How Pakistan lost the Taliban: Inside the collapse of a dangerous alliance
The Pakistan–Afghanistan relationship has reached its most volatile point in years. With the Taliban asserting independence and Islamabad losing leverage, the uneasy neighbours are now locked in a dangerous cycle of violence
The Taliban returned to power in Kabul in 2021, and many in Islamabad believed they had secured a friendly neighbour, one that would restrain anti-Pakistan militants and, at best, help stabilise a volatile frontier.
Four years later, that assumption has collapsed into a full-blown crisis. Cross-border shelling, closed crossings, diplomatic expulsions, and the breakdown of peace talks now reveal how quickly a transactional relationship can turn combustible.
The Pakistan–Afghanistan relationship has long been defined by porous borders, overlapping ethnic ties, and strategic competition. For decades, parts of Pakistan's security establishment cultivated links with Afghan Islamist movements seeking influence in Kabul.
But that tension between Islamabad's historical influence and the Taliban's ideological independence is now fully exposed.
Imtiaz Gul, a Pakistan-based security analyst, told The Guardian, the present confrontation is "a logical conclusion of the tensions that had been brewing up between the two countries, particularly after the continuous refusal of the Afghan regime to take demonstrable action against the TTP."
TTP and cross-border violence
Pakistan's accusation that Afghanistan is harbouring the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the group behind a recent wave of deadly attacks inside Pakistan, is considered the main point of contention.
Islamabad claims these cross-border sanctuaries have fuelled hundreds of terrorist incidents and thousands of casualties. Kabul denies formal responsibility, insisting on a policy of "non-interference".
In October 2025, the situation erupted into high-intensity clashes: Pakistan launched strikes it said targeted TTP leaders inside Afghan territory, while the Taliban retaliated with attacks on Pakistani border posts. The result was a dangerous spiral, border crossings shut, civilians stranded, and both sides trading casualty claims.
Talks in Istanbul the following month collapsed after Pakistan demanded that Kabul "take responsibility" for the TTP's attacks.
Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid told Reuters the negotiations failed because Islamabad had insisted Afghanistan assume responsibility for Pakistan's domestic security.
Why is the Taliban protecting the TTP?
Three intertwined factors explain Kabul's refusal to meet Islamabad's demands.
First, there is ideological and organisational affinity. The Afghan Taliban and the TTP share a common Islamist worldview and overlapping networks. Although Kabul publicly disavows cross-border attacks, informal sympathies and historical ties make a full crackdown improbable.
The TTP's fortunes improved markedly after the Taliban's 2021 takeover, with some fighters finding sanctuary across the border.
According to the Stimson Center, external incentives linking aid or trade to demonstrable Taliban action against militant groups may also shift Kabul's cost–benefit calculus. Such measures, analysts suggest, would not resolve the deeper mistrust but could create breathing space for diplomacy to take root.
Second, the issue of sovereignty and legitimacy is at large. Still lacking international recognition, the Taliban are acutely sensitive to perceptions of weakness.
Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani told Reuters, "Just as we respect the sovereignty and dignity of others, we expect the same goodwill and respect toward us."
Finally, the Taliban face limited capacity and competing priorities. With Afghanistan flooded with economic hardship, humanitarian crises, and internal dissent, containing autonomous militant groups in the borderlands demands resources and political capital they may not have.
Islamabad's loss of leverage
Pakistan's leverage over the Taliban has declined. Once reliant on Islamabad for sanctuary and logistics, the Taliban now govern with greater independence and alternative patrons, including China, Iran and Gulf states.
The Washington Post noted that Pakistan confronts a new reality that it may have lost the Taliban as a reliable strategic asset.
Pakistan's leadership faces mounting pressure from security agencies and public opinion. High-profile attacks and soldiers' funerals have created political momentum for decisive action.
Imtiaz Gul told The Guardian, "Pakistan's patience with Kabul had been wearing thin."
The crisis is no longer a purely bilateral affair. China and Iran prefer a stable Afghanistan that neither exports insurgency nor triggers refugee flows, quietly urging restraint while building economic ties with Kabul.
Turkey and the Gulf states have emerged as potential mediators; President Erdoğan expressed hope for "lasting stability" during the Istanbul talks, where Ankara positioned itself as an honest broker.
Meanwhile, India watches with unease. Islamabad has accused "Indian proxies" of involvement in recent attacks, a charge New Delhi denies. Al Jazeera reports that such claims risk widening regional rifts at an already volatile moment.
What could help
Third-party monitoring of border incidents, limited intelligence-sharing, and the gradual reopening of key crossings under neutral supervision could help rebuild confidence while sparing civilians further hardship.
According to the Stimson Center, external incentives linking aid or trade to demonstrable Taliban action against militant groups may also shift Kabul's cost–benefit calculus. Such measures, analysts suggest, would not resolve the deeper mistrust but could create breathing space for diplomacy to take root.
Ultimately, the Pakistan–Afghanistan relationship has entered a new phase, one where the old equation of patronage and control no longer applies. Islamabad must secure its borders without a dependable partner in Kabul; the Taliban must juggle ideological loyalties with the demands of governance and survival.
