room.

The next Secretary-General may need to be the SAIS Review's 'Galactic Chancellor': unable to govern competing systems, but capable of preventing them from fracturing the republic. Without that recovery, the "impossible job" risks becoming an irrelevant one.