History, description of AL in July Declaration highly biased: David Bergman 

These are my initial comments on the "July Declaration" read out today by the leader of Bangladesh's interim government, Muhammad Yunus. 

1. Much of the history - as well as description of the Awami League - set out in this declaration is highly biased and partial, and seems to just represent the views of those who hate the Awami League, not just for what the party has done whilst in government, but for what the party is to them, that is to say a political adversary. That is to say, much of it reads like a political tract written by long standing adversaries and critics of the Awami League.

2. As a whole, the politicised narrative contained in this declaration is arguably far more problematic than the politicised history that the Awami League deployed in relation to the 1971 war - which had been (ironically) so strongly criticised (by its critics) during Awami League times. This Declaration is replacing one highly partisan and politicised version of history by another even more politicised version. Who knew that was what August 5 was about!

3. The historical narrative contains the following omissions, errors and misrepresentations

- in the Declaration, Awami League's rule between 1972 to 1975 is simply represented in the by the one-party-state BAKSAL, omitting all the post-war nation building that the Awami League government also earlier undertook (para 4);

- it rather bizarrely seeks to lay the blame for the Awami Leagues "failure to materialise the people's aspirations" post-1971, on the "weaknesses in the procedures of drafting and in the structure of the constitution." There are no doubt many reasons why the Awami League was not as successful as it should have been between 1972 to 1975, but I have never heard the that the "drafting" and "structure" of the constitution  is one of them. (I guess that this "constitutional" argument emerges from a niche political grouping now powerful in Bangladesh who want to find reasons to justify a new constitution.)

- the Declaration omits to mention the assassination by the military of the prime minister Sheikh Mujib and 16 members of his family in August 1975 which brought in years of military rule (para 4);

- in the Declaration, the post-Mujib period between November 1975 to 1982, when Ziaur Rahman (who became the leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party) was in power is glossed over and is represented as simply "an uprising in the army ranks joined by common people" which laid the way "for reintroducing multi-party" democracy" (para 4). This is a highly pro-BNP version of that period.

-  the Declaration suggests that "1/11" - when a military controlled government replaced the caretaker government in January 2007 - was the result of a "conspiratorial arrangement" (para 6). It in fact came about as the BNP government was trying to rig the elections, and the only way that it could be stopped was for the army to intervene, a decision that appeared very popular at the time. 

- the Declaration also implies that this "conspiratorial arrangement" of 1/11 brought the Awami League into power (paras 6,7). However, whilst there may have been some rigging of the 2009 elections, the election was is generally seen as amongst the fairest elections in Bangladesh's history, and at the time Awami League was clearly the most popular party (the BNP having squandered its good reputation during its period in power between 2001-6.)

- apart from failing to note that the Awami League came into power through elections in 2008, the declaration gives the impression that throughout the 16 years of power the party was "fascist, undemocratic and anti-people" (para 7). This is simply untrue. The reality was that the Awami League government grew increasingly undemocratic and authoritarian as its period in power progressed.

4. The Declaration portrays the Awami League's period of  government between 2009 and 2024 in a totally one dimensional manner, a representation more typically seen in an adversary's political party campaign literature than in any kind of legal document. 

So these are the adjectives used by the Declaration to describe the Awami League's period of government: "anti-people", "autocratic", "against human rights" "mafia and failed state", "rampant corruption", "looting of banks" and "pursued polices adversely affecting the environment, ecology and climate." Some of these descriptions are of course true. But there is another side of the Awami League completely omitted in the declaration. It also achieved a huge amount in terms of economic growth, education of girls, infrastructural development, and indeed on climate change. There have always been two parallel narratives of the Awami League's time in government, though as time went on, of course, the negative began to outweigh the positive. 

It also says (para 11). "Whereas all sections of the society including political parties, student and labour  organisation, continuously became victims of imprisonment and torture, indictment and assault, murder by abduction and unlawful killings during almost last sixteen years because of their democratic opposition to Sheikh Hasina's fascist government."  Whilst all these things described did happen, they did not happen in the exaggerated way they are described here.

5. The Declaration refers to an opinion given by the Supreme Court on 8 August 2024, under Article 106 of the constitution, which it claims legitimised the interim government (para 20). However nobody, as far as I am aware has seen the signed order, raising questions about whether it was ever signed by the judges. 

6. Whilst it is right that those "students and people participating in the movement" in July/August 2024 should be given some kind of "legal protection" to stop them from being subject to politicised prosecutions in the future (para 24), the wording used seems also to seek to give immunity to those involved in the killing of Awami Leaguers and police officers during the protests (in whatever circumstances  those killings took place.)  This is problematic in terms of "rule of law" which, as seen below, the declarationitself argues is what the people of Bangladesh aspires.

7. The Declaration says that the document will feature in the "schedule of reformed constitution as framed by the government formed through the next general election." (para 27). Surely, it would be a disgrace if such a historically partial and politicised document could ever be included in the constitution. 

8. There are though some positive aspects of the Declaration. In particular: 

- it places 1971 in its rightful position in the nation's history and states that the fight was for a "Liberal democratic" state. (paras 1, 2);

- it describes the protests and uprising pretty accurately;

- it sets out the aspirations of the people of Bangladesh well. It says that they express heir desire for "ensuring good governance and fair elections, rule of law, and economic and social justice and for introducing lawfully democratic reforms for all state and constitutional institutions" (para 22); and for a "democratic state system that upholds rule of law and human rights,  and moral values and is free form corruption and exploitation" (para 25).

- it accurately states that the numbers killed in July/August 2024 by state security forces etc were "nearly one thousand" (rather than the more inflated numbers that are commonly used.)

9. All in all, It is remarkable that Yunus, who came to lead the Interim government from a vantage point of not having been involved in partisan party politics, actually agreed to put his name to this Declaration. Who knows what the future lies for Yunus after the elections, but for many his involvement in this declaration will be he nail in the coffin of his once stellar reputation.

10.  This Declaration should have been much shorter and concise. It should not have included, other than paras 1 and 2 on the 1971 war, any political history; skipped to a revised version of para 13 concerning the increasingly authoritarianism of the Awami League; and then included revised versions of paras 15 to para 27.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and views of The Business Standard.

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