The China-Russia friendship is too big to fail

Almost exactly a year ago, President Vladimir Putin and his counterpart Xi Jinping declared in Beijing that there were "no limits" to their friendship. Just under three weeks later, Russian troops invaded Ukraine, leaving China to grapple with the contradiction between the newly reinforced bond and a clear violation of its cardinal principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference.

What happened next was worse. Putin's ill-conceived blitzkrieg turned rapidly into a quagmire, exposing his corrupt, brutal and poorly prepared armed forces. The attack triggered an unprecedented avalanche of sanctions against Russia, suddenly staring at a future of economic stagnation, and a global energy crisis. It turned fears of a more unified West into reality.

Yet, for all that failure, Xi hasn't dropped Putin. And he won't.

It's not because of any ideological or autocratic pact. There is no such thing. This is about pragmatism, self-interest and a larger concern for Beijing — the US. In any future confrontation, having a severely enfeebled, reprobate power onside is better than having none at all.

Certainly, the war has exposed weaknesses in the relationship. It's shown, for example, the limits of the two sides' ability to influence each other. Russia has not been able to extract significant military support or even large-scale investment from China, nor has Xi convinced Putin to back away from a war that destabilized the global economy at a difficult time for Beijing domestically, assuming he even tried. He hasn't cooled the Kremlin's nuclear threats either, despite "questions and concerns." It may be true that only China has Russia's ear, but who is listening?

The war has also laid bare an acute economic gap. On the whole, trade has risen, hitting a record in 2022, thanks in part to higher oil and gas prices, but the asymmetry has only grown. Russia is increasingly dependent on China as a source of technology and industrial parts, consumers rely on Chinese goods — in 2022, one in seven cars sold in Russia was Chinese, more than double the share a year earlier — and it desperately needs a market for its own exports. The reverse is not true. 

While China has certainly snapped up cheap hydrocarbons, it remains laser-focused on energy security and supply diversity — hence the landmark $60 billion liquefied natural gas deal signed with Qatar, efforts to tighten links with gas-exporting Turkmenistan and the apparent lack of official enthusiasm for the long-contemplated Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline Russia eagerly promotes. That project may well happen in time, but on China's terms. Nor have private companies flocked to Russia, unattractive even before the war and now with added sanctions risk.

In 2022, China accounted for roughly a fifth of Russia's exports, but Russia's imports and exports made up 3% of China's total trade. 

Opportunity Knocks
Imports from Russia jumped in 2022 thanks to raw materials purchases, but the rise in exports has been more modest

Official rhetoric can't hide the power imbalance, either. In the traditional year-end call, the Kremlin statement emphasized Putin's jovial tone, a Xi state trip to Moscow, defense and military technology cooperation — and made no direct mention of Ukraine. Beijing's corseted version ignored the visit, included no word on military collaboration, but did mention Ukraine, its "objective and impartial" position and peace talks.

And yet, neither side has stepped away.

Yes, to some extent the bond is personal. Both leaders both fret about regime survival, reject US hegemony and believe in inevitable Western decline. Beijing, too, distrusts NATO. Ties have been growing stronger for years, well before Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014.

But the reality is simpler. Russia has few choices, with an economy hollowed out by sanctions, held up by the need to serve the war machine, and using convicts to fill a manpower deficit. The decreased clout will allow the relationship to run more smoothly, because Moscow will be forced to yield in any disagreements, argues Alexander Korolev of the University of New South Wales, who studies Russian and Chinese foreign policy and has published a book on the strategic alignment. That could impact any number of issues, from China's infrastructure plans to Southeast Asia, where Russia retains ambitions and arms supply ties, or demands from Beijing for support over the South China Sea. 

The relationship also does not exist in a vacuum: The rapprochement has happened in the context of increasingly aggressive US efforts to contain China, leaving Xi and Putin united in anti-US grievance. China has no incentive to spare Western efforts in Ukraine, ending a helpful distraction for Washington. Nor does it want to risk straining a relationship with Russia, where the strategic ambiguity around the extent of their ties is a powerful deterrent.

There's a catch. The partnership will hold, whatever the war brings, with China continuing its juggling act — Xi may eventually even actually visit Moscow, as the Kremlin hopes — but it's unclear whether ties can easily become much closer without creating strain.

For one, Beijing is turning on the charm internationally after three years of aggressive Covid Zero that left it isolated and hurt investment. It's quietened the most belligerent of its wolf warriors and sent outgoing Vice Premier Liu He to woo Davos last month, where he assured rainmakers and industrial titans that the door would "only open up further." That, and efforts to steady relations with the US, hardly seems compatible with ever closer union with Moscow. China still wants to take up what it sees as its rightful place in the world order — not to blow it up.

Despite recent US questions about support for the Russian war effort, there is no also concrete sign of substantially closer military cooperation. There have certainly been substantial joint exercises, but how joint they truly are remains unclear. China is less dependent on Russian military technology, and even civilian research collaborations continue to run into trouble, as with the venture to build a passenger jet, and space.

Then there's the question of whether Russia's pivot will eventually create domestic pressure on Putin not to turn into Beijing's junior partner any more than he has to. Distrust runs deep.

There are still wild cards, of course. The use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, say, a leadership change or a dramatic defeat for Putin could all force a shift. But then, as Korolev pointed out to me, large powers have historically suffered debacles in disastrous military adventures without necessarily changing their international alignments.

And, should that come to pass, China knows all too well that a friend in need is a friend indeed.

Clara Ferreira Marques is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist and editorial board member covering foreign affairs and climate. Previously, she worked for Reuters in Hong Kong, Singapore, India, the U.K., Italy and Russia. @ClaraDFMarques