Al Jazeera analysis: Is Hamas a more sophisticated force than Israel imagined?

Qatar-based news network Al Jazeera described The strategies employed by Hamas in their assault on Israel last Saturday (7 October) represent some of their most intricate to date, indicating a degree of planning and readiness not previously observed.

The international media outlet carried a feature article titled "Is Hamas a more sophisticated force than Israel imagined?" by Philip Ingram to factually weigh in pro-Palestinian group Hamas in its capacity.

The article is shared below with slight changes in its presentation.

The group executed multi-domain operations, incorporating air, sea, and land elements in a coordinated effort. Initial drone strikes targeted Israeli observation posts, setting the stage for a subsequent overwhelming rocket assault that challenged the Israeli Iron Dome defenses—a series of operations known in military terms as shaping activities, aimed at preparing for the subsequent phase of physically entering Israel.

What followed was an unprecedented physical infiltration, with simultaneous attacks on Israeli civilians and military targets from various directions. Throughout these actions, fear tactics against civilians played a significant role, evidenced by the recording and broadcasting of attacks in Israeli border communities, during a music concert, and through the capture of Israeli soldiers and civilians, subsequently taken into the Gaza Strip.

Hamas further targeted Israeli military objectives, resulting in casualties, capturing individuals, and seizing Israeli military equipment. The multifaceted nature of these operations underscores the evolving complexity of the conflict.

Emerging threat

Hamas seems to have gleaned insights from diverse influences, drawing inspiration from Hezbollah's military infrastructure and guerrilla warfare strategies, coupled with support in the form of training, funding, and weapons from Iran.

Learning from previous engagements with Israeli forces, the group has analyzed tactics employed by fighters in Jenin in 2002, introducing innovations such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), tunnel networks, psychological warfare, and asymmetric warfare into their approach.

Capitalising on Iranian expertise, Hamas has enhanced its capabilities in manufacturing homemade rockets, refining both their accuracy and range.

Past encounters with Israeli forces, particularly during the 2014 war on Gaza, have taught Hamas the value of urban warfare and the use of civilian infrastructure as shields.

They have incorporated these tactics into their current attack too, using densely populated areas as launching sites for rockets and hiding weapons and command and control centres in civilian structures.

This dynamic creates a situation where, during Israeli bombardments, both sides can accuse each other of violating international law. The Law of Armed Conflict strictly prohibits the targeting of an enemy's civilians and mandates the distinction of combatant forces from civilians, with operations forbidden in or near civilian structures, including protected sites like schools, medical facilities, and places of worship.

Jenin lessons

Hamas appears to have also drawn specific insights from the tactics employed byby fighters in Jenin during the infamous Battle of Jenin in 2002. In April of that year, an Israeli assault on the Jenin refugee camp resulted in a Human Rights Watch (HRW) documented death toll of at least 52 Palestinians, including women and children, along with 23 Israeli soldiers killed and several others injured.

The battle, recognised by HRW as a symbol of Palestinian resistance, showcased a combination of rebel tactics, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and urban warfare strategies employed by Palestinian fighters against the Israeli military.

One key takeaway for Hamas from the Battle of Jenin seems to be the effectiveness of IEDs in causing casualties and disrupting Israeli military operations. IEDs, being low-cost and easily concealable, have become a valuable tool for asymmetrical warfare, with Hamas incorporating them into its arsenal for targeting Israeli military vehicles, patrols, and installations. If Israel were to launch a ground offensive into Gaza, these tactics are likely to be employed again.

One of the biggest learnings Hamas gained from the Jenin fighters was the importance of strategic mobility and surprise. During the Battle of Jenin, the Jenin fighters utilised a network of tunnels to move fighters and supplies, evade Israeli forces, and launch surprise attacks. Hamas has since invested heavily in tunnel infrastructure, constructing an extensive network of underground passages that enable them to bypass Israeli checkpoints and mount attacks from unexpected locations. This current attack has taken surprise to a new level.

Hidden planning

The utilisation of tunnels and underground facilities likely played a significant role in concealing the preparation from Israeli intelligence, showcasing a level of sophistication previously unseen.

The intricacy of this concealment suggests meticulous planning over several months.

Hamas is presumed to have carefully studied Israeli intelligence-gathering methods, identifying and diverting attention from potential Israeli sources to create what intelligence agencies term as "background noise." This background noise includes internal political tensions within Israel, adding another layer to the concealment effort.

An uneven contest

In contrast to the sophisticated heavy weaponry and airpower possessed by the Israelis, Hamas relies on homemade improvised explosive devices (IEDs), rockets, and light weapons, complemented by a limited number of more sophisticated yet lightweight arms smuggled in.

This imbalance prompts the group to engage in asymmetric warfare—employing hit-and-run tactics, ambushes, and sniper fire to minimize their own casualties while maximizing the impact of their operations by avoiding direct confrontations.

What is not clear is the end state Hamas expects from this latest attack. Unless it can stimulate wider Middle East involvement against Israel, then all it has done is set diplomacy back years and cause the deaths of many innocent civilians in Israel and in Gaza. Whether Israeli or Palestinian, it is always the innocent people who suffer most.

So, will their operational surprise turn into their strategic loss? Only time and more lives will tell.

Disclaimer: The original version of the Al Jazeera feature, penned by Philip Ingram, has been slightly rewritten here