Regime change in Iran: Will history repeat itself as a farce this time?
As Israel targets Iran’s leadership and nuclear sites, aiming for a regime change, history tells a different tale — more often than not, changing regimes in the Middle East often end in disaster
Karl Marx, citing Hegel's 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte', once remarked that all facts and personages of great importance in world history occur, as it were, twice. But he added that the first time it occurs as tragedy, the second time as farce. This age-old mantra may turn painfully true for Iran.
In 1953, the CIA orchestrated a coup against Iran's democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh to replace him with Reza Shah Pahlavi. It was the deep resentment caused by this Western interference that fuelled the 1979 Islamic Revolution and established the Islamic Republic.
The revolution was undeniably driven by the fury over decades of American interference that allowed the repressive rule of Reza Shah to persist. And in 2025, it seems that the ghost of regime change has once again returned to Iran, threatening the very rule founded on the ashes of the previous Western-backed regime change. If 1953 was a tragedy, 2025 risks becoming a farce — a reckless replay with even graver consequences.
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From 13 June, Israel's military operation has inflicted significant damage on Iran's military and nuclear infrastructure. Over 100 targets, including the Natanz enrichment facility, air defence systems, and missile launchers, were struck, coupled with the assassinations of senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders, the armed forces' chief of staff, and nuclear scientists, thus crippling the country's military top brass.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's rhetoric, along with the operation's name — Rising Lion — purposefully evokes Iran's pre-revolutionary flag and suggests regime change is an implicit goal.
Throughout history, it is not hard to find examples of external regime change that rarely delivers stable, pro-Western governments. Instead, it often entrenches anti-Western sentiment and empowers extremists. External actors, after all, cannot impose internal legitimacy.
President Trump's evolving position reflects pressure from Israel and domestic hawks. Initially, Trump pursued diplomacy, appointing Steve Witkoff as Middle East envoy to negotiate a nuclear deal through Omani mediation.
Though it seemed that Iran was ready for a deal, it was abruptly halted after the Israeli attack. It is also voiced by Bernie Sanders, who wrote, "Netanyahu started this war by attacking Iran. He assassinated Ali Shamkhani, Iran's lead nuclear negotiator, deliberately sabotaging US-Iran nuclear negotiations."
Despite public calls for a "friendly path", Trump authorised limited US support, including intelligence sharing and air defence systems. By 18 June, Trump's rhetoric hardened, demanding Iran's "unconditional surrender" and hinting at targeting Khamenei, though he reportedly vetoed an Israeli plan to assassinate him.
Domestic divisions complicate Trump's stance. Isolationists like Congressman Thomas Massie and Tucker Carlson oppose intervention, while hawks like Senator Lindsey Graham urge US participation, citing Iran's nuclear threat. Vice-President JD Vance, wary of a "regime change war", seeks to limit US involvement to intelligence support, reflecting the tension within Trump's coalition.
Opposition to regime change is not without merit. Let us see the most recent examples of western-backed regime changes in the Middle East — Iraq and Libya.
The US-led invasions of Iraq (2003) and NATO's intervention in Libya (2011) both created massive chaos in the region, ending in utter instability, perpetual conflict and significant loss of human life.
In Iraq, the toppling of Saddam Hussein dismantled the Ba'athist state, leading to sectarian insurgency, the rise of ISIS, and over 200,000 deaths.
Libya's outcome was similarly dire. The removal of Muammar Gaddafi, supported by Western airpower, this time led by the UK and France, plunged the country into civil war, with rival factions and militias vying for control. The power vacuum that devastated Libya fostered terrorism and human trafficking, marking the end of all stability in the region.
Both cases demonstrate that removing autocratic regimes without a viable governance plan can unleash protracted violence and regional disorder.
Iran, with a population of 89 million, dwarfs Iraq and Libya (combined population 51 million). Any attempted regime change could resemble Iraq post-1991 or Syria post-2011, with a weakened central government losing territorial control but the regime persisting through repression (remember the post-Gulf War Iraq).
The complexity of Iran's multi-ethnic society and the regime's entrenched economic and military power suggest that collapse could lead to prolonged instability rather than a swift transition to democracy.
Internally, Iran's opposition is fragmented. Reza Pahlavi's monarchist faction and the Mujahideen-e Khalq lack cohesion and domestic legitimacy, the latter tainted by its collaboration with Saddam Hussein. There are also enough hardliners in the theocratic structure to fill up the vacuum.
At this point, a collapse could mirror Syria's post-Assad turmoil, which, while less chaotic than feared, was preceded by a 13-year war that killed over 500,000 and displaced millions.
Regionally, instability in Iran could disrupt global oil markets, particularly if Iran blockades the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20% of the world's oil flows. A prolonged conflict could spike crude prices above $150 per barrel (very bad news for Bangladesh along with the rest of Eurasia).
Iran's proxies, though weakened, could escalate attacks, with the Houthis targeting Red Sea shipping, disrupting trade through the Suez Canal.
Globally, a US-led intervention risks alienating allies wary of another Middle East quagmire, even though so far, the US seems uninterested. Britain's Keir Starmer has downplayed US involvement. The French president Emmanuel Macron has warned that the biggest mistake today would be to try to enact a regime change in Iran through military means because that would lead to chaos.
Throughout history, it is not hard to find examples of external regime change that rarely delivers stable, pro-Western governments. Instead, it often entrenches anti-Western sentiment and empowers extremists. External actors cannot impose internal legitimacy.
Diplomacy remains the least costly path. Despite Iran's rejection of the June proposal, Witkoff's negotiations showed promise, with Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia mediating. And there could have been a deal had there not been an Israeli strike.
